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Executive Summary 
The FRC commissioned a literature review of academic articles and research papers to 
determine the extent to which analyses have been undertaken which support the objectives 
of the Future of Corporate Reporting (FoCR) project. 
 
For the purpose of this review we agreed to define corporate reporting as financial and non- 
financial information included in annual reports, quarterly reports, restatements, earnings 
announcements and other ad-hoc and stand-alone reports (such as sustainability, CSR, 
integrated reports). We use the term financial reporting to indicate disclosure of financial 
information such as that contained in the financial statements, including the notes, but also 
the narrative discussion of corporate performance (i.e. narratives or other quantitative 
indicators that complement financial data, for example narrative information in the strategic 
report or management discussion and analysis). Non-financial reporting includes corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), social, environmental or sustainability reports (which are 
interchangeable terms), as well as other types of narrative information included in specific 
sections of the annual reports (such as for example, risk disclosure, or disclosures about 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues) or in other corporate documents 
(integrated reports, intellectual capital statements, etc.). 
 
A list of questions to be addressed was discussed between the academics and the FRC and 
the preliminary mapping between the structure of the report and the list of questions was 
agreed as shown in the following table. A detailed mapping out of how this report addresses 
all these questions is included in the concluding section. 
 
Chapters covering broad questions Questions from FoCR brief 
A. How is the quality of corporate reporting defined 
(according to the academic literature)? 
• What are the characteristics of good corporate reporting? 
• What types of information are included as part of 
corporate reporting? 
• What is the role of non-financial/ESG/sustainability 
reporting? 
• How is non-financial/ sustainability reporting defined in 
academic literature? How is it used? 
• How does the annual report fit into the wider corporate 
reporting framework? 
B. What is the role of regulation in corporate reporting? 
How does regulation affect (financial or non-financial) 
information reported? 
• What is the role of regulation in corporate reporting? 
• What is the role of corporate reporting in building 
corporate accountability? 
• How have different periodic reports evolved (preliminary 
announcements, interim reports, annual reports, 
sustainability reports)? 
C. What are the information needs of shareholders and • What are the information needs of investors and how is 
how is the corporate reporting information used by this information used? 
investors? • Is there a link between corporate reporting and 
movements in share price? 
D. What are the information needs of stakeholders 
(other than shareholders) and how is the corporate 
reporting information used by them? 
• What are the information needs of users that are not 
capital providers and how is this information used? 
C + D together • What is the purpose of the annual report? 
• Who is the audience of the annual report? 
• How is narrative information in the annual report used – 
strategic report/ corporate governance statement/ 
remuneration report? 
• What is the role of the financial statements? 
E. How does corporate reporting affect managers’ (or 
firms’) behaviour? 
• How does corporate reporting affect behaviour? 
Conclusion • What is the purpose of corporate reporting? 
• How is this defined in academic literature? 
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An initial scoping exercise of academic journals, published in English, after 1992, revealed 
over 18,000 relevant articles within the disciplines of accounting, finance and management, 
as of May 2019. (See the Appendix for the agreed list of key search terms and details of how 
this large number of articles was reduced to the final selection of 538 papers.) 
 
A. How is the quality of corporate reporting defined? 
 
Section A considers how the academic literature defines the quality of corporate reporting – a 
challenge which first requires consideration of what the purpose of corporate reporting is, for 
standard setters, regulators and academics. The academic literature identifies three main 
functions of reporting: 
 
• valuation (decision usefulness criteria for capital providers); 
 
• stewardship (full and transparent information allows monitoring of that capital); 
 
• accountability (an account of the actions for which an organization is held 
responsible in the eyes of all of its stakeholders). 
 
While the valuation and stewardship perspectives are rooted in positive accounting theory 
(e.g. an approach used by academics to explain and predict what happens in the real word 
looking for regularities and causal relationships between elements, which assumes the 
observation of one objective reality), the accountability perspective is often associated with 
interpretivist research (which assumes the world can be understood by gaining a deep 
understanding of a phenomenon and its complexity within a unique context) and/or a 
normative approach (which seeks to express what ought to be, rather what is, therefore 
adopting a value-based view of the world, rather than a value-free view like positive theory). 
 
Valuation and stewardship have long been the main roles attributed to financial information 
although recently they have also been considered in relation to non-financial information. The 
accountability view, in contrast, has traditionally taken a broader view of corporate reporting, 
addressing the needs of a variety of stakeholders with the inherent complexities and trade- 
offs that different information needs have in terms of what and how to report. 
 
Figure 1 below captures the prevailing views in the academic literature about the role of 





The quality of corporate reporting information can be defined in terms of how useful information 
is for investors and lenders when making investment decisions. However, considerations of 
quality also entail a transparency connotation in the sense that corporate reporting should 
faithfully represent the firm’s underlying performance. This is in order to allow 
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the monitoring of management decisions as well as to provide an account of the actions for 
which an organization is held responsible. 
 
In practice, if the quality of information depends on how well the reporting process is able to 
measure and capture the underlying performance, management discretion can influence the 
quality of information both positively and negatively. In other words, quality is related to the 
set of reporting incentives of the firm’s management. It is also possible that market pressure 
to deliver short-term reported performance impairs the overall quality of financial reporting by 
undermining the long-term viability of the firm’s performance (i.e. “real earnings management”) 
as documented in earlier reviews. 
 
In terms of financial statement information, broadly speaking, there are different attributes that 
define quality. Earnings attributes are desirable to the extent that they reduce information risk 
and the expected rate of return for shareholders. The literature identifies a number of attributes 
that define earnings quality: accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value 
relevance, timeliness, and conservatism. The first four of these attributes are classified as 
accounting-based because they are typically measured using accounting information only, 
whereas the last three attributes are market-based because proxies for these constructs are 
typically based on relations between market data and accounting data. The literature seems 
to suggest that accounting-based attributes are associated with stronger capital market effects 
than market-based attributes. 
 
With respect to accounting conservatism, while it may decrease the value relevance of 
earnings, it does benefit lenders and borrowers in the debt-contracting process and protects 
shareholders against overcompensating management (see also Section D). 
 
Narrative reporting complements and explains a firm’s performance. The literature has made 
an effort to identify qualitative characteristics that indicate whether the narrative provides 
meaningful information to the users of corporate reporting, because management may be 
prone to adopt impression management techniques seeking to hide poor results or emphasize 
good ones. What is “meaningful” to users is very much related to the specific issue that is 
being reported on. In order to evaluate the quality of narrative reporting one should therefore 
consider both the topic (e.g. greenhouse gas emissions, business strategy, risks), as well as 
the user (e.g. shareholders, creditors or other stakeholders). 
 
Studies that employ manual content analysis of narrative reporting typically have the limitation 
of small samples and/or the issue of the inherent subjectivity in the coding process itself. 
Content analysis has nevertheless identified detailed frameworks to define which 
characteristics make for higher quality disclosure. The advent of computational linguistic and 
natural language processing will help overcome the limitation of small sample studies and 
increase the external validity of the research findings, under the assumption that they are able 
to correctly identify key characteristics of the narratives. 
 
Whereas audit and assurance are deemed to increase the quality of financial reporting, for 
sustainability/CSR reporting the evidence is not so clear. This is mainly due to the lack of 
comparable reporting practices, ambiguous assurance guidelines and relatively young and 
underdeveloped reporting systems. 
 
Within the accountability perspective, a stream of research suggests that conceptually there 
is an emancipatory, transformative power for corporate reporting, especially with respect to 
ESG/CSR issues. Narrative forms of reporting have also been analysed in the light of 
dynamics of power, story-telling, sense-making and sense-giving. Following this view, the 
quality of reporting can be assessed by considering the judgements of the various groups 
involved, whether preparers or other stakeholders. This requires that the process of reporting 
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is embedded in, and developed from, close interactions with stakeholders and participatory 
governance. 
 
B. What is the role of regulation in corporate reporting? How does regulation 
affect the (financial or non-financial) information reported? 
 
In addressing these questions, Section B reveals that the academic literature justifies the 
introduction of disclosure regulation as: 
 
• enabling economic effects on the functioning of the financial markets, and/or 
 
• a tool to steer corporate practices towards desired outcomes. 
 
While the review of these capital market and “real” effects is discussed in later sections, 
Section B provides an overview of the effects on reporting itself. 
 
The tension that clearly emerges is that corporate responses to disclosure regulations and 
mandates depend on the firms reporting incentives and management discretion. Furthermore, 
regulations often come into force when other institutional arrangements are already in place, 
as well as mechanisms that can affect reporting practices (for example, the level of 
enforcement, oversight, and penalty imposition). Academic research has not always been able 
to distinguish the effect of the disclosure mandate from that of these other arrangements and 
mechanisms. Consequently, it is difficult to make causal claims. 
 
The literature has focused more on the capital markets effect of disclosure regulations; less is 
known about how reporting practices change. The literature has documented widespread 
boilerplate disclosure, for example in relation to the adoption of the guidance provided by the 
Turnbull report (1999) on disclosures on internal controls in the annual report. However, this 
does not necessarily imply that disclosure as a regulatory tool is ineffective. It is still possible 
that the requirement to disclose influences behaviour directly, but we need more evidence. 
 
A final note on regulation is that most regulatory actions continue to have a strong focus more 
on investors’ needs, and less so on other stakeholders’. It is possible that regulation ends up 
creating “blind spots” if there is no overlap between what investors and other stakeholders 
deem as relevant and material. There are calls for wider stakeholder interests to be embedded 
in conceptual frameworks for corporate reporting. However, in practice, the guidance provided 
to firms is still mixed. For example, the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive mandates the 
reporting of social and environmental information, but firms have discretion in terms of which 
reporting standards/guidance to follow (if any). Different guidelines focus on different main 
users of the information (financial materiality vs. social/environmental materiality). More 
research is needed to better understand these tensions. 
 
C. What are the information needs of shareholders and how is the corporate 
reporting information used by them? 
 
Section C addresses a number of key issues covered by the FRC’s Future of Corporate 
Reporting project, focusing on: 
 
(a) direct evidence of information needs of shareholders and analysts and their use 
of corporate reporting information; 
(b) the empirical evidence regarding the links between corporate reporting and the 
stock market; 
(c) and the literature on the information environment, specifically examining effects 
of corporate reporting on the forecasts and recommendations by sell-side 
analysts as well as the link between corporate reporting and analyst coverage. 
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Section C.1 finds that: 
 
• Financial statements remain an important source of information about firms used by 
investors and analysts primarily for valuation purposes. 
 
• Narrative reporting complements and contextualises information from financial 
statements but is sometimes used as an impression management tool misleading 
the audience of corporate reporting (see also Section A). 
 
• The importance of other communication channels (e.g. other disclosures or private 
communication with managers) has increased over time and rivals that of periodic 
corporate reporting for some information users (e.g. analysts). 
 
• There is some emerging evidence that some users incorporate non-financial 
reporting information in their investment decisions, but its usefulness so far is limited 
by a lack of established reporting standards for such disclosures and low level of 
familiarity with this type of reporting. 
 
Section C.2 summarises the studies examining capital market effects of financial and non- 
financial information reported by companies, providing indirect evidence on investors’ use of 
such information. Academic literature shows that corporate reporting matters for and is used 
by investors. Its relevance manifests itself in a number of ways detailed below. 
 
• High-quality financial reporting reduces information asymmetries faced by market 
participants, which in turn reduces information advantages of the most informed 
investors. Consequently, stock market liquidity improves. These liquidity effects are 
greater if the disclosure regulatory regime is stronger. So far, there is not enough 
empirical evidence illustrating similar effects for non-financial reporting. 
 
• There appears to be some degree of consensus in both theoretical and empirical 
literature that more extensive and higher-quality corporate disclosures reduce 
perceived riskiness of firms and, therefore, are associated with a lower cost of capital 
in general and lower cost of equity capital in particular. Again, these effects have 
been mostly been documented for financial reporting, although literature examining 
the effects of non-financial reporting and integrated reporting has started to emerge 
recently. 
 
• There is ample evidence that financial accounting information has been value- 
relevant, although its relevance has decreased over time both in the US and 
internationally. This decrease has been attributed to increasing reliance on 
information sources and intermediaries other than annual reports (e.g. financial 
analysts, media, or blogs), emergence of new technologies to disseminate 
information quickly and cheaply outside of the accounting system, rising volatility of 
market values due to changes in the market structure (e.g. trading by institutional 
investors and hedge funds, electronic trading), and macroeconomic factors (such as 
ongoing integration of global product and capital markets, or shift from manufacturing 
to a service-oriented economy). 
 
• Value relevance of financial reporting also varies across firms and countries. 
 
• A number of studies document how information provided by ESG reporting is also 
value-relevant and this finding holds for both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. 
 
• The release of corporate reporting (both financial and non-financial) is an important 
factor explaining stock returns. 
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• Yet, only a small proportion of total information incorporated in share prices is 
associated with earnings announcements suggesting that the primary economic role 
of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market. 
 
• Empirical evidence suggests that market reaction to the releases of corporate 
reporting information is not instantaneous with share prices only slowly reflecting the 
information over time. 
 
• The return effects of narrative corporate reporting vary with its linguistic 
characteristics (e.g. tone) and readability. 
 
• Finally, corporate reporting is useful in explaining and predicting volatility of stock 
and option returns, illustrating another aspect of usefulness of such information for 
investors. 
 
Section C.3 reviews the literature focussing on the information environment, specifically 
examining the effects of corporate reporting on forecasts and recommendations by sell-side 
analysts, finding that: 
 
• Analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate and less dispersed for firms with 
higher quality of financial and non-financial corporate reporting. 
 
• Analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion also vary with the institutional corporate 
reporting environment. 
 
• Characteristics of corporate reporting (such as e.g. frequency, quality, readability, or 
tone) and of corporate reporting environment (e.g. mandatory adoption of a particular 
reporting standard) influence the likelihood that a particular firm is covered by an 
analyst in the first place. 
 
D. What are the information needs of stakeholders (other than shareholders) and 
how is the corporate reporting information used by them? 
 
Creditors who are the other type of capital providers, besides shareholders, play a particularly 
important role as users of corporate reporting information. Section D.1 discusses their 
information needs and usage of corporate reporting information and finds that: 
 
• Corporate reporting matters for, and is used by, creditors and their agents (such as 
credit rating agencies). Its relevance manifests itself in a number of ways detailed 
below. 
 
• Financial corporate reporting information provides creditors with relevant 
information, which they take into account in their decisions to extend credit to 
companies and to price it appropriately (i.e. it serves the valuation role). Higher 
quality and credibility of financial information lowers the cost of debt capital: it affects 
the pricing of bank loans and spreads on corporate bonds. 
 
• The quality of financial reporting also determines access to particular credit markets: 
firms with poorer accounting quality are more likely to use private debt (e.g. bank 
loans) as opposed to public debt such as corporate bonds. 
 
• The financial reporting regulatory environment (e.g. country-level measures of 
accounting conservatism, adoption of IFRS, etc.) affects access to credit markets 
and credit pricing. 
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• The quality of financial reporting also affects non-price terms of credit (such as 
maturity and collateral), which are more stringent for borrowers with poorer 
accounting quality. 
 
• Financial reporting information could be useful in the stewardship role in the context 
of debt markets. While accounting-based debt covenants are a mechanism to 
monitor creditors’ performance, financial reporting information is a key input to 
commonly used bankruptcy-prediction models. 
 
• The prevalence of debt covenants (including, accounting-based ones) is 
considerably larger in private debt than in public debt. There has been a considerable 
decrease in prevalence of most types of accounting-based debt covenants, in 
particular balance sheet-based ones over time. This trend has been (at least partly) 
attributed to the implementation of IFRS and increased emphasis of accounting 
standard setters on fair-value accounting, which has reduced the usefulness of 
balance sheet items for debt contracting. 
 
• Financial reporting information serves a valuation role for various credit-related 
financial markets: it influences corporate debt pricing on the secondary market, 
pricing of credit default swaps, etc. 
 
• Finally, there is only very limited evidence of relevance and usage of non-financial 
reporting (e.g. CSR reporting) in the context of credit markets. 
 
Section D.2 focuses on the information needs of stakeholders who are not credit providers 
and their usage of corporate reporting. It finds the following: 
 
• Corporate reporting information (in particular, non-financial reporting) has a very 
broad audience covering many categories of stakeholders who are not capital 
providers (e.g. consumers, employees, suppliers, managers, industry bodies, 
professional associations, accounting firms, consultants, NGOs, academics). In this 
context, corporate reporting information is primarily relevant in the accountability 
role. 
 
• Corporate reporting does not only matter for the company that releases information, 
but it also has effects on firms along its supply chain. It also affects behaviour of 
retail customers, implicitly indicating that they are among the audience of corporate 
reporting as well. 
 
• There is some evidence that managers consider the labour force to be among the 
audience of the corporate reporting (including financial reporting). 
 
• The corporate reporting environment has consequences for whistleblowing and 
could therefore hinder or facilitate the accountability role of corporate reporting. 
 
• Non-financial reporting has huge potential to address the information needs of 
various stakeholders. Yet, this potential remains largely unfulfilled so far, due to 
discrepancies between the information that the stakeholders expect, and the 
contents of the disclosure standards and actual disclosures made by the companies. 
This mismatch is magnified by the lack of stakeholder engagement in the process of 
design and implementation of reporting standards and in the reporting activities of 
the companies. 
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• To date, academic literature has largely failed to solve conceptually the problem 
prioritising potentially conflicting information needs of various groups of 
stakeholders, in particular vis-à-vis shareholders. 
 
E. How does corporate reporting affect managers’ (or firms’) behaviour? 
 
In the final section we consider what the academic literature says about ‘real effects’ and how 
corporate reporting impacts managers’ and firms’ behaviour. Sections C and D have 
addressed evidence of how capital providers (shareholders and creditors) use financial 
information, making inferences, for example on the basis of liquidity, cost of capital, firm value, 
terms of debt contracts, and so forth. The analysis of real effects in this section allows similar 
indirect inferences about how other stakeholders use corporate reporting information 
(importantly, both financial and non-financial). This provides a clear rationale as to why real 
effects are so important. In addition to corporate reporting driving behavioural change, it also 
gives insights about the usage of reporting by various parties. 
 
• The effects on capital providers and other stakeholders are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and this begs the question of whose behaviour are we interested in 
(shareholders, managers, directors, or external stakeholders)? 
 
• When searching for evidence of real effects, we find many studies considering the 
changes of an organization’s behaviour relating to disclosure or compliance 
strategies, as well as the use of reporting as an impression management or public 
relations tool. With a much smaller body of evidence relating to integrated and non- 
financial reporting, there is discussion as to whether non-financial reporting, and its 
‘misuse’ as a public relations tool, can be counter-productive to social change. But 
should the purpose of the reporting also include social change? (see also Section A) 
 
• A section of this literature considers the chicken-and-egg situation of whether 
integrated thinking leads to integrated reporting or vice versa. Quantitative research 
may reveal associations, but not necessarily causation. This is where qualitative 
research and case studies may be useful, although less generalizable. The chicken 
and egg challenge may apply to reporting practices other than integrated reporting, 
but the literature on integrated reporting provides a useful illustration. Whether 
integrated thinking or reporting comes first may be a function of compulsion (through 
regulation or legitimacy concerns) or desire (strategic behavioural change). 
 
• Does improved reporting help steer corporate practices and improve them? The 
literature finds some evidence in this respect. However, there are also studies that 
suggest that better disclosures do not necessarily lead to better outcomes. Further, 
as it is challenging to provide sound evidence of causality, results should be taken 
with caution and more research is needed. 
 
• Where regulatory initiatives continue to be based on investor-primacy there exists 
the potential unintended consequence of companies reporting on how ESG risks and 
opportunities affect corporate financial performance. While this is not a problem in 
itself, it does raise the question as to whether reporting on ESG issues should 
primarily address the interests of other stakeholders. 
 
• How organisations respond to this will be affected by numerous contextual factors, 
including: 
 
− organisation context and culture that supports (or not) changed behaviour; 
− industry norms and institutional pressures that support (or resist) the change; 
− the regulatory context (including compliance and empowerment); 
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− the national and societal context regarding acceptability and expectation of 
behaviour change, especially on social and environmental issues. 
 
• Research on real effects is still in its infancy and faces many challenges. But, as 
more governments are using disclosure requirements as a public policy instrument 
to encourage or discourage certain behaviours and business practices, the need for 
more research into real effects is imperative. The Non-Financial Reporting Directive, 





We identify the following key challenges for the future of corporate reporting in relation to the 
state of the art in the literature. 
 
• Assessing the quality of reporting is a difficult endeavour for the reasons described 
in Section A. All evidence should therefore be interpreted accordingly and 
considerations about what should be reported, why and how are, inherently, part of 
a political process. 
 
• Causality in large-scale empirical studies is challenging to prove, so estimates in this 
literature should be interpreted cautiously. Hence, academic research struggles to 
provide a real impact assessment of new disclosure regulations and mandates. 
 
• As non-financial reporting becomes more predominant, and as the role of narrative 
reporting (even within financial reporting) assumes more weight, two considerations 
are key: (1) there will be difficulties in designing comparable standards for non- 
financial reporting and ensuring reliability and credibility of this type of information 
and (2) reporting standards, guidelines and regulation will still face the challenges 
entailed by allowing discretion in narrative reporting choices (minimum 
requirements). 
 
• Effective reporting standards and regulations need to be conceived together with 
other institutional arrangements, such as for example, enforcement. 
 
• Until very recently, the focus of the literature has been mostly on investors and 
mostly on large-scale indirect evidence (e.g. earnings announcements, analyst 
forecasts, etc.) rather than direct examination of stakeholder needs and their usage 
of corporate reporting information. It might be the case that as far as the big 
questions are concerned, we are in the situation of “we don’t know what we don’t 
know”. Hence, future research on the topic should embrace mixed-methods and/or 
experimental approaches to better ascertain directly what stakeholder needs are and 
how the corporate reporting is used. Further, case-based research may be able to 
provide insights on how the desired change is implemented within the organisation 
and what challenges and tensions may impede it. 
 
• Literature does highlight aspirational goals and potential for reporting, but there are 
methodological challenges for large-scale studies. Regulators and academics need 
to work together, and more studies are needed on how behaviour changes and 
assess the economic and social impact of new regulatory mandates. 
 
• Periodic and structured corporate reporting is only one of the many channels through 
which companies disclose information. With the advent of social media, as well as 
other interactive features of the internet that allow for real-time information to reach 
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a broad audience, it is debatable (and unpredictable) whether structured reporting 
will remain the most important channel. 
 
Policy discussion and recommendations 
 
We identify five key areas for policy discussion and recommendations for the Future of 
Corporate Reporting Project. 
 
1. Is the traditional investor-focus adopted by most of the reporting regulation and guidance 
still the most appropriate for the future of corporate reporting? 
 
This focus ultimately implies that what should be reported is only related to risks and 
opportunities that may have financial implications for companies in the short-term. This 
is at the expense of transparency over externalities and impacts that may have long- 
term consequences, on the firm’s financial performance but also on society overall. 
 
2. How can regulators help in collecting further evidence on the real effects of reporting, 
an area on which research is still limited and providing mixed evidence? 
 
In order to ensure a proper impact assessment of reporting regulations, standards and 
guidelines, policies should be conceived and implemented with the aim of testing their 
impact, for example by working collaboratively with academics to design randomized 
pilot studies or collect specific data around regulatory changes, even if for a subset of 
firms affected. 
 
3. Can more participatory models of reporting improve (or transform) the way in which we 
conceive the quality of reporting? 
 
Participatory models of reporting, where users could be more deeply engaged in the 
process of reporting itself, rather than being considered as only the addressees of 
corporate information, may tackle issues of conflicting information needs. This would 
clearly entail several challenges because of the different nature of various stakeholder 
interests, but dialogic accounting is reputed to allow for a more pluralistic expression of 
public interest. 
 
4. Can new forms of reporting disrupt and innovate our conceptualisation of corporate 
reporting in face of the challenges that society is facing today? 
 
The evidence on whether corporate reporting actually changes any behaviour internally 
is debatable and there is not enough evidence to say whether it satisfies investors’ 
needs. This is an area of current academic focus that is producing more evidence and 
one that policy makers and regulation could further investigate, in collaboration with 
academia. 
 
5. What channels should be used to communicate financial, non-financial or integrated 
content? 
 
Another recommendation in light of the evidence presented in this literature review is 
that standard setters and regulators may need to start considering not only what firms 
should report (content), but also on the how (format) as well as in which channels, which 
may not only be restricted to structured and period reporting. 
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Introduction 
This report surveys academic literature examining stakeholder information needs and their 
usage of corporate reporting information. As discussed in more detail below, we define 
corporate reporting in a relatively narrow sense, i.e. we limit it to periodic and relatively 
structured corporate reporting (in particular, financial statements; earnings announcements; 
quarterly, semi-annual, and annual reports, including narrative and non-financial information; 
stand-alone sustainability or environmental, social, or governance reports; and integrated 
reports). While we recognise the importance of other corporate disclosure channels (e.g. 
conference calls, companies’ websites and social media, etc.), they remain outside of the 
scope of this report due to the mandate obtained from the FRC commissioning this report. The 
exclusion of these unstructured disclosure channels is one limitation which we discuss in our 
conclusions in more detail. 
 
An initial scoping exercise of academic journals, published in English, post 1992, revealed 
over 18,000 relevant articles within the disciplines of accounting, finance and management, 
as of May 2019. Following the methodological approach described in the Appendix, the review 
is currently based on 538 papers. The five substantive sections that follow address a series of 
inter-related issues pertaining to purposes, properties, and usage of corporate reporting 
information. Specifically: 
 
• Section A addresses the question of the definition of quality of corporate reporting, 
by discussing how the literature has investigated the quality of financial reporting and 
the quality of narrative reporting; 
 
• Section B examines the role of regulation in corporate reporting, in particular whether 
and how regulation affects the financial or non-financial information reported, as well 
as how it has affected the evolution of reporting; 
 
• Section C examines information needs and usage of corporate reporting by 
shareholders and equity analysts; 
 
• Section D examines information needs and usage of corporate reporting by 
corporate creditors and by other categories of stakeholders; 
 
• Section E investigates whether and how corporate reporting affects managers’ or 
firms’ behaviour, examines real effects of reporting and of the reporting environment, 
and discusses relevance of corporate reporting for accountability and stewardship 
purposes. 
 
Finally, the concluding section summarises key findings of the report, identifying the main 
challenges. It also discusses policy relevance of the literature analysed and the implications 
of the findings for future regulatory measures. In doing so, it helps address big questions about 
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A. How is the quality of corporate reporting defined? 
Defining the quality of corporate reporting is a challenging endeavour. It requires us first to 
consider the notion of the purpose of corporate reporting itself. In other words, the 
characteristics of good corporate reporting are assessed against the purpose that one believes 
corporate reporting has. The academic literature has identified three perspectives in this 
regard: valuation, stewardship and accountability (Beyer et al., 2010; Jonas & Blanchet, 
2000). The valuation and stewardship perspectives are rooted in positive accounting theory, 
an approach used by academics to explain and predict what happens in the real world, looking 
for regularities and causal relationships between elements, which assumes the observation of 
one objective reality. In contrast, the accountability perspective is often associated with 
interpretivist research which assumes the world can be understood by gaining a deep 
understanding of a phenomenon and its complexity within a specific context, and/or a 
normative approach which seeks to express what ought to be (rather what is) and therefore 
adopts a value-based view of the world (rather than a value-free view like positive theory). As 
the definition of the purpose of reporting is central to how research has defined quality, we 
proceed with explaining each perspective. 
 
First, corporate reporting plays a valuation role, in that it allows investors1 to assess the future 
value of the investment. Such role has been traditionally assigned to financial reporting and 
information. The majority of accounting literature focuses on capital providers (shareholders, 
but also creditors), so that the primary purpose of financial reporting is to allow them to 
evaluate the potential future return on investment opportunities. In other words, the quality is 
determined in relation to the usefulness of the (financial) information to the users of that 
information (i.e. ‘decision usefulness’ criteria). 
 
Second, with respect to the stewardship role, corporate reporting, especially financial 
reporting, allows the same capital providers to monitor the use of the capital, once it has been 
committed. Therefore, the quality of financial information is defined primarily in terms of 
providing capital providers with full and transparent information that allows them to monitor 
corporate performance in a truthful and reliable way. 
 
Both the valuation and stewardship role assume that the primary addressees of corporate 
reports are financial stakeholders, i.e. investors (as defined in footnote 1). However, Zeff 
(2013) notes that the stewardship role can also be related to a wider set of stakeholders than 
just investors as, for example, set out in “The Corporate Report”, a discussion paper submitted 
to the ICAEW by the Accounting Standards Steering Committee back in 1975 (Accounting 
Standards Steering Committee, 1975). It was a foundational document for a wider discussion 
on corporate reporting in the UK, and highlights that some of recent attention on stakeholders 
other than investors, is not necessarily new. 
 
In line with Zeff’s arguments, another stream of accounting research identifies a broader range 
of users, i.e. the stakeholders, as the primary addressees of corporate reporting and to whom 
the firm should be held accountable (Freeman et al., 2004; Harrison & van der Laan Smith, 
2015). A stakeholder is any party that has an interest in a company and can either affect or be 
affected by the business. Key to the concept of stakeholders is the idea that different 
stakeholders have different, even conflicting needs (Freeman, 1984); that inevitably affects 
the scope of reporting (i.e. what type of information is considered material or relevant may 
vary across stakeholder groups). By definition, shareholders and creditors are stakeholders of 
a company. However, for the purpose of this review, we consider shareholders and creditors 
 
 
1 Investors include all capital providers, i.e. equity capital (shareholders) and debt capital (creditors), whether actual 
or potential. We use the generic term shareholder to identify all type of owners, i.e. institutional investors, individual 
investors, pension funds, asset management companies, etc. (unless differently specified). 
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separately from other stakeholder groups, such as employees, customers and suppliers, local 
and national governments, pressure and advocacy groups, society overall, and the natural 
environment. According to this perspective, information plays an accountability role, where 
accountability is defined as the duty to provide an account for the actions for which an 
organization is held responsible in the eyes of all stakeholders (Gray et al., 1997). In this 
context, therefore, the quality of reporting is related to the ability of reporting to fulfil this 
accountability role towards shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders.2 Similarly, Sunder 
(2016) asserts that (financial) reporting could serve “broadly defined societal goals” (p. 214), 
although he acknowledges that there is less agreement about which accounting regime would 
attain this goal better. 
 
An important implication of adopting an accountability perspective to corporate reporting is 
that the scope of reporting by definition would also entail non-financial information, such as for 
example, disclosures on social and environmental impacts, as stakeholder interests are not 
necessarily only financial. This is not to say that the valuation and stewardship perspectives 
do not involve non-financial reporting, but that traditionally the focus of research undertaking 
these perspectives has been on financial reporting and investors as users. Figure 2 below 
captures the prevailing views in the academic literature about the role of corporate reporting 
with respect to users and scope of information. 
 









For the purpose of this review we define corporate reporting as financial and non-financial 
information included in annual reports, quarterly reports, restatements, earnings 
announcements and other ad-hoc stand-alone reports (such as sustainability, CSR, integrated 
reports). We use the term financial reporting to indicate disclosure of financial information such 
as that contained in the financial statements, including the notes, but also the narrative 
discussion of corporate performance (i.e. narratives or other quantitative indicators that 
complement financial data, for example narrative information in the strategic report or 
management discussion or analysis). Non-financial reporting includes corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), social, environmental or sustainability reports (which are interchangeable 
terms), as well as other types of narrative information included in specific sections of the 
 
 
2 The debate about to whom the firm is held accountable is not independent from the legal frame that defines the 
fiduciary duties of directors. While this debate is beyond the scope of this review, recent research argues that 
shareholder primacy is not a legal requirement of fiduciary duties in most countries, the US being an exception 
(Eccles & Youmans, 2015). 
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annual reports (such as for example, risk disclosure, or disclosures about environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) issues) or in other corporate documents (integrated reports, 
intellectual capital statements, etc.). 
 
This section is organised in two sub-sections, which mirror how various streams of research 
on corporate reporting have developed: 
 
• Section A.1 presents academic research on the quality of financial reporting, with a 
focus on information conveyed by financial statements, as defined in studies 
focusing on: 
 
− earnings management and reporting incentives, 
− accounting conservatism, 
− restatements, 
− and surveys of users. 
 
• Section A.2. provides an overview of the literature on reporting quality that has 
focused on narrative reporting, which includes both financial and non-financial 
information i.e. studies on: 
 
− conceptual frameworks used to describe the quality of disclosure, 
− impression management, 
− computerised textual analysis, 
− issues of assurance for non-financial information, 
− and alternative approaches. 
 
Whenever relevant, we have highlighted specific literature reviews that will give better insights 




A.1. Quality of financial reporting 
 
The quality of financial reporting can be assessed against the role attributed to corporate 
reporting (Jonas & Blanchet, 2000). While the valuation role is concerned with the relevance 
of information to users when making capital allocation decisions, the stewardship role is 
concerned with ensuring that users are provided with as much information as possible 
(information sufficiency) and in a transparent way (information competency). These two 
attributes are not mutually exclusive, instead they reinforce each other (Jonas & Blanchet, 
2000). The accountability role will be discussed in A.2. as it has been traditionally related to 
broader corporate reporting, rather than just financial reporting. 
 
The demand for financial information for valuation and stewardship purposes arises due to 
two problems: 
 




3 Information asymmetry occurs when one party in an economic transaction possesses greater material knowledge 
than the other party, in other words parties in a transaction can access to different levels of information. Information 
asymmetry can lead to market failure. Information asymmetry can be ex-ante: one party lacks the information when 
negotiating the terms of a contract to the transaction (adverse selection); or ex-post: one party lacks information 
about the performance of the agreed-upon transaction (moral hazard). 
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• agency costs of equity4, i.e. costs that arise because of the separation between 
ownership and management and the need to monitor managerial performance 
(Beyer et al., 2010; Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
 
With regards to first point, a reasonable assumption is that managers have more information 
than outsiders (Christensen, 2010). This information asymmetry makes it difficult for outsiders 
to assess, for example, the profitability of investment opportunities. Furthermore, insiders 
might have incentives to portray a more (or less) favourable image of the firm’s future 
profitability. If capital providers cannot assess this future profitability correctly, they will tend to 
under-price firms with high profitability and over-price those with low profitability, potentially 
leading to market failure. In the literature this is known as the “lemons problem” (Akerlof, 1970), 
and it has led the literature to analyse managers’ incentives to disclose additional information 
to avoid mispricing. 
 
With respect to the second point, demand for accounting information arises also because 
shareholders lack information about the actual performance of the company, which is 
controlled by managers. Contracts with managers often make use of accounting information 
(e.g. generated return on investment) to solve agency problems. Further, governance 
structures are in place to ensure monitoring of management actions, and within these the 
quality of financial reporting is an important monitoring mechanism. Outsiders value such 
information when monitoring managers and require a lower expected rate of return when they 
can rely on such information (Beyer et al., 2010; Christensen, 2010). 
 
Importantly though, the demand for accounting information, whether for valuation or 
stewardship, may not always result in the information being voluntarily supplied by firms, 
hence the need for regulation (see Section B). However, even in the presence of accepted 
accounting standards and reporting regulation, because of the inherent discretion allowed in 
the reporting process the quality of the accounting information is also determined by the set 
of managerial, firm, market and institutional incentives, e.g. “reporting incentives” 
(Christensen, 2010; Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Dechow et al., 2010; DeFond, 2010). In other 
words, a firm’s reporting strategy, which refers to the quality of the information disclosed, is 
not only affected by the regulatory setting, or the accounting standards adopted, but also by a 
set of other factors, such as for example, managerial compensation, managerial reputation, 
firm’s visibility and business model, governance, market expectations, enforcement rules, 
other institutional arrangements, cultural values etc. Therefore, different firms may respond to 
the introduction of new reporting regulation and/or to the adoption of new standards in different 
ways (Christensen et al., 2015; Daske et al., 2013; see also Healy & Wahlen, 1999, and 
Dechow et al., 2010, for extensive literature reviews). Healy & Palepu (2001) offer a 
comprehensive framework to explain the variation in financial reporting quality which goes 
beyond firm-specific incentives, and also includes regulation (i.e. the regulatory environment 
and its enforcement) and the quality of auditors and information intermediaries (i.e. analysts). 
Healy & Palepu (2001) further note that the credibility of voluntary disclosure may also be 
related to the quality of financial reporting. Overall, one key message for the purpose of this 
section is that the quality of financial statement ultimately depends on how managers use their 




4 Agency theory identifies the agency relationship where one party, the principal, delegates work to another party, 
the agent. In the context of a corporation, the shareholders are the principal and the directors/managers are the 
agents. Agency theory is based on the assumptions that agents do not necessarily make decisions in the interests 
of the principal (opportunism or self-interest of the agent) and that there is information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent. As such, agency costs of equity are incurred to protect principal’s interests and to reduce 
the possibility that agents will misbehave. 
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accounting theory managers may use their discretion in the financial reporting process in two 
ways: 
 
1. Managers may use discretion to improve the signal value of earnings, i.e. to increase 
informativeness about the underlying economics (Nelson and Skinner, 2013). In this 
case, management discretion can improve earnings quality (efficiency perspective). 
 
2. Managers may use their discretion to distort the representation of the firm performance. 
In other words, managers can engage in opportunistic earnings management to portray 
a more favourable view of the underlying economics of the firm, or else, for example, 
take a one-time charge against income in order to reduce the value of assets, but also 
lower expenses in the future. In this case, the quality of financial reporting is reduced 
(opportunistic perspective). 
 
Another consideration made in the literature about the quality of financial reporting is that 
financial reporting is a process, rather than just an outcome, made up of different elements 
(Jonas & Blanchet, 2000): 
 
1. company’s transactions and events, 
 
2. selection of accounting policies, 
 
3. application of accounting policies, 
 
4. estimates and judgements involved, 
 
5. disclosure of transactions and events, policies, estimates and judgements. 
 
Hence, the quality of a company's financial reporting ultimately depends on the quality of each 
part of the financial reporting process. 
 
The concept of quality of financial reporting has also been related to a general idea of 
transparency (Barth & Schipper, 2008), i.e. the extent to which financial reports reveal an 
entity’s underlying economics in a way that is readily understandable by the users of financial 
reports. For these authors, the underlying economics of a firm include also the risks it faces 
and how it manages them, therefore transparency also entails reporting on these risks and 
how they are managed. We will discuss the role of narrative reporting in Section A.2. 
 
Quality has also been discussed with reference to the qualitative characteristics described in 
the accounting conceptual frameworks (Sunder, 2016). The IASB defines the qualitative 
characteristics of financial reporting as the “the types of information that are likely to be most 
useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors for making decisions 
about the reporting entity on the basis of information in its financial report (financial 
information)”. Hence, the assessment of quality is based on the qualitative attributes of 
financial reports that are considered desirable, for example: truth and fairness5, relevance, 
reliability, timeliness, accuracy, conservatism etc. However, Sunders (2016) notes that there 
are inevitably trade-offs between these attributes (for example between conservatism and 







5 There is a debate in the literature on whether “truth and fairness” can be subsumed under the decision-usefulness 
purpose of financial reporting. For a debate, see Evans (2003) and Alexander and Jermakowicz (2006). 
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These trade-offs imply that policy makers and regulators will have to decide which one is 
reputed as most important.6 
 
In his final remarks on the conceptual frameworks for accounting from an information 
perspective, Christensen (2010) draws the conclusion that there is no consensus among 
stakeholders on the purpose of corporate reporting, as the process of defining it is inherently 
political and therefore it is “impossible” to define in an objective way what is meant by quality 
of corporate reporting. However, as of now, we can summarise the approaches to quality 
definition as follows: 
 
• The quality of financial information can be assessed against the decision usefulness 
of that information for investors and lenders; 
 
• The quality of financial information also relates to the faithful representation of the 
firm’s underlying economics (transparency); 
 
• There are trade-offs among different attributes of financial information as conceived 
in accounting standards conceptual frameworks; 
 
• Management discretion can influence both positively and negative the quality of 
financial information; 
 
• The quality of financial information is related to the set of reporting incentives of the 
firm, as well as to the underlying financial reporting process. 
 
We now proceed with presenting how the academic literature has approached the 
measurement of financial reporting quality. 
 
 
A.1.1. Earnings quality and earnings management 
 
In this section we provide an overview of the literature that has focused on how to identify 
good proxies for earnings quality, or else capture instances of earnings management (an 
inverse measure of earnings quality). It is outside of the scope of this review to provide a 
detailed summary of earnings management research (please see Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
and Dechow et al. (2010) for more details). The aim of this section is to summarise the 
attributes of earnings that scholars have considered and highlight the challenges that research 
faces in its endeavour to define and measure earnings quality. The research in this area mainly 
takes a decision usefulness approach, i.e. attributes are defined on the basis of how they 
inform investment decisions. 
 
For clarity purposes, Box 1 below summarizes the earnings attributes that have been used in 
the literature to assess earnings quality and that will be discussed throughout the remainder 








6 For a historical perspective on the objectives of financial reporting and a cross-country comparison, please refer 
to the review by Zeff (2013). 
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Box 1. Attributes of earnings 
Persistence: a highly persistent earnings number is viewed by investors as sustainable, 
that is, more permanent and less transitory. Persistence is normally calculated as the slope 
coefficient in a regression of stock returns on the change and/or level of earnings. Related 
to persistence is the notion of predictability, i.e. the capacity of the entire financial reporting 
package, including earnings and its components of earnings for improving users' abilities 
to forecast items of interest. 
Smoothness: it is the relatively absence of variability in earnings in relation to changes in 
cash flows. Companies use accounting discretion to smooth earnings as investors 
generally prefer shares with steady and predictable earnings streams – whereas shares 
whose earnings are subject to more volatile patters may be regarded as riskier. 
Informativeness: usually measured with the earnings response coefficient (ERC, i.e. how 
investors respond to information that has value implications). A higher ERC implies that 
earnings better reflect fundamental performance. It is used as a measure of decision 
usefulness in the context of equity valuation decision. A notion related to informativeness 
is that of value relevance, i.e. the ability of earnings to explain variation in returns. 
Accruals quality: generally speaking, extreme accruals are low quality because they 
represent less persistent component of earnings. However, it is important to note that the 
fundamental performance is likely to be different for firms with extreme accruals versus 
firms with less extreme accruals (i.e. the lower persistence of accruals relates not only to 
measurement rules, but also to the fundamental performance). 
Abnormal accruals: accruals that are not “expected” and are usually determined using 
regression models that estimate “normal” level of accruals, given a set of firm-specific 
variables (see Dechow et al. 2010, Exhibit 2 for a summary of various models). The idea 
behind abnormal accruals is to capture the degree to which managers have used 
discretion, therefore higher levels of abnormal accruals usually indicate lower earnings 
quality because they reduce decision usefulness. Regardless of the model adopted to 
measure abnormal accruals, it is important to note that they are not necessarily a violation 
of GAAP. 
Timeliness and conservatism: these two attributes assume stock returns as reference 
measures for the quality of earnings. The timeliness of earnings recognitions refers to the 
extent that current earnings reflect value relevant information. Earnings conservatism 
(conditional conservatism) is defined as the asymmetric timeliness of good and bad news 




In the late 1990s, the SEC raised concerns of widespread earnings management (Dechow et 
al., 2010; DeFond, 2010; Hodge, 2003). This triggered a boom of accounting research aiming 
at understanding whether earnings management misleads investors and therefore leads to 
sub-optimal asset allocation decisions. Earnings management occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or 
to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. While 
discretion in accounting choices is expected and should exist because of the fundamental 
need for judgment and estimates to implement accrual accounting, the intended effect of this 
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discretion should be to produce an earnings number that provides a better measure of the 
underlying economic performance than cash flows (Dechow & Skinner, 2000). 
 
The review by Dechow et al. (2010) proposes three broad categories to classify how the 
literature has proxied earnings quality: 
 
1. properties of earnings, (see also Francis et al. (2004) discussed below); 
 
2. investor responsiveness to earnings, in other words the estimated change in a 
company’s share price due to any unexpected earnings (see also Section C.2.4); 
 
3. external indicators of earnings misstatements, such as restatements, internal control 
deficiencies and accounting enforcement activities. 
 
Francis et al. (2004) propose attributes that define earnings quality: accrual quality, 
persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism (See 
Box 1). The first four attributes are characterized as accounting-based because they are 
typically measured using accounting information only, whereas the last three attributes are 
characterized as market-based because proxies for these constructs are typically based on 
relations between market data and accounting data. According to these authors, the earnings 
attributes are desirable to the extent that: 
 
• they reduce information risk, and 
 
• they imply a capital market advantage, in terms of reduced cost of equity, i.e. the 
expected rate of return for shareholders. 
 
Francis et al. (2004) find that accounting-based attributes have stronger cost of equity effects 
than market-based attributes, with accrual quality having the largest effects. 
 
Tucker & Zarowin (2006) pose the question as to whether income smoothing distorts 
accounting earnings information or improves the informativeness of firms reported current and 
past earnings about their future earnings and cash flows. Income smoothing is the managers’ 
attempt to use their reporting discretion to intentionally reduce the fluctuations of their firms’ 
earnings. Theoretically smoothing may improve earnings informativeness if managers use 
their discretion to communicate their assessment of future earnings, or alternatively, it makes 
earnings noisier if managers intentionally distort the earnings numbers. By measuring income 
smoothing as the negative correlation of a firm’s change in discretionary accruals with its 
change in pre-managed income, they find that firms with greater smoothing present higher 
future earnings response coefficient (FERC, i.e. the association between current-year stock 
returns7 and future earnings), in line with the hypothesis that smoothing improves the 
informativeness of past and current earnings about future earnings and cash flows. These 
findings need to be interpreted with two caveats in mind: one is the assumption that market is 
efficient, the other is that the income-smoothing measure may suffer from potential 
measurement error problems since managers’ discretionary decisions are unobservable. 
 
More recently, Perotti & Wagenhofer (2014) explore the variety of earnings quality proxies to 
identify which measure best helps investors in making resource allocation decisions. In other 
words, their assumption is that the main purpose of financial reporting is the usefulness of 
financial reporting to investors. Using the simple idea that the shares of firms with higher (true) 
earnings quality will be less mispriced than those of other firms, they propose a market-based 
 
 
7 Stock returns are generally calculated as (increase in share price + dividends), if they are measured in absolute 
terms; or as (increase in share price + dividends)/share price. 
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measure for the ranking of earnings quality proxies. “Mispricing due to poor earnings quality 
increases errors in pricing firms but does not lead to systematic under or overpricing. 
Therefore, we measure mispricing by the firm-specific absolute value of excess returns. An 
earnings quality measure is of higher quality than another if it better explains variations in 
absolute excess returns” (Perotti & Wagenhofer, 2014, p. 546). Their findings suggest that 
accruals quality is the best measure, with abnormal accruals as second-best measure. Next 
are smoothness measures and the earnings response coefficient, while predictability and 
persistence do significantly less well, and value relevance measures appear to perform the 
worst. 
 
The rationale behind the attributes of earnings described above is related to the decision 
usefulness of earnings, which implies that earnings of higher quality are those that lead to 
better economic decisions (Schipper and Vincent, 2003; Perotti & Wagenhofer, 2014). 
Earnings quality however has also been related to the economics-based definition of income 
developed by Hicks (1939). Hicksian income corresponds to the amount that can be 
consumed (that is, paid out as dividends) during a period, while leaving the firm equally well 
off at the beginning and the end of the period (e.g. if there is to be an expectation of maintaining 
intact the capital value of prospective receipts - see Hicks (1939), p. 176). For Schipper and 
Vincent (2003), earnings quality is determined by the extent to which earnings “faithfully” 
represent Hicksian income, i.e. how well the measure captures the concept. Specifically, 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) define earnings quality as dependent on: 
 
1. the time-series properties of earnings (persistence, predictability, variability), 
 
2. selected qualitative characteristics (decision usefulness in terms of relevance, reliability, 
and comparability8/consistency); 
 
3. the relations among income, cash, and accruals9; and 
 
4. implementation decisions, i.e. unintentional estimation errors in accruals and intentional 
accruals manipulations. 
 
Similar to Schipper and Vincent (2003), Dechow et al. (2011) also follow a decision usefulness 
approach in their literature review on earnings quality. They stress the idea that earnings 
quality is conditional on the decision relevance of the information and that the term “earnings 
quality” in itself is meaningless, since it is defined only in the context of a decision, and not 
necessarily restricted to the context of equity valuation decisions. Further, they note that the 
quality of a reported earnings number depends on whether it is informative about the firm’s 
financial performance, many aspects of which are unobservable (a theme that recurs in the 
earnings management literature, see Schipper & Vincent (2003), among others). Finally, it is 
also important to reiterate that earnings quality is jointly determined by: 
 
1. the relevance of underlying economic performance for an investment decision, and 
 






8 For a review of output-based measurement of accounting comparability, refer to Gross & Perotti (2017). 
9 Hales & Orpurt (2013) indicate that the information contained in a direct-method statement of cash flows is 
incrementally useful beyond the indirect-method statement of cash flows and other financial statement information, 
because this information can be used to enhance predictions of future operating performance as measured by cash 
from operations (CFO) and earnings. Further, the reporting of the direct-method components improves the 
usefulness of that information. 
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These two factors affecting earnings quality reflect the idea by Jonas and Blanchet (2000) that 
financial reporting is a process and therefore earnings quality is dependent on the quality of 
the different phases of the reporting process, which also affects, generally speaking, not only 
earnings quality, but overall the quality of corporate disclosures. 
 
In this regard, Francis et al. (2008) specifically investigate the relation between voluntary 
disclosure and earnings quality. If voluntary disclosure and earnings quality were substitutes, 
in the presence of high information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, the 
demand for disclosure would be high. This is because the value of additional information is 
greater in such a setting, and firms with poor earnings quality would issue more disclosure. 
On the other hand, if voluntary disclosure and earnings quality were complements, firms with 
good earnings quality would issue more disclosures because investors would treat such 
disclosures as more credible. The findings of Francis et al. (2008) suggest a complementary 
association between earnings quality and voluntary financial disclosure, implying that firms 
with good earnings quality provide higher levels of disclosure than do firms with poor earnings 
quality. 
 
Another important aspect to consider for the definition of earnings quality is in relation to the 
frequency of reporting. In other words, the key question is whether the frequency of reporting 
matters for reducing information asymmetry and enhancing the quality of the information 
provided (Fu et al., 2012). On one hand, more frequent financial information could lead to 
lower information asymmetry if it increases the amount of information available to the public. 
However, this would be true only if investors’ private information is exogenously endowed, i.e. 
if investors cannot affect the level of information they can access. On the other hand, 
sophisticated investors themselves have incentives to search and acquire private information 
to anticipate future disclosures. These incentives may eventually lead to increase information 
asymmetry if more frequent financial reporting leads sophisticated investors to have more 
private information. Using a US sample for the time period 1951-1973, during which the SEC 
raised the required reporting frequency from annual to semi-annual in 1955, and to quarterly 
reporting in 1970, Fu et al. (2012) document that a mandatory increase in financial reporting 
frequency leads to lower information asymmetry and the cost of equity. However, the effects 
could be more complicated. For benefits, see Cuijpers & Peek (2010) from Section C.2.1, as 
well as Rahman et al. (2007) and Tsao et al. (2016), Section C.3.2, Rahman et al. (2012) 
mentioned in Section C.2.5. Moreover, Kim et al. (2017), discussed in C.3, documents many 
more issues with increased frequency of earnings guidance, largely pertaining to short- 
termism. 
 
Two more observations are in order. First, Dechow et al. (2010) note that proxies used in the 
literature to measure earnings quality are quite different, and unlikely to be measuring the 
same underlying theoretical construct, given the mixed evidence of the consequences of 
earnings management on capital markets. In his commentary, Defond (2010) notes that 
abnormal accruals (see Box 1), firstly identified by Jones (1991) is by far the most popular 
proxy used, and the one on which academics have focused their efforts to improve and 
enhance. Regardless of the model adopted to measure abnormal accruals, it is important to 
note that they are not necessarily a violation of GAAP. A certain degree of earnings 
management is allowed within GAAP, with the intent to leave discretion in how managers 
decide to account for the underlying economics of the firm. Studying the degree of earnings 
management that is allowed within GAAP is important, as it captures how managers use the 
discretion allowed by the standards, and therefore provides insights about how management 
reporting decisions affect the quality of earnings (Defond, 2010). 
 
Second, earnings quality depends on both a firm’s financial performance and the accounting 
system that measures it, and yet the literature has largely focused just on the impact of the 
latter. There is relatively little evidence about how the firm’s actual performance affects 
earnings quality. Of course, it is almost impossible to observe the “true” underlying 
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performance; we have to rely on what is reported, and this is influenced by the system that 
measures it (DeFond, 2010). Therefore, one important caveat of the earnings management 
stream of literature is that proxies for corporate disclosure and reporting may not perfectly 
separate a firm’s economic fundamentals from the representation of these fundamentals (Leuz 
& Wysocki, 2016). Hence, it is not yet clear in the literature how these two factors jointly affect 
earnings quality. Disentangling these two factors is still a challenge for research. 
 
 
A.1.2. Accounting Conservatism 
 
Broadly speaking, accounting conservatism can be defined as “accounting policies or 
tendencies that result in the downward bias of accounting net asset value relative to economic 
net asset value” (Ruch & Taylor, 2015, p.17), i.e. anticipate no profits, provide for all possible 
losses. 
 
A key question in the academic literature is whether accounting conservatism is costly or 
beneficial to the users of financial statements, i.e. whether it improves the quality of the signal 
conveyed by financial statements (Beatty, 2007; LaFond & Watts, 2008; Mora & Walker, 2015; 
Roychowdhury & Watts, 2007; Ruch & Taylor, 2015). The answer is ambiguous as different 
users may have different views over the role of financial statements. 
 
The assessment of the costs and benefits of accounting conservatism relates to the different 
perspectives on the informational role of accounting. For example, the FASB – which adopts 
a valuation perspective – does not consider conservatism as a qualitative characteristic of 
financial reporting because conservatism would bias accounting information, compromising 
neutrality, and potentially lead to inefficient decision making. However, according to the 
stewardship perspective, accounting provides information that allows contracting parties to 
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness with which obligations are performed in contracting 
settings – such as debt and managerial compensation. In this contest, conservatism is an 
efficient contracting mechanism mainly because contracts have asymmetric payoffs to 
contracting parties (Ruch & Taylor, 2015; see also Section D.1). This implies that a lender 
demands that the borrower report information that reflects bad news (e.g. weak financial 
performance), in a timelier manner than for good news. Furthermore, some policy makers 
have argued in favour of greater emphasis on conservatism in light of the 2008 financial crisis 
(Mora & Walker, 2015). Conservatism is often associated with the concept of prudence, i.e. 
the inclusion of a degree of caution in the exercise of the judgements needed in making the 
estimates required under conditions of uncertainty (Mora & Walker, 2015). 
 
The literature on accounting conservatism generally refers to two different forms of 
conservatism (Mora & Walker, 2015; Ruch & Taylor, 2015): conditional and unconditional 
conservatism, where the former depends on economic news events, and the latter does not. 
 
• Conditional conservatism occurs when negative news is recognised in earnings in 
a timelier manner than positive news (asymmetric recognition of positive and 
negative economic news), for example the application of the lower of cost or market 






10 The lower of cost or market value is a conservative way to value and report inventory. Typically, inventory at 
year-end is stated at historical cost. However, if the original cost of the inventory at year end is greater than the net 
realisable value, the inventory should be reported at this lower market value. 
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• Unconditional conservatism instead occurs through the consistent under- 
recognition of accounting net assets, for example, expensing R&D expenditure. 
 
While conditional conservatism is unlikely to be associated with earnings management, 
unconditional conservatism may facilitate the accumulation of (hidden) reserves on the 
balance sheet, that can be released into earnings when targets need to be met (Ruch & Taylor, 
2015). Conditional conservatism results in a greater association between earnings and returns 
when news is bad, which implies that timely loss recognition provides information that is more 
value relevant. However, value relevance is only one desirable attribute of accounting from 
the valuation perspective and not necessarily from the contracting perspective, so it may not 
be the best attribute to consider, given that the demand for conservatism originates from non- 
equity market users, such as creditors and suppliers. 
 
Ruch & Taylor (2015) suggest that timely loss recognition is commonly theorized to alleviate 
information asymmetry, whereas deferred gain recognition may exacerbate information 
asymmetry by withholding information about future gains. Unconditional conservatism is 
deemed to increase information asymmetry because that information related to firm value is 
being withheld from investors (assuming there is no other source of such information). LaFond 
& Watts (2008) find a positive association between conditional conservatism and information 
asymmetry, but they argue that information asymmetry induces conditional conservatism 
(rather than the other way around): equity market participants demand conservative 
accounting to mitigate the effects of information asymmetry, and therefore, conservatism 
arises in the presence of information asymmetry. 
 
Overall, evidence suggests that conditional conservatism: 
 
• mitigates information asymmetry and the negative market response to bad news 
economic events; 
 
• is not efficiently incorporated into analyst forecasts, indicating that it provides poor 
quality information to analysts; 
 
• decreases the value relevance of earnings. 
 
However, research is inconclusive on the effect of conservatism on the cost of equity capital 
(Ruch & Taylor, 2015, p. 28). Research also supports the idea that conservatism benefits both 
lenders and borrowers in debt contracting situations, it furthers protect shareholders against 
overcompensating management, and it incentivizes management to let go of negative net 
present value projects in a timely manner. See Section D.1 below for further discussion of 





Restatements are central in the public policy debate on the quality of financial reporting 
(Palmrose & Scholz, 2004). Restatements are revisions of prior financial statements and 
reflect an acknowledgement that the financial statements originally issued to the public were 
somehow not in accordance with GAAP (Palmrose & Scholz, 2004). 
 
A key question explored in the literature is how earnings quality relates to financial 
restatements. Doyle et al. (2007) find that material weakness in internal control are associated 
with low accruals quality, in support of the hypothesis that a weak control environment has the 
potential to allow intentionally biased accruals through earnings management as well as 
unintentional errors in accruals estimation. Ettredge, Scholz, Smith, & Sun (2010) document 
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that restatements are indeed due to purposeful earnings manipulation. Their analysis 
compares non-fraud restating companies’ balance sheet bloat to that of a fraud and control 
sample and shows that at least one year prior to the first restated period, companies with non- 
fraudulent restatements have significantly more bloat than the control companies, but less that 
fraudulent companies. Further, Dechow et al. (2011) find that in the year prior to the 
misstatement, accruals measures are unusually high (relatively to the broad population of 
firms) and interpret this evidence as managers using the flexibility allowed by GAAP to report 
higher accruals (and earnings), before resorting to aggressive manipulations. These authors 
further note that the positive accruals in year prior to the restatement may also be driven by 
an overinvestment problem, since a manager who is optimistic about future prospects may 
also be optimistic in terms of assumptions and forecasts that relates to asset values and 
earnings. 
 
The literature documents that the market reacts negatively to restatements (Palmrose et al., 
2004) and that they increase the likelihood and severity of lawsuits (Palmrose & Scholz, 2004), 
in particular when they involve restating revenues. Negative market reactions to restatement 
announcements imply that investors perceive restatements as a sign of poor financial 
reporting quality, caused either by declines in future prospects and/or increases in risk and 
uncertainty (Palmrose et al., 2004). Prior research in financial reporting restatements posits 
that distinguishing between the types of restatement is important because investors and 
regulators view irregularities in reporting as being much more severe than errors (Hennes, 
Leone, and Miller 2008)11. 
 
Along similar lines, Desai et al. (2006) investigate the behaviour of short sellers around 
restatements to assess whether the motive for short selling is at least in part related to 
questionable financial reporting and provide evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
Restatements have been documented to have spill over effects (Gleason et al., 2008). 
Specifically, restatements in one firm cause investors to reassess the content and credibility 
of financial statements issued by other firms in the same industry, documented by a share 
price decline among non-restating firms. Since this share price decline is not found to be 
related to changes in analysts’ EPS forecasts, it does not simply reflect investors’ expectations 
of decreased economic prospects for the peers. Instead it reflects an “accounting contagion” 
as the share price decline is larger for firms with low accruals quality. 
 
However, the loss of credibility is temporary: the earnings response coefficient for earnings 
announcements surrounding restatement have a U-shaped pattern, in which they are not 
significantly lower in the post-restatement period over an average of four quarters (Wilson, 
2008). Wilson (2008) also shows that the loss duration is greater for firms correcting revenue 
recognition errors and that there is no loss in the information content of earnings for those 
firms that make changes to their financial reporting governance structure following the 
restatement. 
 
He and colleagues (2019) document that firms that announce both a restatement and an 
associated internal control weakness experience significantly more negative market returns, 
greater implied volatility and higher likelihood of class action lawsuits than firms with 
restatements not associated with internal control weakness. However, when they split the 
restating firms into timely (where the material weakness precedes the restatement) vs. non- 
timely reporters (where the material weakness is concurrent with or follows the restatement), 
they find that timely reporters experience more negative market returns, and interpret this 
evidence as suggestive that investors perceive early material weakness disclosure to signal 




11 For a detailed review of the underlying causes attributed to financial restatements, see Plumlee and Yohn (2010). 
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favourable litigation outcomes, as they face higher likelihood of lawsuit dismissals and pay 
lower settlements, compared to non-timely reporters 
 
The academic literature has identified other factors that affect the quality of financial reporting 
in the aftermath of a restatement. For example, Hirschey and colleagues (2015) investigates 
whether the timeliness of restatement detection, measured as the length of time between the 
end of the misstated period and the subsequent restatement announcement, is associated 
with greater ERC. While shorter detection periods are significantly associated with high-quality 
corporate governance characteristics and executive and/or auditor turnover, but not with 
characteristics of restatements, firms with shorter detection periods exhibit a more moderate 
decline in the information content of earnings (as captured by the ERC) following restatement 
announcements relative to firms with longer detection periods. Further, the timeliness of 
detection has an incremental effect on the information content of earnings relative to executive 
and/or auditor turnover. Specifically, more timely detection and disclosure of restatements is 
preferable. 
 
Similarly, the literature has documented how accrual quality improves significantly following 
the restatement and this improvement is observed for both earnings and non-earnings error 
restatements (Wiedman & Hendricks, 2013). This finding supports a signalling view according 
to which firms tend not to simply correct errors in order to comply with regulations, but also 
improve their financial reports more broadly, allowing them to signal higher reporting quality. 
This is consistent with results provided in Chakravarthy et al. (2014) who consider reputation- 
building actions directed towards both capital providers and other stakeholders. Using the 
earnings response coefficient as a measure of the expected quality of financial statements, 
they find that difference in the earnings response coefficients between restating and non- 
restating firms are higher in the post-restatement period than in the pre-period when firms take 
more reputation repair actions with both capital providers and stakeholders. This is important, 
as it highlights the need of a multi-stakeholder strategy to repair the credibility of financial 
reporting. Nevertheless, a recent study by Ye & Yu (2017) document that restatement have a 
long long-lived effect on analyst behaviour and that analysts differentiate between 




A.1.4. Earnings quality according to survey-based studies 
 
One last stream of literature deals with the definition of earnings quality by surveying users. 
As noted by Nelson & Skinner (2013), “how one thinks about earnings quality is to some 
degree in the eye of the beholder: this term is primarily used in financial statement analysis— 
the decisions being made, and the decision contexts are likely to vary.” An example of this 
literature is the paper by Hodge (2003). He documents that one possible reason for the decline 
in the perceived reliability of audited financial information among investors is the perceived 
decline in auditor independence. Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal (2005) conduct a survey among 
CFOs and find that CFOs believe that earnings, more than cash flows, are the key metrics 
considered by outsiders. Specifically, CFOs consider two benchmarks for the current quarterly 
earnings number: 
 
1. the quarterly earnings for the same quarter in the prior year, and 
 
2. the analyst consensus estimate. 
 
The survey by Graham et al. (2005) also documented a key trade-off in financial reporting 
decisions, that is the short-term need to deliver the benchmark and the long-term goal of 
investment decisions that maximise value for the shareholders. Meeting or exceeding the 
28  
earnings benchmark(s) is key to building credibility in the market (and thus maintain or improve 
the share price), whereas not being able to hit the target, even if for a small amount, may be 
interpreted as evidence of “hidden problems” in the firm. However, this pressure to hit the 
short-term target may have detrimental effects for the firm’s future performance. The CFOs 
surveyed essentially acknowledge that market pressures may encourage decisions that at 
times sacrifice long-term value (for example, cutting down R&D) to meet quarterly earnings 
targets (i.e. what the literature calls “real” earnings management, as opposed to accrual 
earnings management). The survey also highlights the importance of disclosing additional 
information to enhance clarity and understanding of financial statements to investors, as 
disclosing reliable and precise information can reduce information risk for investors, and hence 
the required return. This view is aligned with Barth and Schipper (2008) remarks on what 
transparency entails. However, voluntary disclosure does not come without costs, as it is 
possible that it reveals sensitive information to competitors12. 
 
A more recent survey by Dichev and colleagues (2013) shows that CFOs believe that quality 
entails “consistent reporting choices over time, backing by actual cash flows and absence of 
one-time items and long-term estimates”. They argue that this view is mainly in line with a 
valuation perspective, where “investors view the firm as a long-life profit-generating entity, and 
value is based on estimating and discounting the stream of future profits”. This implies that 
current earnings are considered to be high quality if they serve as “a good guide to the long- 
run profits of the firm”. Their survey also does provide support for a view of earnings quality 
that aligned with the stewardship approach (especially with reference to debt contracts and 
managerial compensation). 
 
Evidence of how earnings quality is interpreted by (sell-side) analysts is provided in Barker 
and Imam (2008). Earnings quality is described as a “multifaceted concept”, which relies on 
both accounting-based and non-accounting-based information. Their evidence suggests a 
greater relative use of non-accounting-based information when a positive or negative (but not 
neutral) opinion is expressed. They attribute this greater use to the desire by the analyst to 
sell news story, given that non-accounting information is “inherently more amenable to 
analysts credibly expressing diversity of opinion”. They also document an important role for 
accounting-based information. When analysts are positive on accounting aspects of earnings 
quality, they can use it to either be positive or negative on non-accounting aspects. However, 
if they are negative on accounting aspects, then they are constrained to be negative overall 
(therefore analysts are unlikely to issue a buy recommendation when they feel negative about 




A.2. How is the quality of narrative reporting defined? 
 
The importance of narrative reporting and its development has been related to the growth in 
disclosure regulation (Dyer et al., 2017), as well as the changing demand for information from 
various stakeholders (Beattie et al., 2004). While the European research tradition refers to the 
term “narrative” reporting, the literature developed in North America mostly refers to “voluntary 




12 Meeting or beating analysts forecast is a key determinant of earnings management but not the only one. There 
is a large amount of literature on the determinants of earnings management and reporting quality, that is not 
surveyed in depth here as it is out of the agreed scope. 
13 There are instances where the two terms do not coincide. For example, disclosures of internal control weakness 
are in nature narrative, but mandatory. 
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different underlying research approaches and epistemologies14. We will use them 
interchangeably. 
 
North American research draws mainly upon agency theory, and economic information 
asymmetry arguments, is grounded in analytical work and investigates questions adopting an 
archival approach in which disclosed information is considered an objective economic fact. 
This implies that most studies consider disclosure as the result of a trade-off between costs 
and benefits in reducing information asymmetry and agency costs. European research on 
narrative reporting instead is rooted in humanities and social sciences, in which the role of 
narrative in creating subjective meaning for human actors is central. 
 
Overall, therefore, research on disclosure and narratives include both large-scale quantitative 
analyses, based on manual content analysis or assisted by computerised linguistic 
techniques, as well as qualitative studies using discourse analysis. A schematic overview of 
the various approaches used is provided in Beattie et al. (2004) and reproduced below for 






Figure A.2 - Approaches to the analysis of narrative reporting 
Source: Beattie, V., McInnes, B., & Fearnley, S. (2004). A methodology for analysing and evaluating 
narratives in annual reports: A comprehensive descriptive profile and metrics for disclosure quality 
attributes. Accounting Forum, 28(3), 205–236. https://doi.org/10.1016/. Reproduced with the permission of 
Taylor & Francis Ltd, http://www.tandfonline.com © 2004 University of South Australia. 
 
 
Importantly the scope of narrative reporting is by itself broader than the scope of information 
conveyed by the financial statements, even if narratives are used in financial reporting (e.g. in 
the annual report, in the Management Discussion & Analysis or Strategic Report). Narrative 
reporting however includes other forms of non-financial disclosures such as, among others, 
risk (Elshandidy et al. 2018), intellectual capital (Beattie & Smith, 2013; Beattie & Thomson, 




14 Beattie (2014) also provides a broad overview of how accounting research has investigated narrative reporting. 
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emissions (Comyns & Figge, 2015), climate change (Ferguson et al. 2016), gender equality 
(Grosser & Moon, 2008) and employee relations (Mäkelä, 2013). These disclosures may serve 
the purpose of helping with interpreting, contextualizing and assessing the financial 
performance of firms and/or the purpose of fulfilling accountability to a variety of stakeholders 
on impacts of corporate activities that are not strictly financial, i.e. social and environmental 
(Cohen et al., 2012). 
 
 
A.2.1. Multidimensional frameworks for defining disclosure quality 
 
Content analysis studies have developed frameworks and metrics for disclosure quality 
attributes, with a specific concern that the quantity or extent of information does not 
necessarily proxy for the quality of the narrative (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 2008). Quality is 
often defined in terms of how much narrative reporting is able to convey “meaning” to investors 
and stakeholders, in that it helps explain the underlying economic performance or other non- 
financial impacts of corporate activities. 
 
One seminal paper is this respect is Beattie et al. (2004), who argue that disclosure is a 
“complex, multi-faceted concept” (p. 213) and as such, it requires going beyond considering 
the presence or absence of a specific information item. They propose a multi-dimensional 
framework that considers both the topic (i.e. information items that can be grouped into broad 
themes or categories) and disclosure attributes, such as historical/forward-looking, 
financial/non-financial and quantitative/non-quantitative. 
 
Along similar lines, and on the grounds that narrative information contributes to clarifying 
financial measures and to identifying value-generation drivers that may not be properly 
represented in financial statements, Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) propose a framework that 
considers the quantity of information (how much is disclosed) and the “richness” of this content 
(what and how it is disclosed). Richness is defined in terms of: 
 
• “width” of disclosure, i.e. the various topics that describe the business model and 
value-creation strategy of the firm (they rely on the Jenkins framework to develop 
the list of topics and consider that the wider the variety of topics disclosed, the better 
the disclosure); and 
 
• “depth” of disclosure, in terms of its ability to provide insights on the firm’s future 
performance and defined in terms of economic direction of the impact (positive, 
negative, not disclosed), type of measure (financial vs. non-financial, quantitative vs. 
qualitative, not disclosed) and outlook profile, which reflects the: 
 
 time orientation of the information disclosed, under the “assumption that 
the more financial reports look ahead, the greater their importance for 
investors and stakeholders and the less likely they are to be pre-empted 
by other information sources” (p. 343), and 
 
 management’s orientation to action, which reflects “the capability of 
management to tackle critical issues and take advantage of emerging 
situations, as well as the strategies and plans to be adopted for 
managing critical success factors (actual state of business, 
management’s hypothesis or expectations, decisions and actions 
already taken, and planned actions and programs)” (p. 343). 
 
The main goal of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) study is to develop a framework that captures 
the “efficacy of disclosure in improving the capabilities of financial analysts to appreciate the 
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value-creation strategy and expected financial results of a firm” (p. 341). Hence, they apply 
the disclosure framework to forward-looking information reported by a sample of Italian listed 
firms and study how their disclosure quality metrics relate to the accuracy and dispersion of 
analyst forecasts. 
 
Building on the idea that the quality of disclosure depends not only on the quantity of 
information reported but also on the what and the how, other content analysis frameworks 
have been developed in relation to specific types of reporting, such as: 
 
• risk disclosure (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004), 
 
• environmental information (Comyns & Figge, 2015; Hasseldine et al., 2005; Hooks 
& van Staden, 2011; Liesen et al., 2015; Toms, 2002), 
 
• corporate social responsibility and sustainability reporting (Bouten et al. 2011; 
Chauvey et al. 2015; Michelon et al., 2015; Moneva et al., 2006), 
 
• integrated reporting (Melloni et al., 2017). 
 
These papers choose a list of information items that is consistent with the specific type of 
reporting that is being analysed. For example, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) identify the 
following categories: 
 
• strategy (goals for performance, mission, broad objectives, and way to achieve 
objectives); 
 
• company characteristics, such as financial structure, corporate structure (changes 
in ownership, mergers, and acquisitions), technological structure (core and support 
technologies), organization (organizational structure and human resources 
management) and business processes (concerning the way operations are 
managed); and 
 
• environment around the company (legal and regulatory, political, economic, 
financial, social, natural, and industry). 
 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) framework has been often adopted to define the content 
in CSR reporting studies (Bouten et al., 2011; Michelon et al., 2015). This first dimension 
capturing the content (i.e. topic) of information is then complemented with 
 
• attributes of disclosure similar to those provided in Beattie et al. (2004) and Beretta 
and Bozzolan (2008), or 
 
• contextualised to the specific type of reporting, in relation to the guiding principles 
most commonly used. 
 
For example, Bouten et al. (2011) refer back to the GRI guidance to develop a second 
dimension that captures the degree to which each disclosure item refers to “vision and goals”, 
“management approach” or “performance indicators”. Michelon et al. (2015) also consider 
other attributes of disclosure, for example whether it is forward looking or backward looking, 
financial, quantitative or qualitative. For these authors, these attributes help in assessing how 
much, what and how, each report conveys, adopting an accountability perspective on the 
purpose of CSR reporting. Following Beretta and Bozzolan (2008), Michelon et al. (2015) 
further apply a managerial orientation criterion to the analysis of CSR disclosures. They define 
managerial orientation as boilerplate if the disclosure talks about general expectations, context 
and hypotheses (forward looking) or policies and strategies (backward looking). Alternatively, 
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disclosure is defined as committed when it focuses on objectives and targets (forward-looking) 
or results and outcomes (backward looking). 
 
A similar approach also developed in Chauvey et al. (2015), where a list of information items 
is combined with quality as defined by a combination of principles reported in the GRI, FASB 
and IASB conceptual frameworks. For example, relevance applied to CSR reporting is 
operationalised as stakeholder inclusiveness. Comparability involves “a clear definition of 
presented data and indicators, as well as an explanation about the methods of elaboration, 
calculation, and/or reporting mechanisms”. Neutrality is measured as a balance between 
positive and negative pieces of information. 
 
An alternative approach to measure narrative disclosure quality is provided in Toms (2002) 
who uses a pilot questionnaire sent to investors and analysts to identify which items they 
deemed more relevant for the credibility of the information, thus creating a hierarchy in which 
rhetoric, general statements are penalised and quantifiable, and verifiable information (e.g. 
use of targets, results) is rewarded. While the approach is slightly different, it still aims to 
capture disclosure that provides meaningful information to the stakeholders of the company, 
similar to the attempts by Bouten et al. (2011), Michelon et al. (2015) and Chauvey et al. 
(2015). 
 
A third approach to the measurement of narrative information quality is the one considered by 
Comyns & Figge (2015). Their disclosure quality measure embeds the principles for good 
reporting stemming from relevant guidelines (in their case, the GRI, the European Federation 
of Accountants, and the GHG (greenhouse gas) protocol). Comyns & Figge (2015) then build 
a disclosure framework that combines these principles, identifying the following dimensions: 
accuracy, completeness, consistency, credibility, relevance, timeliness and transparency. For 
each quality dimension, they identify specific criteria. For example, for the principle of 
relevance, they consider whether the reporting of GHG emissions (the specific type of 
reporting they investigate) is relevant for the sector, and an additional criterion related to 
whether the boundary for the GHG inventory is described and information complete given the 
boundary definition. For completeness, the criterion considers whether companies report 
Scope 1, Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions15, which stands to indicate the level with which 
emissions are directly linked to corporate activities. Comyns & Figge’s (2015) paper is a good 
example of how the quality of reporting is often specific to the “topic” being reported, and thus 
of how different characteristics and criteria apply to the definition of quality. 
 
The above approaches mainly rely on manual classification and coding of narrative reporting. 
This approach bears the inherent limitation of adopting relatively small samples, and there 
may be concerns over potential subjectivity in the coding (although the literature has rigorous 
protocol to ensure the reliability of the coding). An alternative approach consists in employing 
textual analysis, i.e. an automated, computer-assisted coding that aims at capturing certain 
feature of the narratives. Such an approach is common for papers that analyse the narratives 
in financial reporting (see also Section A.2.3), and it has recently been used also in relation to 
other types of reporting. For example, Muslu et al. (2019) use textual analysis to capture the 
“tone”, “readability”, “length”, “numerical content”, “horizon content” which become the proxy 
of their measure of CSR disclosure quality. A similar approach is taken by Melloni et al. (2017) 
to investigate the quality of narrative reporting in integrated reports, where quality is defined 
in the concepts of conciseness and completeness/balance. They consider length and 
readability as proxy for the quality dimension “conciseness”, while the quantity of disclosure 
 
 
15 Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions from owned or controlled sources. Scope 2 emissions are indirect 
emissions from the generation of purchased energy. Scope 3 emissions are all indirect emissions (not included in 
scope 2) that occur in the value chain of the reporting company, including both upstream and downstream 
emissions. 
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(measured using ESG disclosure scores from Bloomberg) and tone are proxies for 
“completeness/balance”. In conclusion, it is likely that the advent of computational linguistics 
will further develop the literature on the quality of reporting, as new frameworks and techniques 
will be developed to measure it. 
 
 
A.2.2. Impression management 
 
Narrative information has been conceived to complement and integrate the information 
conveyed by financial statements. A key debate in the literature is whether, as managers might 
have incentives to manage earnings, they may also have incentives to manipulate the 
message conveyed through narrative information. In their extensive review of the literature, 
Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2007) note that if “narrative disclosures are used for impression 
management rather than incremental information purposes, then financial reporting quality will 
be undermined. If managers engage in impression management, and if users are susceptible 
to it, then adverse capital misallocations may result”. 
 
In a corporate reporting context, impression management16 describes the attempt to control 
and manipulate the impression conveyed to users of accounting information (Clatworthy & 
Jones, 2001; 2006) by distorting readers’ perceptions of company’s achievements (or failures). 
Impression management is therefore related to reputation management, for a detailed review, 
see Craig & Brennan (2012). The literature in this area has developed relatively objective 
proxies to identify impression management (e.g. Cho et al., 2010), as well as qualitatively 
explored the use of rhetorical devices (Bujaki & McConomy, 2012; Higgins & Walker, 2012). 
As the role of narrative information grows in importance (and not only in relation to economic 
performance, but also sustainability-related issues), the opportunity for impression 
management may increase. To a certain extent, impression management can therefore be 
considered an inverse measure of reporting quality (similar to how earnings management is 
an inverse measure of earnings quality). However, the use of linguistic devices to manage 
impressions (and how to avoid it), has hardly been considered by regulators. Regulators such 
as the FRC should be aware that the prominence of this problem may grow over time, and 
should therefore consider it when designing future disclosure guidelines. 
 
In another conceptual paper, Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2011) develop the concept impression 
management further and go beyond the dichotomy between opportunistic behaviour of 
managers and incremental information. Specifically, besides a conceptualization of impression 
management as self-serving bias (economics-based perspective that views impression 
management as inconsistencies between reported and actual outcomes), Merkl- Davies and 
Brennan (2011) draw on the sociological tradition, and propose ideas of: 
 
1. symbolic management (manipulation is intended to influence stakeholders’ perceptions 
of the congruence of organisational practices with social norms and rules, i.e. a means 
through which reporting helps firms maintain their organisational legitimacy); 
 
2. accounting rhetoric (to manage inconsistencies between portrayed and actual decision 






16 Impression management is a topic of study in social psychology and focuses on how individuals present 
themselves to others in order to be perceived favourably. 
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Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2007) identify two types of impression management 
strategies: concealment and attribution. Concealment can be achieved either by obfuscating 
negative outcomes or emphasizing positive outcomes. Attribution is a defensive framing tactic 
that shifts the blame for negative outcomes away from the actor in question (“excuses”) and 
claims more responsibility for successes than for failures (“entitlements”).17 Impression 
management predominantly occurs in less regulated narrative disclosures, which focus on 
interpreting financial outcome (Brennan et al., 2009) or elsewhere, for example in non-routine 
reporting such as hostile takeover defence documents (Brennan et al., 2010) or in CSR or 
sustainability reports (Hooghiemstra, 2000), and there is evidence that impression 
management strategies are specific to the audience the firm is targeting in their disclosures 
(Bozzolan et al., 2015). Importantly, impression management in corporate reporting is not only 
documented in narrative disclosure, but also visuals such as graphs and pictures (Beattie, 
2014; Godfrey et al., 2003). 
 
Most of the papers looking at impression management in annual reports adopt an economics- 
based perspective, which focuses on trade-off between costs and benefits of disclosure. This 
stream documents managerial opportunism in narrative disclosure, whether this is defined as 
opacity (Courtis, 2004), selectivity (Leung et al., 2015), redundancy or boilerplate18 (Dyer et 
al., 2017; Hope et al., 2016; Kravet & Muslu, 2013). The literature also suggests a positive 
association between the presence of earnings management and distortion of graphical 
information (Godfrey et al., 2003). Other studies have documented the use impression 
management in annual results press releases (Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2017; Guillamon- 
Saorin et al., 2012), but also that this practice is restricted when the corporate governance 
system is strong (Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). 
 
The idea of impression management has diffused widely within the stream of literature that 
investigates motives for, and practices in, sustainability (or CSR) reporting and disclosure. 
Developed in non-mainstream journals since the early 1990s, this literature considers 
legitimacy theory19 as the conceptual underpinning for this type of voluntary disclosure, as 
opposed to more recent studies published in mainstream journals that focus on the value of 
CSR information in explaining firm financial performance and investor-based capture of that 
value20. The literature based on legitimacy theory is rooted in a (social) accountability 
conceptualization of the purpose of corporate reporting and provides evidence of the use of 
impression management strategies in CSR reporting. While CSR and sustainability reporting 
originated in response to public pressure over the societal and environmental impacts of 
corporate activities and/or in response to specific legitimacy threats, such as environmental 
accidents, they still have the potential to provide stakeholders with an account of the social 
and environmental impact of corporate activities (Gray et al., 1997). “[C]orporate social 
reporting as a form of impression management can contribute to firms’ reputations. (…) 
 
 
17 For more details on impression management strategies and techniques, please refer to Brennan et al. (2009), 
Cooper and Slack (2015) and Hahn and Lülfs (2014). 
18 This literature focuses on textual analysis of 10-K disclosure, whether broadly (Dyer, Lang, & Stice-Lawrence, 
2017; Lang & Stice-Lawrence, 2015) or in relation to specific items, such as risk disclosures (Hope, Hu, & Lu, 2016; 
Kravet & Muslu, 2013). While these studies do not explicitly refer to the term “impression management” which has 
not received much attraction in the North American accounting community, they still explore ideas of managerial 
opportunism in management narrative disclosures, and therefore are included here under the impression 
management umbrella. 
19 Legitimacy theory adopts a socio-political approach to the investigation of corporate disclosure. It states that 
firms that perform poorly use disclosure as a tool to obtain, maintain or restore their legitimacy to operate in our 
society. According to this approach, corporate reporting helps managing the perceptions of stakeholders, possibly 
even deflecting attention from issues of concerns or emphasizing accomplishments. 
20 See Roberts (2018) for a critique about the lack of engagement that this most recent literature has shown with 
the tradition of the other school of thoughts, and the perils of misinterpretation of recent findings in light of this lack 
of engagement. Further, refer to Section B.2 for further discussion. 
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[E]specially firms faced with a predicament, can, by using impression management, effectively 
handle legitimacy threats that in turn could affect both reputation and stock price” 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000, p. 60). 
 
Importantly, as social and environmental disclosures have only recently been included in 
stand-alone reports, early work in this area documents evidence of impression management 
in environmental (or social) information contained in annual reports. For example, Cooper and 
Slack (2015) analyse the disclosure of water leakage performance in water and sewerage 
companies in England and Wales and compare this information with the counter-account 
provided by the industry regulator, OFWAT. They find that the level, nature and presentation 
of a leakage disclosures change markedly reflective of their performance against OFWAT’s 
target (failure to meet the target). Specifically, these changes in reporting practice include the 
use of tactics and presentational methods consistent with impression management, raising 
concerns regarding the balance and trustworthiness of such disclosures in the annual report. 
Based on their evidence, Cooper and Slack (2015) recommend that IASB should consider 
additional guidance on narrative disclosure, including on issues relating to presentational 
format, to reduce the scope for impression management in annual reports. While in this study 
environmental disclosures of water leakages are voluntary information, another study 
analyses the quality of such disclosures when they are mandatorily required in the financial 
report (Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008). Besides documenting non-compliance, the study also 
provides evidence of use of various impression management strategies, ranging from 
dismissal to concealment. 
 
Hahn and Lülfs (2014) argue that because sustainability reports are voluntary, they are “prone 
to interpretation and greenwashing”. In a voluntary context, standards for reporting such as 
the GRI guidelines, may be helpful to improve the quality of reporting. However, Hahn and 
Lülfs (2014) show that, with specific reference to the issue of balance and impartiality of 
information, firms tend to avoid disclosing negative impacts, which they interpret as “symbolic 
legitimation” strategies. While “substantial legitimation” would require a real change in 
corporate aims, actions and activities, “symbolic legitimation” strategies have the aim of 
changing stakeholder perceptions of these processes, for example through disclosures 
choices. Evidence of impression management has also been documented in other specific 
aspect of sustainability reporting, such as disclosure on biodiversity (Adler et al., 2018; Boiral, 
2014). 
 
The critical stream of research on the use of impression management tactics in sustainability 
reports has recently moved away from legitimacy theory and employed a new theoretical 
concept labelled ‘organised hypocrisy’ to analyse the use of misleading information. Cho et al. 
(2015) explain that misleading sustainability disclosure in some company’s narratives is 
related to contradictory societal and institutional pressures that require organizations to 
provide different “narratives” to different stakeholders and develop a façade that helps 
maintain their legitimacy. They note that these insights suggest that it is unlikely that 
sustainability reporting will ever evolve into a more meaningful, substantive disclosure. 
Similarly, Cho et al. (2018) provide evidence of the misleading discourse contained in stand- 
alone reports, by considering and comparing the “frontstage sustainability discourse” of a 
sample of US oil and gas firms to their “backstage corporate political activities” in the context 
of the passage of the American-Made Energy and Good Jobs Act, also known as the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) Bill. In other words, these companies’ sustainability 
discourse on environmental stewardship and responsibility is inconsistent and misaligned with 
the firms’ less visible but proactive political strategies. Cho et al. (2018) interpret this 
misalignment as evidence of ‘organised hypocrisy’. 
 
Whether sustainability reporting is indeed employed to camouflage corporate actions is a 
debate that is not fully resolved in the literature. There is strong evidence that firms are prone 
to manage their reputation and legitimacy through sustainability reporting and portray an 
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image that is possibly more favourable than the underlying performance. Such evidence draws 
from a wide literature covering a relatively long period that documents instances of impression 
management when the underlying performance is less favourable. However, one key aspect 
of this literature is that it is mostly based on voluntary reporting settings. There is more 
research that needs to be done to understand whether the widespread adoption of regulation 
and disclosure mandates will have a positive effect on the quality of sustainability reporting. 
However, sustainability reporting may also have strong transformative potential (McNally & 
Maroun, 2018) if it helps in changing corporate behaviour (see Section A.2.5 and Section E 
for more details on this literature). 
 
 
A.2.3. Use of Computerised Textual Analysis to define measures of reporting quality 
 
The increase in the narratives that accompany financial statements, whether reported in the 
annual report, or other forms of complementary reports (e.g. sustainability reports), or in other 
form of communication (earnings announcements, earnings forecasts, etc.) reveal that the 
importance of narrative, unstructured reporting for valuation purposes is possibly as high as 
that of structured, quantitative financial statements. Luckily, the advent of natural language 
processing and computational linguistic have allowed a better understanding of the verbal 
content of company reporting, as well is allowing the identification of attributes of specific 
disclosures among the overall report, see for example Hope et al. (2016), Kravet and Muslu 
(2013) and Muslu, et al. (2014). For a complete overview of the status of the literature and 
status of art in this specific field please refer to the following three literature reviews: Lewis 
and Young (2019), Li (2010) and Loughran and McDonald (2016). In this section, we only 
provide a brief description of the key measures that papers in this area have employed, i.e. 
tone and readability (see Box 2). 
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Box 2. Textual attributes of disclosure 
Tone (Loughran & McDonald, 2011): using a frequency-of-words approach, papers have 
focused on identifying the tone (optimistic/positive vs. pessimistic/negative) of the narrative 
information reported in either annual reports or other forms of reporting such as 
sustainability reports or press releases. Studies in this area are alternatively positioned in 
the impression management (or management obfuscation) vs. incremental information 
hypotheses, i.e. hypothesise that if firms use narrative disclosures to better inform markets, 
any positive language should be related positively to future performance, vs. the idea that 
optimism in disclosure is used to portray a more favourable view of the underlying 
performance (Bozzolan et al., 2015; Cho, Roberts, & Patten, 2010; Muslu et al., 2019; 
Yekini,  Wisniewski,  &  Millo,  2016).  Allee & DeAngelis (2015) have considered tone 
“dispersion”, under the hypothesis that “a more even distribution of tone (higher tone 
dispersion) throughout the narrative reflects a portrayal of good or bad news as pervasive, 
while a less even distribution (lower tone dispersion) isolates the news to fewer 
components of performance” (p. 242). 
Readability: the concept of readability relates to that of transparency (Dyer et al., 2016; 
Dyer et al., 2017; Guay et al., 2016; Hasan, 2018; Lang & Stice-Lawrence, 2015; Lehavy 
et al., 2011; Li, 2008; Loughran & McDonald, 2014; Muslu et al., 2019; Rennekemp, 2012). 
The more readable the narratives, the more transparent. Papers in this area often use the 
length of the report or a section of a report as a measure of complexity or transparency 
rather than as a proxy for the amount/quantity of information (differently from content 
analysis studies), but it is likely to be capturing both. Other papers employ specific 
readability measures coming from the computational linguistic literature, like the Fog index 
which “combines the number of words per sentence and the number of syllables per word 
to create a measure of readability. The Fog index proposes that, assuming everything else 
to be equal, more syllables per word or more words per sentence make a document harder 
to read” (Li, 2008, p. 222). Other papers rely on frequency-of-words approaches such as 
that used by the software DICTION to derive measure of obfuscation (such as the 
“certainty” score in (Cho et al., 2010). Refer also to (Craig & Brennan, 2012) for other 




A.2.4. Information quality and assurance in sustainability reports 
 
Sustainability-related issues have become more central to capital markets (see for example 
the recent EU initiative on Sustainable Finance and the Task Force on climate-related financial 
disclosures). Given the concerns expressed by the literature on the quality of sustainability 
reporting and evidence provided of impression management/boilerplate disclosures discussed 
in Section A.2.2, a key debate is whether and how assurance of sustainability information can 
improve the quality of this type of reporting. It is generally assumed by standard setters and 
stakeholders that assurance provides credibility to sustainability information (Simnett et al., 
2009). Another stream of accounting literature is critical of the idea that the goal of assurance 
providers in the sustainability reporting arena is to improve the credibility of reporting or that 
they are able to do so, e.g. O’Dwyer et al. (2011); see also Michelon et al. (2019) for a full 
discussion and further references. Importantly, in sustainability reporting narratives have a 
greater role than in financial reporting, given that not all social and environmental issues can 
be reported in terms of their financial costs or benefits. Hence, providing assurance for this 
type of reporting is quite a different process than it is in the traditional financial reporting arena. 
 
Two recent papers give further insights on this debate. Ballou et al. (2018) and Michelon et al. 
(2019) both provide evidence that the presence assurance is positively related to the likelihood 
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of reporting a sustainability restatement (or more than one), i.e. the voluntary disclosure in a 
report (usually a footnote) that indicates that either there was an error or emission (in a prior 
year report), or that there have been methodological changes that required a recalculation of 
previously reported data). This positive association is opposite to what is found in the financial 
auditing literature, which provides evidence of a positive association between audit quality and 
financial reporting quality. Palmrose & Scholz (2004) find that audit quality is negatively related 
to financial restatements. In other words, assurance should lead to the discovery of errors 
prior to reporting, whereas findings of Ballou et al. (2018) and Michelon et al. (2019) suggest 
the opposite. Despite obtaining similar results, the two studies provide two different 
interpretations for this positive association. Ballou et al. (2018) consider restatements to be a 
sign of reporting quality, that is enhanced through assurance (i.e. assurance leads to 
improvements in the quality of the information, although after the release of the report, rather 
than ahead of it). Michelon et al. (2019) adopt a more critical perspective and suggest that 
these restatements are a means for assurance providers to establish their legitimacy in a new 
market. Whereas a financial restatement would damage the reputation of the auditor in the 
financial reporting context, Michelon et al. (2019) argue that a restatement of information from 
prior sustainability reporting is less likely to be viewed negatively as in financial reporting for 
the following reasons: 
 
• lack of clear/universally adopted reporting standards, 
 
• ambiguous assurance guidelines, and 
 
• under-developed or non-existent firm-specific internal sustainability reporting 
systems, among others. 
 
Michelon et al. (2019) do not deny that assurance eventually leads to the discovery of errors 
(even if after the release of the report), and therefore may contribute to improving in the long 
term the quality of sustainability information. However, they also highlight the following key 
challenges for sustainability assurance research and practice: 
 
• the lack of guidance in assurance standards when it comes to materiality threshold; 
 
• the lack of regulatory filings for the disclosure of these restatements, 
 




A.2.5. Alternative approaches to quality definitions 
 
Whereas the majority of accounting research relies on objective, accurate proxies for the 
concept of quality of reporting, other epistemological streams of literature take a different 
perspective. This is particularly true for the field known as social and environmental 
accounting, that has investigated the role of social and environmental (or sustainability) 
reporting for stakeholders, as well as the role of stakeholder engagement in producing social 
and environmental reporting21. Two key messages come from this literature, in relation to the 





21 The GRI framework recommends stakeholder engagement in the definition of what issues are material for 
reporting. In other words, it recommends that stakeholders have a say on the issues and topics they wish to see 
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First, this literature ascribes the potential for an educational, aspirational, emancipatory role 
to this type of reporting (Christensen et al., 2013). The emancipatory role is defined in terms 
of its ability to develop good reporting practice that also transforms the underlying corporate 
activities and decisions (See also Section E). In Thomson and Bebbington’s (2005) words: 
“education should lead to a desire and ability to develop ‘praxis’ whereby knowing about the 
world and having an emancipatory goal in mind leads to actions which transform individual 
and collective lives in a just and equitable manner” (p. 510). Such educational role, albeit 
idealised and ambitious, gives sustainability reporting a legitimate aspiration. In such a 
context, accounts are considered educational artefacts and the quality of the information (and 
potential for education and change they convey) is related to the underlying quality of the 
stakeholder engagement that leads to the production of this accounts. “What emerges, 
however, is that there is the (at least implicit) belief that if social and environmental reporting 
flows from a stakeholder engagement process then the reporting will be ‘good’, or at least 
better than it would have been if it hadn’t taken place. The quality of the reporting, therefore, 
is intimately linked to the quality of stakeholder engagement which precedes and is part of the 
report” (Thomson & Bebbington, 2005, p. 517). Whereas Thomson and Bebbington use a 
pedagogical lens to discuss the quality of reporting in terms of its emancipatory potential, the 
literature also suggests the production of these emancipatory potential requires a 
conceptualisation of dialogic forms of accountability (Brown, 2009; Brown et al., 2015; Irvine 
& Moerman, 2017). In this perspective, reporting is considered as part of the governance 
system, conceptualised not as control, but as participatory governance (Bebbington et al., 
2007; Brown & Dillard, 2015). Although participatory governance and dialogic accountability 
have the potential to bring change, they could still be subject to managerial capture, if their 
adoption was done symbolically (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown & Dillard, 2013a, 2013b; 
Passetti et al., 2019). 
 
Second, and linked to the point above, stakeholders may produce information about the 
company, complementing that released by companies. Considering this set of “external” 
information may impact the overall quality of corporate reporting, in that the voice of the 
stakeholders interested in the impact of corporate activities may improve the overall 
accountability. These “counter-accounts” are alternative financial or narrative accounts that 
are externally produced to promote corporate transparency and accountability, with the 
potential for social change (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2017; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Irvine & 
Moerman, 2017). In other words, any report prepared by relevant stakeholders can be 
conceived as a counter-account: “information and reporting systems employed by groups (…) 
with a view to promoting their causes or countering prevailing official [corporate] position(s)” 
(Gallhofer et al., 2006, pp. 681-682). These counter-accounts can be radical and distanced, 
or engaged and consensus-seeking (O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009), because of the different 
rationales motivating the stakeholder groups. Therefore, the overall performance of a 
company can be understood through a construction of the performance portrayed in multiple 
reports (Georgakopoulos & Thomson, 2008). As counter-accounts represent a reconstruction 
of the social reality of the firm, they help building accountability (Boiral, 2013; Rodrigue, 2014). 
 
Another element that emerges from non-mainstream literature is that narrative forms of 
reporting can be analysed in the light of dynamics of power, e.g. discourse analysis (Beelitz & 
Merkl-Davies, 2012; Mäkelä, 2013), story-telling (Al-Htaybat & von Alberti-Alhtaybat, 2018; 
Beattie, 2014; Courtis, 2004; Higgins et al,, 2014; Lai et al., 2018), sense-making and sense- 
giving (Beattie, 2014; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2011). For others, quality can be assessed 





discussed in a sustainability report. This is in contrast to the approach adopted by the SASB, where issues are ex- 
ante defined as material in terms of their potential impact on capital markets. 
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stakeholders (Chaidali & Jones, 2017; Diouf & Boiral, 2017; Helfaya et al., 2019; Higgins et 
al., 2014; Hui & Matsunaga, 2015; Lai et al., 2018). 
 
Finally, a few papers have analysed lack of success of certain forms of reporting, and tried to 
identify the reasons, as well as to reflect on the lessons learned (Nielsen & Roslender, 2015; 
Roslender & Nielsen, 2017). The two papers by Nielsen and Roslender focus on the demise 
of the intellectual capital statement (ICS) reporting framework that emerged from the Danish 
Guideline Project (DGP). The findings suggest that the practice failed to achieve enough 
traction, possibly because of other regulatory pressures related to different forms of reporting 
or the financial crisis. They highlight that, despite the lack of success and continuation, it was 
deemed as a positive experience with benefits mainly for the internal management and 
employees. In those organisations that persevered with some form of reporting, the key 
difference was the presence of champions at the senior management level who would 
advocate enthusiastically about the importance and relevance of the intellectual capital 
statement. The authors also relate the lack of institutionalization of the practice in the country 
to weak regulatory requirements to report on the issue (and therefore suggest that making 
disclosure mandatory is imperative). Further, they identify a lack of competence and 
willingness to promote and engage in the practice on the side of the accounting profession. 
 
 
A.3. Concluding comments 
 
Defining the quality of corporate reporting is a challenging endeavour, and likely to be driven 
by the notion of what is the purpose of corporate reporting for standard setters, regulators and 
academics alike. The following key conclusions can be drawn: 
 
• The academic literature has identified three perspectives in this regard: valuation, 
stewardship and accountability (Beyer et al., 2010; Jonas & Blanchet, 2000). 
While valuation and stewardship have long been the main roles attributed to financial 
information, recently they have also been considered in relation to non-financial 
information. The accountability view has instead traditionally assumed a broader 
view of corporate reporting, as addressing the needs of a variety of stakeholders, 
with the inherent complexities and trade-offs that different information needs have in 
terms of what and how to report. 
 
• The quality of financial information can be defined in terms of how useful information 
is for investors and lenders when making investment decisions. However, it also 
entails a transparency connotation in that it should faithfully represent the firm’s 
underlying performance. 
 
• In practice, the quality of financial information will depend on how well the reporting 
process is able to measure and capture the underlying performance, but 
management discretion can influence both positively and negative the quality of 
financial information. In other words, the quality is related to the set of reporting 
incentives of the firm. It is possible that market pressure to deliver short-term 
reported performance impair the quality of financial reporting overall, by undermining 
the long-term viability of firm’s performance (i.e. “real earnings management”), as 
documented by survey-based studies. 
 
• Broadly speaking, there are trade-offs among the different attributes of financial 
information (for example between timeliness and accuracy, between comparability 
and relevance). Earnings attributes are desirable to the extent that they reduce 
information risk and the expected rate of return for shareholders. The literature 
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seems to suggest that accounting-based attributes are associated with stronger 
capital market effects than market-based attributes 
 
• With respect to accounting conservatism, while it may decrease the value relevance 
of earnings, it does benefit lenders and borrowers in debt-contracting and protects 
shareholder against overcompensating management (see also Section D) 
 
• Narrative reporting has been investigated as complementing and explaining firm’s 
performance. The literature has made an effort to identify qualitative characteristics 
that indicate whether narrative information is providing meaningful information to the 
users of corporate reporting, as management is prone to adopt impression 
management techniques that can obfuscate poor results or emphasize good ones. 
What is “meaningful” to users is very much related to the specific issue that is being 
reported on, so that in order to evaluate the quality of narrative reporting one should 
consider both the topic (e.g. greenhouse gas emission, business strategy, risks) as 
well as the user (e.g. shareholders, lenders or other stakeholders). 
 
• Studies that have employed manual content analysis of narrative reporting typically 
have the limitation of small samples and/or issue of subjectivity in the coding itself, 
but they have the merit of having identified detailed frameworks to define which 
characteristics make disclosure of higher quality. The advent of computational 
linguistic and natural language processing will help overcome the limitation of small 
sample studies and increase the external validity of the research findings, under the 
assumption that they are able to correctly identify key characteristics of the 
narratives. 
 
• Whereas audit and assurance are deemed to increase the quality of financial 
reporting, for sustainability/CSR reporting the evidence is not so clear, mainly due to 
the lack of comparable reporting practices, ambiguous assurance guidelines 
(including issues materiality thresholds) and relatively young and underdeveloped 
reporting systems. 
 
• A stream of research suggests that, at the conceptual level – corporate reporting can 
have an emancipatory, transformative power, especially with respect to social and 
environmental issues (see also Section E). However, it would require that the 
process of reporting embeds and develops from close interactions with stakeholders 
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B. What is the role of regulation in corporate reporting? How does 
regulation affect (financial or non-financial) information 
reported? 
Leuz (2010) identifies four economic reasons to justify the regulation of financial reporting and 
disclosure practices: 
 
• the existence of externalities, 
 
• market-wide cost savings from regulation, 
 
• insufficient private sanctions and dead-weight costs from fraud, 
 
• and agency conflict that could be mitigated by disclosure. 
 
However, it is important to note that disclosure is not only subject to regulation but can also 
itself be considered a regulatory mechanism (Spira & Page, 2010). In other words, disclosure 
regulation is used to steer corporate practices towards desired outcomes (Christensen et al., 
2017). With the introduction of a disclosure mandate, firms are expected to alter the activities 
they are required to report on whenever stakeholders may use the information to put pressure 
on firms (Christensen et al., 2019). See Section E for more details on real effects of corporate 
disclosure. 
 
Reporting regimes can be created privately or by the law. While public regulators have the 
advantage of having more investigative and enforcement power, the advantage of private- 
sector regulators (or so called “private authority regulation”) is expertise in technical matters 
(Bushman & Landsman, 2010; Leuz, 2010). However, both types of regulators may be prone 
to capture. 
 
The case for mandatory disclosure is sustained by the public interest theory, which takes the 
position that markets are subject to failures, and that (benevolent and competent) government 
can correct them. However, this theory has been criticised on three lines of argument: 
 
1. competition and market orderings can mitigate market failures, 
 
2. when the above does not happen, contracts correctly written and enforced can also 
resolve market failures, 
 
3. the assumption of benevolent and competent governments does not necessarily hold 
true. In fact, regulators can themselves be captured by their own self- (rather than the 
public-) interest. 
 
Hence, regulation introducing mandatory disclosure may not be effective in solving the market 
failure if regulators (whether public or private) are indeed captured. Ultimately, regulation is a 
political decision process (Bushman & Landsman, 2010; Christensen, 2010; Moran, 2010; 





22 Rowbottom and Schroeder (2014) explore the repeal of legislation requiring UK companies to report an operating 
and financial review and “illustrate the process by which accounting regulation is influenced by political ideology” 
(p.656). While most research focuses on political and ideological influences that lead to predictable regulatory 
outcomes, this paper is interesting because it analyses under which circumstances “the power of political influence 
was largely resisted by those it was intended to benefit, leading to an unpredictable regulatory outcome” (p. 656). 
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The effects of regulation on reporting practices are likely to be conceptually related to the 
regulation on disclosure. First, a key point is what firms should report, although this issue is 
strictly related to why the regulation would be beneficial in the first place. “If the underlying 
rationale for regulation is to create cost savings by mandating a standardised solution which 
is close to what firms would be willing to provide in private contracts, then the rules should 
focus on general purpose information that is likely to be useful for many different contracts. If 
the underlying rationale is based on dead-weight costs from fraud and agency conflicts, the 
rules should focus on information” (Leuz, 2010, p. 234). 
 
Second, there is an issue of how much discretion to leave to firms. Discretion is a double-edge 
sword (see Section A). While the application of discretion has the potential to make the 
regulation less costly for the firm and allow managers to convey private information and better 
reflect the underlying economic performance, it can also be used opportunistically 
(Christensen et al., 2019; Leuz, 2010). See section C and D for specific examples. 
 
Third, reporting outcomes are also likely to be affected by the costs associated with 
implementing disclosure regulation (Bushman & Landsman, 2010; Leuz, 2010; Leuz & 
Wysocki, 2016). Besides direct costs of producing, distributing and verifying the information, 
there are likely to be indirect costs because disclosing information to capital markets can also 
inform other parties (whether it is competitors, regulators, etc.). 
 
Fourth, disclosure regulation comes into force within a pre-existing set of other institutional 
arrangements and complementarities (Bushman & Landsman, 2010; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016; 
Moran, 2010), as reporting regulation is usually an element of a country’s institutional 
infrastructure. All of these elements, and the interdependencies among them (Leuz, 2010) are 
likely to affect the effectiveness of the regulation (as defined by the regulator), as well as how 
firms respond to the new disclosure regulation.23 
 
Finally, mandating disclosure also implies setting up a certain enforcement regime. This 
requires consideration of, for example, which authority is designated to enforce the rule, how 
compliance will be monitored and what potential sanctions are available in case of a violation. 
Enforcement is a key variable in determining not only how firms will adjust reporting practices, 
but also how the market perceives the introduction of new mandatory standards for reporting 
(Christensen et al., 2013). Further, the interactions and dynamics between voluntary and 
mandatory disclosures are likely to be important when implementing new disclosure mandates 
(Cianciaruso & Sridhar, 2018; Einhorn, 2005): mandatory disclosures may influence the 
incremental information content of voluntary disclosures, and therefore also contribute to 
explaining the firm’s discretionary disclosure strategies. See also evidence provided by 
Francis et al. (2008), discussed in Section A. 
 
A thorough review of the literature on the economics of disclosure and financial reporting 
regulation is provided by Leuz & Wysocki (2016), to which we refer for more insights on the 
consequences of disclosure regulation. The key points raised by Leuz & Wysocki are as 
follows:24 
 
1. Research on the effects of disclosure and regulation is not always able to provide 
evidence for causal effects, which require identifying counterfactuals (i.e. groups that 
are not affected by the regulation) or natural experiments that allow a good identification 
of the regulatory effects. Common to the literature on earnings quality, it is hard to 
 
 
23 For an overview of different approaches to reporting, see Leuz (2010) and Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003). 
24 We acknowledge some overlap with discussion in later sections. However, we note that these issues are pertinent 
to the same problem, although in relation to different research questions, and therefore give them visibility wherever 
necessary. 
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disentangle the disclosure outcomes from underlying performance, which would be 
necessary in order to have a clear view of how regulation changes disclosure and the 
economic consequences of such change. Similarly, it is hard for research to provide an 
accurate account of costs and benefits of disclosure regulation. 
 
2. There is less research that looks at market wide effects of regulation (spillovers), despite 
the fact that this evidence would be central to the purpose of the regulation itself. 
 
3. The literature has mostly focused on regulation in the US rather than other countries, 
but because of the interaction among elements of the countries’ institutional frameworks, 
studying other countries would provide a richer understanding of regulatory effects, 
whether intended or unintended, and beyond just consequences for capital markets. 
 
4. The adoption of IFRS worldwide has created a huge literature on the effects of reporting 
standards internationally, but there are few studies that are able to attribute capital 
market effects to the change in accounting standards. There are two reasons for this: 
(1) IFRS were not adopted in isolation but together with other institutional arrangements, 
making it difficult to separate the effects of IFRS adoption from other concurrent 
institutional changes; (2) IFRS were adopted together with changes also in enforcement 
rules, which, again, makes it hard to identify the effect of IFRS adoptions separately. 
 
5. Impact assessments and post-implementation reviews could be done more openly and 
involve researchers more extensively. Researchers need the support of legislators and 
regulators to be able to estimate causal effects and cost-benefit analysis of disclosure 
regulation. This implies that to have good economic analysis regulation should be 
designed with “ex-post” analysis in mind, which also includes the collection of the 
necessary data. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, we will review empirical papers that have focused on the 
effects of regulation on corporate reporting (B.1) and provide an overview of studies that have 
studied the evolution of reporting (B.2). 
 
 
B.1. Empirical papers on the effects of regulation on corporate reporting 
 
As noted above, in point 3 from the literature review by Leuz and Wysocki (2016), most of the 
academic evidence is focused on the US context. Two regulations that have attracted a lot of 
attention are the Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. With respect to key 
findings, we refer to Leuz and Wysocki (2016), who include a very thorough and 
comprehensive review of these studies (see Section 4.2, pp. 560-571). Further, in relation to 
the stream of accounting research on internal controls related to the regulatory changes 
introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we refer to the very recent literature review by 
Chalmers et al. (2019). Finally, Christensen et al. (2019) offer an economic analysis of 
CSR/sustainability reporting standards adoption that includes a comprehensive review of the 
literature investigating the consequences of CSR reporting regulation. We refer to this report 
for further insights. 
 
 
B.1.1. Studies on European Directives 
 
Christensen and colleagues (2016) look into the implementation of two EU Directives affecting 
disclosure through security regulation: the Market Abuse Directive (on insider trading and 
market manipulation) and the Transparency Directive (on reporting and disclosure). The 
55  
Transparency Directive focuses also on improving supervisory regimes and enforcement 
rather than expanding existing disclosure requirements. Both Directives have the overarching 
goal of reducing adverse selection in capital markets and they therefore focus on market 
liquidity. One key element of interest in this study is the research design, that allows for 
plausible causal evidence, which is something that most studies in the area cannot provide. 
The idea behind the research design is to make sure that there is not “something else” that 
may explain the capital market outcomes documented in relation to the adoption of the 
regulation. 
 
Christensen et al. (2016) exploit the fact that the Directives were adopted in the 27 EU 
countries at different points in time. This is important for three reasons. First, it is less likely 
that any documented market outcome across different countries is affected by concurrent, but 
unrelated, economic shocks. Second, this staggered implementation (i.e. different dates of 
adoption in different countries) makes the investigation less likely to pick up other market 
responses to events that may have given rise to the Directives in the first place. Third, they 
exploit the existence of unregulated markets (that are not affected by the new directives) within 
the EU countries to control for concurrent country-specific shocks. Their insights are also 
useful because the benefits documented on capital markets vary across countries, indicating 
that although the same regulation was imposed across all of them, other institutional features, 
including prior regulation and ability to enforce the new rules, matter. It is important to note 
that archival studies that can reasonably provide causal effects of disclosure regulation with 
such rigorous research design are rare. At most, evidence in the area can be interpreted 
qualitatively (as associations) and little can be said on the economic magnitude of the effects. 
 
One recent study looks at the more recent Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFD) (Aureli et 
al., 2019) in the UK, Italy and France. This Directive imposes minimum requirements, allowing 
EU member states flexibility in implementation action in terms of the content of the new 
disclosure requirements. These authors analyse the domestic regulation in force before and 
after the introduction of the directive, suggesting a convergence of rules and some change in 
certain countries. For example, they find similarities in provisions that encourage 
completeness, clarity, comparability, accuracy and reliability. However, country regulators 
made different efforts to implement the new requirements. Italy, despite being the country with 
the highest distance from the new reporting requirements, moved from a poor regulation to a 
most stringent one, whereas France used the new regulation to carry prior requirements 
forwards. The UK already had reporting requirements in law that were similar to those in the 
directive and, as such, the UK changed relatively little. 
 
As the Directive implementation is recent, there are yet to be published studies that look at its 
effects on firm disclosures. Regardless, in order to properly assess the effects of the Non- 
Financial Reporting Directive, it is important to note that studies will face similar research 
identification strategies as described in Christensen et al. (2016) and Leuz and Wysocki 
(2016). Further, the effects of this Directive will also depend on pre-existing regulatory 
requirements which may be quite different, not just in terms of what they require, but also in 
terms of their tradition within the institutional setting of each country (Hibbitt & Collison, 2004). 
 
 
B.1.2. Reporting regulation in the UK 
 
In the UK, major legislative changes affected the period 1920-50, as companies began to rely 
more on funds raised on the stock exchange, transforming the reporting environment as we 
know it today. Prior to the Cohen Committee report of 1945, disclosure requirements were 
modest, with legislation providing a minimum standard that could be voluntarily supplemented 
by managerial discretion. As noted, managerial discretion can be used the most when the 
legislation is less demanding, and at the same time affect also the direction and scope of 
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future regulation. In other words, whether discretion is used purposefully or opportunistically 
will also influence how the legislator will design and implement future regulations. Arnold and 
Matthews (2002) analyse corporate disclosure data for the years 1920, 1935 and 1950 in an 
effort to provide a picture of the status quo, in the aftermath of the Royal Mail case of 1931 
(which revealed fundamental problems with the distinction between provisions and reserves), 
and at a closing date that incorporates the effects of the 1948 Act on disclosure levels. This 
study analyses the financial disclosure of a sample of 50 companies and find that transparent 
disclosure practices become more common among a small number of firms. However, the 
regulatory changes seem to have had a modest impact in the wider business community. This 
early evidence is aligned with more recent studies on US (Dyer et al., 2017) and international 
firms (Lang & Stice-Lawrence, 2015). 
 
Other studies based on the UK setting analyse the effect of the introduction of various version 
of the UK Corporate Governance Code on disclosure25. For example, Sheridan and colleagues 
(2006) identify changes in the quantity of corporate news announcements (dealing with 
strategy and operating activities of firms) issued following the publications of corporate 
governance codes. These announcements, although voluntary in nature, were retrieved from 
the London Stock Exchange Regulatory News Service (and therefore bearing potentially price- 
sensitive information) for a continuing sample of 46 companies, during a period of 13 years 
(1989-2002). The evidence suggests that the number of announcements issued per quarter 
increased after the issue of the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) 
Reports and less so after the publication of the Turnbull Report (1999) and the introduction of 
the Combined Code (2000). 
 
Notably, the Turnbull Report focused on providing a conceptual framework for risk 
management, of which risk disclosure is a key component. Solomon et al. (2000) conduct a 
survey of UK institutional investors to understand their attitude toward risk disclosure. Their 
evidence suggests that although institutional investors do not generally favour a regulated 
environment for risk disclosure or a general statement of business risk, they agreed that risk 
disclosure would help their investment decisions and that risk disclosure was an important and 
relevant issue for the corporate governance reform. Further, the survey (based on 97 
institutional investors) reveal that the characteristics of the funds managed and the investment 
horizons affect investors’ attitudes towards risk disclosure. Pension and insurance funds were 
more likely to agree that a corporate governance process should aim to encourage best 
disclosure practices within companies, but they also highlight the need to emphasize the 
maintenance of self-regulation. As with any survey, the responses today could be very 
different. 
 
The theme of risk disclosure in the UK setting is later picked up in Spira and Page (2010)26 
who look at the UK Companies Act 2006 requirement to make disclosures relating to risks and 
future prospects. While in the US, securities legislation is based on a “hard, mandatory” 
approach to disclosure, the development of the UK corporate governance policy has followed 
a softer approach, based on the comply-or-explain principle (Zeff, 2013). In this context, 
disclosure is seen to be beneficial from three linked and overlapping perspectives: “in securing 




25 Studies have also considered more broad levels of compliance and disclosure with respect to the provisions of 
the Corporate Governance Code. Elmagrhi et al. (2016) consider 100 UK listed companies from 2008 to 2013 and 
analyse their disclosures with respect to the 120 CG provisions drawn from the 2010 UK Combined Code. They 
document a substantial variation in the levels of disclosure of governance practices, that is driven by characteristics 
of the board of directors (size of the board, proportion of independent directors and board diversity). 
26 This study is also useful to illustrate that while we can observe the change in reporting behaviour in the content 
of the disclosures themselves, the behavioural effect in corporate policies and practices which disclosure is 
intended to affect are difficult to assess (see also Section E in this regard). 
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stakeholders; in enabling better investment decisions and the smooth running of capital 
markets; and as a form of indirect regulation that achieves the goals of regulators” (Spira & 
Page, 2010, p. 410). 
 
However, as mentioned in the opening of this section, disclosure itself can be considered a 
tool for regulation (Spira & Page, 2010) to steer the behaviour of companies towards improving 
practices and performance upon which they now have to disclose (Christensen et al., 2017). 
However the regulatory choice to mandate disclosure to encourage companies to make 
changes in the underlying practices may have two outcomes: (1) it can be effective in 
improving those behaviour or (2) it may encourage boilerplate responses (Christensen et al., 
2019) and “a falsehood that, if discovered, may adversely affect the reputational capital of the 
directors involved. Box ticking and boilerplate statements may be the outcome of this process” 
(Spira & Page. p. 428). See Section E for a more detailed discussion of this literature. 
 
Spira and Page (2010) provide evidence that full compliance with specific disclosure is not the 
only response and identify other types of compliance response: boilerplate disclosures and 
statement of the obvious. “Boilerplate disclosures are to be expected and it hardly seems likely 
that, given official guidance, companies will reinvent wording that has already been thought 
through by high-powered committees. Furthermore, as we found when looking at disclosures, 
deviation from the wording provided in the guidance introduced ambiguity and perhaps the 
suspicion that one was reading an explanation of noncompliance rather than additional 
information about compliance. Statements of the obvious are distinguished from boilerplate in 
that they do not rely on pre-existing forms of words, but nevertheless amount to ‘filler’ in the 
sense that they fulfil the requirement for a narrative disclosure, but leave the reader with the 
feeling that the company is providing the disclosure without anything individual to say. Both 
boilerplate and statements of the obvious, however, have little to say about the specific 
situation of the company making the disclosure.” (p. 428). 
 
The use of boilerplate disclosure can be explained in light of three possible high-level 
institutional forces: 
 
1. direct instructions to make a particular disclosure influence the use of certain wording, 
 
2. companies imitate each other, or follow the lead of others, including consultants and 
auditors) and 
 
3. there are shared patterns of thoughts are present across professions and networks that 
affect the disclosure practice 
 
However, evidence of widespread boilerplate disclosure does not necessarily imply that 
disclosure as a regulatory tool is ineffective. If the requirement to disclose influences behaviour 
directly, the form and content of the disclosure may be less important than the internal process 
by which disclosure is produced, for which we need more evidence. See Section E for more 
details. 
 
Other studies based in the UK have explored the role of regulation in affecting non-financial 
information (Bernardi & Stark, 2018; Williamson & Lynch-Wood, 2008). Williamson and Lynch- 
Wood (2008) compare the “Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and 
Directors’ Report etc.) Regulations 2005” with the Companies Act 2006. These regulations 
had the aim of improving corporate reporting on social and environmental matters by 
promoting transparency on key drivers of corporate performance. The operating and financial 
review (which has now been replaced by the strategic report) would contain a discussion of 
 
• the development and performance of the business during the financial year, 
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• the trends and drivers underlying the development and performance during the 
financial year, 
 
• and trends and factors potentially affecting the future development and performance 
of the business. 
 
Using a survey from 79 companies affected by the regulation and secondary data on the 
reactions of different stakeholders to the changes in the law, Williamson and Lynch-Wood 
(2008) show that companies that had to comply with the requirements of the operating and 
financial review were sufficiently prepared for its implementation and, given the choice, 
preferred the operating and financial review to be statutory. The authors therefore conclude 
that reasons for repealing the operating and financial review had then been overstated. 
However, they also assert that these new reporting requirements were unlikely to meet the 
information needs of all stakeholders. “By relegating the interests of wider stakeholders, [the 
new reporting requirements] seem to ignore the evidence that stakeholder conflict exists and 
that this conflict is usually resolved in favour of shareholders (Owen et al., 2001). This leads 
us to conclude that without far-reaching institutional rights being built into the law the 
differentials between stakeholder groups will remain (Swift, 2001), which will continue to 
undermine the legitimacy of corporate actions” (p. 137). 
 
The arguments presented immediately above are aligned with the idea that the quality of 
reporting (and the relevance of disclosures) are to be assessed with reference to the purpose 
of reporting itself (see Section A). For example, in the case of social and environmental 
information, the interests of stakeholders other than investors are particularly relevant and 
could affect both what information is reported and the way that information is reported. A 
typical example is greenhouse gas emissions. Until recently, and before the emergence of the 
label ‘climate emergency’, capital markets were perhaps uninterested in such information as 
it did not bear the regulatory and reputational risks it bears today. Therefore, the presence of 
this specific purpose was not considered “material” for investors, yet it may have helped 
regulators and policy makers. Furthermore, the quantity of emissions at the local level are 
material to the community of people living in proximity to the site creating the emissions (an 
oil well, a factory, etc.). However, in itself this information may not be material for investors, 
who are generally more interested in the total levels of pollution from emissions. Should firms 
report specific information about average emission levels at the site-level, and across different 
areas, where regulatory burdens are different? Or should they report total emission levels? 
When does a social and environmental issue become material and for whom? 
 
Such key questions are fundamental in the debate about whether corporate reporting should 
be conceived to satisfy the information needs of shareholders and investors, at the expense 
of other stakeholders. Scholars have criticized this approach and proposed accounting and 
reporting models to reach wider stakeholders (Harrison & van der Laan Smith, 2015). 
 
 
B.2. Evolution of reporting 
 
Despite the decrease in value relevance of financial statements in the US setting (Hail, 2013; 
see also to Section C.2.3 where the reasons for this are discussed), financial statements are 
still deemed to be an essential component of the financial reporting system, and the corporate 
governance model of a firm (Baker & Wallage, 2000; Davern et al., 2019). A notable exception 
is the point of view of Baruch Lev and Feng Gu, expressed in their book “The end of accounting 
and the path forward for investors and managers” (Lev & Gu, 2016). One key reason for their 
claims about “the end of accounting” is the decreasing role that financial reporting has for 
valuation purposes in capital markets. However, as outlined in Section A, the usefulness of 
financial reporting for investors is only one of the potential purposes of corporate reporting. 
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The literature has in fact highlighted that stewardship and accountability (i.e. needs of users 
that are not necessarily investors) also are key aims that corporate reporting can serve. 
 
Such views are also expressed in Baker & Wallage (2000). They acknowledge that the 
currently accepted model of financial reporting may be disrupted or transformed by 
technological innovation, but they also state that predicting with certainty the future of financial 
reporting is a difficult task (Hail, 2013). Almost 20 years ago, they brought forward the idea 
that “the currently accepted model of financial reporting may not reflect the manner in which 
investment decisions are actually made, consequently raising the question of whether investor 
decision-making should be the principal raison d'etre of financial reporting” (p. 174). Their 
conceptual paper argues that there is still need for financial reports to serve the need of 
corporate governance, for the benefits of a wider range of stakeholders, and society more in 
general. 
 
Starting from, and adapting, the recommendations of an ICAS discussion/conceptual report 
on “Auditing into the Twenty-first Century (McInnes, 1993)”, a new financial reporting model 
would give more emphasis on the accountability of directors towards a wider group of 
stakeholders, and with regards to a wider range of matters not strictly related to financial 
performance (Baker & Wallage, 2000). Although such a model would be controversial, Baker 
and Wallage (2000) argue that if decision usefulness is to be the primary criterion to assess 
the quality of financial reports, then there is a need to clarify who the decision-makers are. 
Currently, these decision makers are the shareholders and investors. “If the focus of 
accounting standards setting bodies were to shift to a wider notion of decision-making and 
stakeholder groups, it is likely that financial reports, including audited financial statements, 
would look quite different than they do at present. If adopted, the recommendations of the 
ICAS document would mean significant changes to the accepted financial reporting model and 
the current system of corporate governance” (p. 183). They further conclude that to improve 
financial reporting, the institutional process by which changes are developed needs to be 
“oriented to the public interest, focused on the right objectives, open to new ideas, proactive 
in obtaining the needed information, and free of needless barriers to progress”. Any new 
reporting regulation - in their view - should be responsive to the changing circumstances of 
the public interest. 
 
Fifteen years after the paper by Baker & Wallage (2000), others have reiterated the need for 
financial reporting to go beyond serving the needs of shareholders only (Harrison & van der 
Laan Smith, 2015). In 2010, the FASB carried out a revision of its conceptual framework 
through the release of Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8. This statement 
essentially limited the range of addressees of financial reporting to potential investors and 
creditors. With these decision-makers in mind, information serves the purpose of allowing 
rational investment decisions which also consider the prospects of future performance. 
Harrison & van der Laan Smith (2015) develop a critique of the FASB choice to limit the range 
of addressee of financial reports. They question that accounting practices should be founded 
only on financial-focused theories and challenge the idea of shareholder supremacy (vis-à-vis 
other stakeholders). In their paper, they propose a model for the responsibility of the public 
accounting profession, and they call for the profession to consider the development of 
standards for reporting information for the needs of a broader group of stakeholders than just 
investors and creditors. Along similar lines, but even more provocative, is the standpoint of 
Brown and Dillard (2015) who also challenge the shareholder focus of conventional accounting 
and call for new approaches that promote wider accountability and participatory governance 
(see Section A). 
 
One key consideration emerging from this debate is that widening the scope of corporate 
reporting to also include the provision of non-financial information does not necessarily require 
that the purpose of corporate reporting will change or has changed. Furthermore, the inclusion 
of non-financial information may not be enough to satisfy the information needs of decision- 
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makers other than shareholders. Recently critiques have been made that the Integrated 
Reporting (<IR>) framework (and the Sustainability Accounting Standard Board - SASB), for 
example, while having broadened the range of information companies are asked to report, has 
done so with a disproportionate focus on the needs of investors (Flower, 2015; see also 
Section D.2.3). Similar concerns have been brought about by the requirements of the Non- 
Financial Reporting Directive (Monciardini, 2016). For a brief overview of the major standard 
setters in CSR reporting, please refer to Rupley et al. (2017, pp. 173–174). 
 
Christensen et al. (2019) also note that the definition of what is deemed material when it comes 
to sustainability reporting is unclear, as the relevant decision makers for this type of information 
would be much broader (for more details, refer to Section 6.2 of their paper). The GRI 
framework, in this regard, recommends extensive stakeholder engagement in the definition 
and identification of social and environmental matters that are to be deemed as material, 
whereas the SASB, for example, identifies which items are material by industry in terms of 
their potential effects on capital markets. Ultimately, which approach is better – once again – 
depends on the purpose of reporting, but it is important to note that there is a trade- off 
between the two. There is a risk that items that do not necessarily have (short term) financial 
implications for capital markets, do have an impact for other stakeholders (i.e. negative 
externalities) and until these potential negative impacts become a risk for the firm (whether 
operational or reputational), it may go unaccounted for (refer to example on greenhouse gas 
emissions reported the previous section). 
 
Along these lines, Unerman et al. (2018) note that sustainability reporting often includes issues 
that “are not captured in, or are external to, the financial dimensions of transactions and events 
as communicated in financial reporting” (p. 498). In other words, these “externalities” arise 
from corporate activities, but are borne by others, and therefore do not bear implications for 
the short-term financial performance (although they may have long-term effects). However, 
Unerman et al. (2018) note that as these externalities are recognised as financial risks or 
opportunities, firms may voluntarily internalise them (i.e. change underlying practices to avoid 
negative financial implications or exploit potential benefits). Despite the challenges in 
quantifying these externalities, the ultimate argument in their paper is that in order to 
communicate the financial impacts of externalities, the “silos” between the domains of financial 
reporting and sustainability reporting should be broken down. 
 
There are other papers that have reflected upon the evolution of CSR/sustainability reporting, 
in light of the fact that (a) it is increasingly becoming an integral part of wider corporate 
reporting, and (b) that several international and supranational initiatives are likely to increase 
the intertwining between sustainability and traditional financial reporting (<IR>). Tschopp & 
Huefner (2015) provide an overview of the evolution of CSR reporting in comparison with 
financial reporting. (See Figure B.1 below, which reports for convenience Table 1 from their 
paper for an overview). Their analysis suggests that CSR reporting is still in its infancy, 
characterized by a lack of standardization and deficiencies in comparability, indicating that the 
quality of CSR reporting is still relatively low compared with that of financial reporting. 
However, there is a trade-off between comparability and relevance of information. While 
standardization helps comparability, it may render information less relevant for decision 
making if the standards do not allow enough discretion or story-telling (see more discussion 
about trade-offs of attributes of information in Section A, see also Section D.2.3). A more 
recent study further suggests that there is a lack of convergence in the definition of what is 
non-financial reporting among regulators and standard setters (Stolowy & Paugam, 2018). 
Because of this inconsistency, there is a lot of variation also in corporate reporting practices. 
 
Regulatory disclosure regimes when it comes to social and environmental matters are quite 
different among the US, Canada and Europe (Schneider et al., 2018), although the line 
between what is mandatory and what is voluntary has become blurred recently across the 
three settings. Specifically, despite disclosure being mandatory, regulation typically only sets 
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minimum reporting requirements, and therefore managers are still left with considerable 
discretion on what and how to report. This implies that we may be able to observe 
heterogeneity in the quality and substance of information provided. Further, recent regulatory 
initiatives may modify the reporting channel through which information is delivered to the public 
rather than asking for new information to be released. An example of such regulatory initiative 
is studied by Christensen et al. (2017). Section 1503 of the Dodd-Frank Act required 
mandatory inclusion of mine-safety disclosures in the financial reports for SEC-registered 
firms, owners of a US mine. However, this information is (and was) already publicly available 
on the Mine Safety and Health Administration website. The effects of this new mandate on 
firm behaviour documented in Christensen et al. (2017) suggest that many investors may be 
relying mainly on the official financial market channels for their information (see also Section 
E). We need better understanding of how different regulatory approaches to disclosure of 
social and environmental matters affect firm’s disclosure response and practices. 
 
Figure B.1 - Overview of the differences between financial and CSR reporting 
Source: Tschopp, D., & Huefner, R. J. (2015). Comparing the Evolution of CSR Reporting to that of Financial 
Reporting. Journal of Business Ethics, 127(3), 565–577. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2054-6 




B.3. Concluding comments 
 
The literature justifies the introduction of disclosure regulation either as enabling economic 
effects on the functioning of the financial markets, or as a tool to steer corporate practices 
towards desired outcomes. While the review of these capital market and “real” effects will be 
discussed in the following sections, this section has provided an overview of the effects on 
reporting itself. 
 
• The tension that emerges is that corporate responses to disclosure regulations and 
mandates depend on the firms reporting incentives and management discretion (as 
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highlighted also in Section A), as well as on other institutional arrangements in place 
before the regulation. 
 
• Furthermore, regulations often come into force with a set of other mechanisms that 
may affect reporting practices, for example the level of enforcement and the ability 
of oversight bodies to verify compliance and impose penalties. Research has not 
always been able to distinguish the effect of the disclosure mandate from that of 
these other arrangements and mechanisms. Therefore, it is hard to make causal 
claims. 
 
• The literature has focused more on the capital markets effect of disclosure 
regulations (see Section C), and less is known on how reporting practices change. 
However, the literature has documented widespread boilerplate disclosure, for 
example in relation to the adoption of the guidance provided by the Turnbull report. 
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily imply that disclosure as a regulatory tool is 
ineffective. It is still possible that the requirement to disclose influences behaviour 
directly, but we need more evidence. 
 
• A final note is that most regulatory actions continue to have a strong focus on 
investors’ needs, and less so on other stakeholders. This is not a problem in itself, 
but there is the possibility that regulation ends up creating “blind spots” if there is no 
overlap between what investors and other stakeholders deem as relevant and 
material. 
 
• There are several calls from scholars that encourage the embedding of wider 
stakeholder interests in conceptual frameworks for corporate reporting. However, in 
practice the guidance provided to firm is still mixed. For example, in the aftermath of 
the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive that mandates the reporting of social and 
environmental information, firms have discretion in terms of which reporting 
standards/guidance to follow (if any). 
 
• Different guidelines may have different focuses in terms of who are the main users 
of these information. While the recent guidance published by the EU Commission on 
climate related disclosures (European Commission, 2019) claims that materiality in 
the context of environmental information is double-fold (financial materiality and 
social/environmental materiality), the guidance provided by the Task Force on 
Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) adopts a financial materiality 
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C. What are the information needs of shareholders and how is the 
corporate reporting information used by them? 
This section addresses a number of key issues covered by the FRC’s Future of Corporate 
Reporting project. First, it discusses direct evidence on shareholders’ information needs and 
their usage of corporate reporting information (and its various components such as financial 
statements, narrative reporting, non-financial reporting, etc.; see Section A). Second, it 
summarises the empirical evidence regarding the links between corporate reporting and the 
stock market. Importantly, the analysis of capital market effects of corporate reporting also 
provides indirect evidence on investors’ use of corporate reporting information in determining 
their trading and investment decisions. For instance: 
 
• the examination of market liquidity effects of corporate reporting allows for the 
drawing of conclusions into the role that corporate reporting has in reducing 
information asymmetries between firms and investors; 
 
• the analysis of market reactions (in terms of return or volatility effects) to the release 
of corporate reporting illustrates how market participants perceive and process the 
information reported; 
 
• value relevance studies illustrate the extent to which corporate reporting information 
is useful for valuation purposes (see Section A), etc. 
 
Third, the discussion of this section addresses the question about the audience of corporate 
reporting information, we also cover the literature on investment analysts below (rather than 
in Section D where we discuss other stakeholders), following the approach of prior studies, 
e.g. Cascino et al. (2013, 2014). Schipper (1991, p. 105) argues that given the analysts’ 
importance as “intermediaries who receive and process financial information for investors, it 
makes sense to view analysts (‘sophisticated users’) as representative of the group to whom 
financial reporting is and should be addressed”.27 The distinction between analysts and equity 
investors is particularly blurred for buy-side analysts who support portfolio investment 
decisions of investment management firms (using among others information processed by 
sell-side analysts, including their forecasts) and have significant influence on the trading 
activities of fund managers (Brown et al., 2016; Cheng et al., 2006; Frey & Herbst, 2014). 
Plausibly, similar arguments apply to other forms of corporate reporting, including non- 
financial reporting. 
 
Finally, the discussion below allows us to address further a broader question about the 
purpose of corporate reporting in general and of specific disclosures in particular 
(complementing the insights of Section A). Importantly, the evidence summarised here mostly 
pertains to the valuation role of corporate reporting (as defined in Section A), with relatively 
few insights applying to the stewardship role (cf. Section A) and the usage of corporate 
reporting information in this context.28 
 
Section C.1 below reviews the literature discussing direct evidence of information needs of 




27 For the sake of consistency, the relatively limited literature on the usage of analysts’ information in credit decisions 
is discussed in Section D, where information usage of information by other stakeholders, including creditors, is 
covered. 
28 Section E.3 further discusses indirect evidence on shareholder’ usage of corporate reporting information for 
stewardship purposes. In particular, it reviews the literature on the links between corporate reporting and 
governance outcomes (e.g. managerial compensation and turnover). 
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studies examining capital market effects of financial and non-financial information reported by 
companies. In doing so, it documents how investors incorporate the information contained by 
corporate reporting in their share and option trading (and how it gets reflected in 
prices/returns). Therefore, it provides indirect evidence on investors’ use of such information. 
Section C.3 reviews the literature focussing on the information environment, specifically 
examining effects of corporate reporting on the forecasts and recommendations by sell-side 
analysts as well as the link between corporate reporting and analyst coverage. 
 
 
C.1. Direct evidence on information needs of equity investors and their usage of 
corporate reporting information 
 
C.1.1. Survey-based and other direct evidence on information needs of equity 
investors and their usage of corporate reporting information 
 
The literature providing direct evidence on information needs of equity investors and their 
usage of information is relatively scant, with most of the studies in this stream making 
inferences from survey- or interview-based research, sometimes combined with experimental 
designs.29 Some earlier relevant studies have been reviewed by Bradshaw (2011) and Cascino 
et al. (2013; 2014), although their reviews focus on financial reporting only. Therefore, the 
discussion below complements and expands the prior reviews, focusing predominantly on 
more recent literature.30 
 
Overall, the existing empirical literature disagrees about the usefulness of various components 
of financial reporting, as already alluded to in Section A. Earlier studies reviewed by Cascino 
et al. (2013, 2014) as well as the findings of Brown et al. (2016) and Cascino et al. (2016) 
highlight the paramount importance, relevance, and usefulness of financial statements data to 
equity investors. However, there is a disagreement as to whether it (a) holds true to the same 
extent across various jurisdictions and (b) remains to be as important nowadays as it used to 
in the past (Davern et al., 2019). 
 
Drake et al. (2018) track the requests for accounting reports stored in the SEC EDGAR 
database and find that investors use historic along with the most recent financial reports, in 
particular for difficult-to-analyse firms. Requests for historic reports during the fiscal year are 
positively associated with financial reporting complexity and requests around earnings 
announcements are positively associated with accounting discretion and negative earnings 
shocks. Brown et al. (2016) document that US buy-side analysts find 10-K or 10-Q reports 
more useful than quarterly conference calls and management earnings guidance for 
determining their share recommendations. However, Brown et al. (2015) challenge such a 
claim. Their survey of analysts’ shows that private communication with management is a more 
useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and share recommendations than information from 
financial statements. Importantly, companies tend to cater to information needs of the users 
of corporate disclosures. Specifically, managers of companies where forward-looking 
information (most frequently, earnings per share guidance) is requested or asked about by 




29 Surveys could potentially suffer from untruthful responses by the participants (Bradshaw, 2011). Moreover, there 
is a risk that they could “lead” the respondents in the sense that they make assumptions about the presumed uses 
of corporate reporting by investors for a particular purpose, e.g. valuation. 
30 The literature examining the links between corporate reporting and shareholder trading activities and patterns, 
including insider trading, is covered in Section C.2.1 where we discuss trading and liquidity effects of corporate 
reporting rather than here. 
69  
quarters. This finding confirms that analysts shape managers’ disclosure choices in a 
meaningful way (Chapman & Green, 2018). 
 
As discussed in Section A, the usefulness of financial reports depends on the purpose for 
which the information is to be used (in particular valuation v. stewardship, see Section A). 
Professional investors consider financial accounting information to be more relevant for 
valuing of firms as opposed to assessing performance of their managers31 (Cascino et al., 
2016). Not all financial statement information is considered equally useful by equity investors 
either, with the importance of (consolidated) income statements usually dominating balance 
sheet figures, although the importance of the latter is higher for underperforming firms 
(Cascino et al., 2013, 2016). Nevertheless, Davern et al. (2019) find that financial reporting 
(specifically, reported net income, shareholders’ equity, and operating cash flows) remains 
relevant for investment decisions in the Australian context. Moreover, their field evidence also 
demonstrates that no one financial statement dominates in investor decision making. 
 
There is also some evidence that both professional and non-professional investors use non- 
GAAP earnings/performance measures. While professional investors often regard such 
measures to be more value-relevant and informative about managerial performance than 
statutory measures such as net income, non-professional investors use non-GAAP measures 
because they are swayed by management’s emphasis of such numbers and thus subjected 
to cognitive biases (Cascino et al. 2016; Davern et al. 2019; Elliott, 2006). Cascino et al. (2016) 
also discuss in detail professional investors’ perceptions of usefulness and reliability of specific 
line items in financial statements, highlighting the concerns of perceived subjectivity and 
managerial biases. Yet, Barton and Mercer (2005) conduct an experiment examining how 
analysts react to self-serving disclosures by managers that blame firms’ poor financial 
performance on temporary external factors and find that analysts perceive such disclosures 
as plausible, at least in some instances. When such explanations are considered credible, 
analysts provide higher earnings forecasts and share valuations than if the explanation had 
not been provided. However, Barton and Mercer (2005) also show that these disclosures can 
backfire if analysts find them implausible. Specifically, implausible explanations that blame 
poor performance on temporary external factors lead analysts to provide lower earnings 
forecasts and assess a higher cost of capital than if the explanation had not been provided. 
 
Clatworthy and Jones (2008) examine how UK-based analysts and fund managers cope with 
international differences in financial reporting systems when analysing overseas equities. 
Among both groups they find a substantial reliance on sources other than the annual report 
when analysing overseas companies. Moreover, they also evidence greater reliance on 
alternative sources to accounting information (such as other foreign analysts) in countries 
characterised as having weak equity markets (i.e. countries with a below-average ratio of 
market capitalisation to national income, mostly in Continental Europe). Finally, Clatworthy 
and Jones (2008) identify coping mechanisms that analysts and fund managers employ when 
analysing overseas securities, including reliance on locally based analysts, use of non- 
accounting information, use of more familiar accounting standards and restating accounts to 
a more familiar basis. 
 
There is also a debate in the literature about the usefulness of narrative information included 
in the periodic report vis-à-vis financial statement figures. Such ‘non-accounting’ information 
is used to contextualise and add meaning to accounting data (Barker & Imam, 2008) and 
constitutes a highly important source of information about companies for professional 
investors (Cascino et al., 2016). In this context, Orens and Lybaert (2007) survey sell-side 
financial analysts and find that their use of non-financial information reported by the companies 
 
 
31 The literature examining the usage of corporate reporting in such a stewardship context is discussed in more 
detail in Section E below. 
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improves the accuracy of the analysts’ forecasts. The benefits stem primarily from the use of 
more forward-looking information and more internal-structure information. Yet, Campbell and 
Slack (2008) challenge the value of narrative information for users of corporate reporting and 
suggest that the amount of such information included in annual reports might be excessive. 
Narrative information is more subjective and therefore also prone to managerial opportunism 
and impression management (see Section A for more details). Moreover, the experimental 
study of Hales et al. (2011) suggests that investors might be swayed by the tone of the 
language used, depending on their trading strategies. In particular, vivid language significantly 
influences the judgment of investors who hold contrarian positions (e.g. short investors in a 
bull market), it has limited influence on the judgment of investors who hold positions consistent 
with the general tenor of the market (ibidem). 
 
While financial reporting, and financial statements in particular, have been seen as a 
cornerstone of corporate reporting for years (the sentiment echoed by participants of the 
survey by Cascino et al., 2016), more recent literature provides some examples of studies 
focussing on usefulness of non-financial corporate reporting. For instance, Diouf and Boiral 
(2017) interview a range of corporate stakeholders, including fund managers and analysts, to 
ascertain their perceptions of firm sustainability reports. They find that investors perceive the 
reports to reflect impression management strategies used by firms to highlight the positive 
aspects of their sustainability performance and to obfuscate negative outcomes rather than 
address information needs of investors. The survey of sell-side equity analysts and of fund 
managers by Slack and Tsalavoutas (2018) raises similar questions over the usefulness of 
corporate reporting following the International Integrated Reporting (<IR>) Framework. 
Despite institutional-level support for <IR>, the interviews reveal that its usefulness to fund 
managers and equity analysts is low, which might partly stem from low level of familiarity with 
this reporting standard among mainstream equity market actors (ibidem). On the other hand, 
Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim (2018) survey mainstream investment organizations on their usage 
of reported environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information. The primary factors 
driving such a usage are relevance to investment performance, followed by client demand, 
product strategy, and then, ethical considerations. An important impediment to the use of ESG 
information is the lack of established reporting standards for such disclosures (ibidem). Yet, 
many investors surveyed by Stubbs and Higgins (2018) support mandatory <IR> because, in 
their experience, voluntary sustainability reporting has not led to more substantive disclosures 
or increased the quality of reporting. 
 
 
C.1.2. Concluding remarks 
 
The findings of the literature studying direct evidence on information needs of equity investors 
and their usage of corporate reporting information can be summarised as follows. 
 
• Financial statements remain an important source of information about firms used by 
investors and analysts primarily for valuation purposes. 
 
• Narrative reporting complements and contextualises financial statements 
information, but is sometimes be used as an impression management tool 
misleading the audience of corporate reporting (see Section A as well). 
 
• The importance of other communication channels (e.g. other disclosures or private 
communication with managers) has increased over time and rivals that of periodic 
corporate reporting for some information users (e.g. analysts). 
 
• There is some emerging evidence that some users incorporate non-financial 
reporting information in their investment decisions, but its usefulness so far is limited 
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by lack of established reporting standards for such disclosures and low level of 
familiarity with this type of reporting. 
 
 
C.2. Capital market effects of financial and non-financial corporate reporting 
 
The literature examining capital market effects of corporate reporting is vast, with some of the 
sub-topics being subject of recent literature reviews.32 Therefore, the discussion below 
complements prior reviews, focussing particularly on the issues of highest relevance for the 
FRC project. We refer readers to prior work for more in-depth coverage of some of the related 
issues. For instance, Barth et al. (2001), Healy and Palepu (2001), and Kothari (2001) expertly 
summarise earlier academic work on capital market relevance of financial accounting 
information, providing foundation for more recent studies. Reviews by Cascino et al. (2013, 
2014) provide an update on a more recent literature on this broad topic, while a more focussed 
study by Bertomeu and Cheynel (2016) reviews theoretical literature examining the links 
between corporate disclosures and cost of capital. Finally, Ruch and Taylor (2015) summarise 
the literature on accounting conservatism and its capital market consequences. 
 
Beyer et al. (2010) review research on capital market implications of managers’ voluntary 
accounting information disclosure decisions and of similar disclosures mandated by 
regulators. Leuz and Wysocki (2016) review the literature on the impact of regulation 
pertaining to corporate disclosure and financial reporting on firm-level and market-wide 
outcomes. It also identifies major empirical shortcomings plaguing the relevant studies and 
highlights methodological challenges faced by the researchers in this area. A related review 
by Ahmed et al. (2013) has a much narrower scope and provides a meta-analysis of empirical 
literature on the effects of IFRS adoption.33 Finally, while the literature reviews listed above 
focus on financial reporting, a recent review by Christensen et al. (2019) provides economic 
analysis of adoption of CSR and sustainability reporting standards. A recent review by 
Elshandidy et al. (2018) summarises the literature on informativeness of risk reporting and its 
capital market effects. Chalmers et al. (2019) review recent literature on internal control 
reporting, including findings pertaining to capital market effects of such reporting 
internationally. Finally, Christensen et al. (2019) reviews the literature on the effects of CSR 
reporting on shareholders and analysts in Section 4.2 and 4.4 of their paper, respectively. 
 
Typically, the studies discussed in this section follow one of the following research designs: 
 
• Examination of the effects of companies reporting a particular type of information, or 
providing a particular form of reporting (often on voluntary basis), e.g. effects of 
voluntary adoption of International Integrated Reporting (<IR>) Framework at a 
company level; 
 
• Examination of the effects of companies reporting particular information within a 







32 Here, while talking about capital markets, we restrict our attention to equity markets. We cover the issues 
pertaining to debt markets in Section D.1, which focusses on credit providers. 
33 This important regulatory change has been extensively studied by prior literature, but the detailed analysis of its 
effects is of only peripheral relevance for the current FRC project and therefore below we only review the 
corresponding literature when doing so is aligned with other goals of the project. 
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• Examination of the effects of regulatory changes pertaining to corporate reporting, 
e.g. country-wide adoption of IFRS or International Integrated Reporting (<IR>) 
Framework; 
 
• Examination of the effects that regulatory changes have on the capital market effects 
of firms’ reporting particular information, e.g. has IFRS adoption strengthened the 
link between accruals quality and the firms’ cost of capital? 
 
As alluded to in Section B above, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) highlight common methodological 
challenges and shortcomings of the empirical literature on the effects of corporate disclosures 
in general, and on their capital market effects in particular. First, studies examining voluntary 
disclosures could suffer from self-selection biases (i.e. firms choose a certain reporting 
practice for reasons that also affect the capital market outcomes) that are not always properly 
controlled for in the empirical research design. Second, the evidence on casual effects of 
disclosure and reporting regulation is often difficult to obtain and relatively rare (with many 
studies reporting just associations). This is mostly due to difficulties in identifying 
counterfactuals, unaffected control groups, and/or truly exogenous natural experiments that 
would allow a clean identification of the regulatory effects and their economic consequences.34 
Third, it is difficult to separate the measurement of disclosure outcomes (e.g. reporting quality) 
separately from the underlying economics. Fourth, many studies focus on isolated micro-level 
outcomes, largely ignoring broader externalities, network effects or spill-overs, and market- 
wide effects. Despite applying a quality threshold to the literature reviewed, many of the 
studies discussed below suffer to at least some extent from one or more of the issues listed 
above and therefore the corresponding results should be interpreted with caution. 
 
 
C.2.1. Trading and liquidity effects 
 
This section discusses the links between corporate reporting (as well as the corporate 
reporting environment) on trading and stock market liquidity, e.g. how reporting influences on 
trading volume, bid-ask spreads, market depth, volatility of liquidity, trading by informed 
investors, and volatility, among others. Leuz and Wysocki (2016) argue that such liquidity 
issues could underpin some other capital market effects of corporate reporting (predominantly, 
cost-of-capital effects, but plausibly also other measures discussed in other parts of this 
section, i.e. value relevance, stock returns, and volatility).35 While we acknowledge that such 
an indirect mechanism (i.e. liquidity channel) could work, it is unlikely to be the only channel 
linking corporate reporting with capital market outcomes (and the studies reviewed in sub- 
sections that follow, i.e. C.2.2-C.2.5, do not identify it explicitly. Hence, below we only focus 
on more direct effects of corporate reporting on trading and market liquidity issues and discuss 
the effects on the cost of capital, firm value, stock returns and volatility in separate stand-alone 
sub-sections. 
 
Generally, the existing literature predominantly supports the intuition that better corporate 
reporting and corporate reporting environment mitigate information asymmetries, which is then 
associated with improvements in liquidity at both micro and macro levels (Leuz & Wysocki, 
 
 
34 This is one of the most common reasons for the endogeneity problems affecting some of the corresponding 
empirical literature. In very simple terms, endogeneity implies that the statistical model is no able to control for 
everything that may affect both the variable of interest (i.e. reporting) and the outcome (i.e. market effect). 
35 The intuition here stems from the fact that corporate disclosures and reporting affect the degree of information 
asymmetries among investors and in doing so the probabilities of informed traders using their informational 
advantages to trade shares. Investors and market makers require compensation for potential risk of trading with 
an informed investor. 
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2016). On the other hand, reduction in mandatory disclosure requirements negatively affect 
stock liquidity, even for firms that voluntarily maintain their disclosure level (Cheng et al., 
2013), which could have implications for regulation of disclosure (cf. Section B). 
 
The improvements in liquidity could be reflected in lower trading costs (in particular, bid-ask 
spreads), increased depth of the market (i.e. ability to execute larger trades), and increased 
speeds of order execution. Specifically, at the macro level, liquidity has been shown to improve 
following the adoption of common accounting standards, like IFRS (e.g. Gao et al., 2018; Lang 
& Stice-Lawrence, 2015; Lepone & Wong, 2018), of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Gupta et 
al., 2018; Jain et al., 2008), of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Chiyachantana et al., 2004), and of 
a country-wide adoption of IFRS or International Integrated Reporting (<IR>) Framework 
(Barth et al., 2017). For instance, following Sarbanes-Oxley Act adoption, US firms have been 
mandated to provide management’s report on internal controls (as per Section 302) and such 
disclosures have been shown to reduce stock return volatility (Gupta et al., 2018). 
 
At a micro level, an increase in a firm’s reporting frequency (from semi-annually to quarterly) 
reduces investors’ incentives to acquire private information between consecutive 
announcement dates, thus reducing information asymmetries among investors and, 
consequently, increases share liquidity and stimulates trading (Cuijpers & Peek, 2010). 
Difficult-to-read annual reports hinder investors’ ability to process and analyse information 
contained in corporate annual reports, reducing thereby their willingness to trade which 
decreases stock liquidity (Boubaker et al., 2019). Bid-ask spreads around unexpected loss 
announcements are greater when preceded by higher levels of income smoothing, suggesting 
that investors have difficulties seeing through managerial opportunistic motives before the 
unexpected loss announcements (Yu et al., 2018). Finally, Heflin et al. (2005) document that 
effects of corporate reporting on stock liquidity are more complex than previously argued. 
While firms with higher-rated disclosures are charged lower effective (i.e. executed rather than 
quoted) bid-ask spreads, they are also quoted lower depth of the market, consistent with the 
notion that better disclosures reduce information asymmetry but also cause some liquidity 
suppliers to exit the market (ibidem). 
 
Corporate reporting is strongly associated with fluctuations in a firm stock liquidity as well. For 
instance, liquidity is usually lower (with bid-ask spreads higher) prior to earnings 
announcements and higher afterwards (Chakrabaty & Shaw, 2008; Huang & Skantz, 2016; 
Johnson & So, 2018; So & Wang, 2014). Johnson and So (2018) document an interesting 
asymmetry: the cost of trading on negative news, relative to positive news, increases before 
earnings announcements (suggesting that financial intermediaries reduce their exposure to 
announcement risks by providing liquidity asymmetrically). On the other hand, Huang and 
Skantz (2016) document that the post-announcement reduction in information asymmetry (and 
the corresponding increase in liquidity) is greater when managers or analysts issue non- GAAP 
earnings at the earnings announcement and when the magnitude of the non-GAAP earnings 
adjustment by the analysts is larger. This suggests that earnings adjustments by analysts and 
managers increase the amount and precision of earnings information and help to narrow 
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders following earnings 
announcements. 
 
Attributes of corporate reporting and the reporting environment are also related to trading 
volume, as well as the timing of trades by (some groups of) investors. For instance, following 
the cross-listing in the US (subjecting non-US firms to more stringent reporting requirements), 
their post-earnings-announcement trading volume increases significantly (Bailey et al., 2006). 
For firms cross-listed in the US, their earnings and book-value reconciliation adjustments (from 
IAS to US GAAP) are positively associated with the abnormal trading volume (Chen & Sami, 
2008). 
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Kravet and Muslu (2013) examine companies’ textual risk disclosures in 10-K filings and find 
that annual increases in risk disclosures are associated with increased trading volumes around 
and after the filings. Baginski et al. (2018) find that, after controlling for economic factors, 
abnormal trading volume is higher when the linguistic tone of publicly released management 
forecasts is more positive, suggesting that there is significant investor disagreement over the 
implication of this tone for firm value. Further tests in the paper show that the net buying 
behaviour of small investors is positively associated with residual tone, while larger investors 
tend to sell on this signal. 
 
Other studies document similar differences in reaction to particular corporate disclosures by 
less-informed small (often small and individual) investors and better-informed (usually larger 
and institutional) investors. For instance, trading volume around a management forecast 
release is significantly related to a proxy for investor disagreement over management forecast 
information, but not significantly related to analyst forecast dispersion before a management 
forecast, which is a proxy for investor disagreement over information available before the 
information event (Cho & Kwon, 2014). 
 
Dorminey et al. (2018) show that loss announcements (as opposed to earnings 
announcements reporting profits) generate more investor disagreements and more trading 
volume. Earnings announcements that decrease analysts’ consensus are associated with 
more post-announcement trading volume, indicating that investors’ private information 
becomes useful only in conjunction with information in the announcement and that this 
information is important enough to spur trading (Barron et al., 2005). Frankel and Li (2004) 
find that while financial statement informativeness is negatively associated with the frequency 
of insider purchases, company news - good or bad - is positively associated with insider 
purchase frequency. However, the information asymmetry risk is reduced by the analyst 
following (i.e. number of analysts following the firm), which is associated with reduced 
profitability of insider trades and reduced insider purchases (ibidem). Alexander et al. (2014); 
Campbell et al. (2009), Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) provide evidence that institutional 
investors (in particular, transient ones i.e. those actively trading to maximise short term profits) 
trade to exploit the post-earnings announcement drift through their arbitrage trading strategies. 
Yet, Levi and Zhang (2015) document that even some institutional investors are reluctant to 
trade in the high-information-asymmetry days before earnings announcements36 unless forced 
to do so by liquidity needs. 
 
Tsai (2014) documents that some informed individual investors trade aggressively (and 
profitably) around earnings announcement dates. Yet, individuals are significant net buyers 
after both negative and positive extreme earnings surprises, consistent with behavioural 
explanation (i.e. attention effects). Finally, Blankespoor et al. (2019) find that individual 
investors tend to disregard accounting information and their trading behaviour is largely driven 
by recent history of stock returns. 
 
 
C.2.2. Cost-of-capital effects 
 
This section discusses the associations between corporate reporting (both financial and non- 
financial) as well as corporate reporting environment and firms’ (implied) cost-of-capital. The 
focus here is on the cost of capital in general and cost of equity in particular, while the issues 
specific to the cost of debt are discussed in D.1.1 below. Bertomeu and Cheynel (2016) review 
theoretical literature on the subject in quite some detail and therefore we do not replicate their 
 
 
36 Yet, Donders et al. (2000) find increased trading volumes in the share option markets around announcement 
days. 
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discussion here. Overall, there appears to be quite some degree of consensus in this 
theoretical literature that more extensive and higher-quality corporate disclosures are 
associated with lower cost of capital (e.g. Bertomeu et al., 2011, or Cheynel, 2013, are good 
examples of studies generating such a prediction). Interestingly, while some of the models 
predict a negative link between corporate reporting and the cost of capital irrespectively of 
whether disclosures are mandatory or voluntary, the model of Bertomeu et al. (2011) predicts 
the link to be present only for mandatory disclosures. 
 
Christensen et al. (2019), Larcker and Rusticus (2010), and Leuz and Wysocki (2016) review 
some of the relevant empirical literature on the subject (in particular, earlier studies). 
Therefore, our review complements and updates these prior reviews. Importantly, Larcker and 
Rusticus (2010) highlight endogeneity issues37 that have plagued some of the earlier empirical 
research in this area and discuss how an instrumental-variable approach (i.e. a variable that 
induces changes in the explanatory variable, but has no effect on the dependent variable) 
could mitigate against such concerns in the cost-of-capital studies. However, finding a valid 
instrument is not easy. 
 
A number of empirical studies confirm a negative link between the quality of various aspects 
of corporate reporting/disclosures and firms’ cost of capital. For instance, Shroff et al. (2013) 
document that following the regulatory reform relaxing US firms’ restrictions on disclosures in 
the periods preceding security offerings, firms provide significantly more of such pre-offering 
disclosures, which are in turn associated with decreased costs of raising equity capital. Francis 
et al. (2005) test the prediction that firms more reliant on external financing are more likely to 
undertake higher levels of disclosure and that a higher level of disclosure should, in turn, lead 
to a lower cost of external capital. Using an international sample of companies from 34 
countries, they document beneficial effects of voluntary disclosures on cost of both equity and 
debt capital. El Ghoul et al. (2011) and Plumlee et al. (2015) find a negative relation between 
the quality of a firm’s voluntary environmental and social disclosures and cost of equity capital, 
but Clarkson et al. (2013) and Qiu et al. (2016) find no such effect, and Richardson and Welker 
(2001) find the relation to be positive. 
 
While Zhou et al. (2017) document a negative link between the quality of integrated reporting 
and firms’ cost of capital in South Africa, this result is not mirrored in the study by Barth et al. 
(2017) despite the same institutional setting. Cole and Jones (2015) document that higher 
quality of Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) is associated with lower cost of 
capital in the US. Elzahar et al. (2015) illustrate that the quality of disclosures pertaining to 
financial KPIs (mandated in the UK) has a negative effect on the firms’ cost of capital. 
 
However, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) review a number of early studies on the topic to argue 
that the empirical evidence on the negative link between corporate disclosures and the cost 
of capital is somewhat mixed, holding only for a) some firms or b) some types of disclosures, 
or c) in only some institutional contexts. For instance, Li (2015) documents that firms domiciled 
in countries with more conservative financial reporting systems have lower cost of equity and 
debt capital. Daske (2006) shows that adoption of internationally recognised financial reporting 
standards (IAS/IFRS or US GAAP) by German companies has not reduced the cost of capital 
for adopting firms as expected, and has actually led to its increase. Daske (2006) proposes 
two potential explanations for this finding: (1) it may stem from difficulties in estimating cost of 
capital (leading to estimation errors), or (2) from specific institutional factors pertaining to the 
nature of the transition process towards the use of international reporting standards in 
 
 
37 The endogeneity problems referred to here are related to situations when either (1) the outcome and explanatory 
variables are simultaneously determined (i.e. simultaneous-equation bias) or (2) a variable that affects both the 
outcome and explanatory variables is not included in the regression model (i.e. correlated omitted variable bias). 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) illustrate that both are common in empirical accounting research. 
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Germany, inadvertently decreasing comparability of financial reports across firms within 
Germany and across different periods for the same firms. 
 
Finally, Hoberg and Lewis (2017) argue that management could use corporate reporting 
strategically with the aim of lowering their firms’ cost of capital. MD&A disclosures of fraudulent 
firms are abnormally extensive as far as their volume is concerned. Yet, they are of lower 
quality: they discuss fewer details explaining the drivers of firm’s performance and disclose 
more information about positive aspects of firm performance, consistent with the use of 
impression management strategies (see Section A). 
 
 
C.2.3. Value relevance studies 
 
This section discusses studies that examine the value relevance of information provided by 
corporate reporting (both financial and non-financial) and the impact of it on the reporting 
environment. Methodologically, the focus here is predominantly on the studies that employ 
valuation models, such as e.g. Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model or one of its extensions, and 
then examine the incremental impact that particular items reported by companies have on firm 
value. Studies directly examining the impact of corporate reporting on share prices and returns 
(including event studies) are discussed in Section C.2.4 below. As before, we acknowledge 
that some of the relevant earlier literature has been summarised by prior reviews (e.g. Ahmed 
et al., 2013; Ball & Sadka, 2015; Barth et al., 2001; Cascino et al., 2013 and 2014; Christensen 
et al., 2019; and Kothari, 2001). Thus, the discussion below complements these prior 
summaries. In short, there is ample evidence that financial accounting information has been 
value-relevant38, although its relevance has decreased over time both in the US and 
internationally (Balachandran & Mohanram, 2011; Hail, 2013). At the same time value 
relevance of financial information varies across countries (Fietcher & Novotny-Farkas, 2017; 
Hail, 2013; Hung, 2000), as discussed below. Hail (2013) discusses potential explanations for 
differences in relevance of accounting numbers for valuation purposes across firms, countries, 
and periods. In particular, he discusses the role of three institutional and macroeconomic 
trends in this context: 
 
• IFRS adoption; 
 
• fair value accounting; 
 
• accounting scandals or market bubbles. 
 
Moreover, Hail (2013) suggest that other potential explanations exist as well. For instance, the 
following are likely to contribute to the changing role of the income statement versus the 
balance sheet and the overall relevance of financial information under GAAP (ibidem): 
 
• shift from a mainly manufacturing to a service-oriented economy; 
 
• increasing reliance on information sources and intermediaries other than annual 






38 The literature evidencing value relevance (or lack thereof) of non-financial reporting is relatively scarce as it has 
only started to emerge in recent years making it more difficult to draw firm conclusions from it (Christensen et al., 
2018). 
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• emergence of new technologies to disseminate information quickly and cheaply 
outside of the accounting system; 
 
• ongoing integration of global product and capital markets; 
 
• rising volatility of market values due to changes in the market structure (e.g. trading 
by institutional investors and hedge funds, electronic trading, etc.). 
 
“As long as these potential explanations differ across countries (which they likely 
do) and are correlated with the institutional proxies [used] (…) (which they likely 
are), they will be reflected in the differential trends in value relevance” (Hail, 2013, 
pp. 353). 
Regarding the impact of the reporting environment on value-relevance of financial reporting 
information, Ahmed et al. (2013) and Choi et al. (2013) examine the impact of IFRS adoption 
for value relevance. Ahmed et al. (2013) find that the value relevance of equity book value has 
not increased post-IFRS adoption, whereas the value relevance of earnings has generally 
increased when assessed using price models. Eng et al. (2014) examine whether accounting 
figures reported under IFRS by firms cross-listed in the US are comparable with those reported 
under US GAAP and find that value relevance, timeliness, and accrual quality of accounting 
numbers under US GAAP are not significantly different than those under IFRS. 
 
More specifically, as far as financial institutions are concerned, McInnis et al. (2018) compare 
the value relevance of banks’ financial statements under fair value accounting with that under 
current GAAP, which is largely based on historical costs. They find that that the combined 
value relevance of equity book value and income under fair value is lower than that under 
GAAP. They question the relative usefulness of fair value accounting for bank valuation in the 
US. Fietcher and Novotny-Farkas (2017) use a global sample of IFRS banks and find that 
assets designated at fair value through profit or loss are generally less value-relevant than 
held-for-trading assets and available-for-sale assets, particularly so in bank-based economies. 
This effect is weakened by a richer firm-level information environment and the presence of 
institutional investors with fair value experience. Finally, Barth et al. (2014) find that net income 
adjustments resulting from mandatory 2005 IFRS adoption in Europe are value-relevant for 
both financial and non-financial firms. 
 
Hail (2013) examines trends in value relevance of a number of balance sheet and income 
statement numbers over a 30-year period and confirms that the loss in relevance of the income 
statement discussed above has continued in recent years and is present in a large 
international sample, in particular in countries with strong institutions. While the overall 
relevance of the balance sheet remains stable, Hail (2013) finds a downward trend during 
earlier years of the sample analysed (up to mid-1990s), which reverses in subsequent years, 
especially in common law countries (i.e. countries with legal system of the English-law origin) 
with strong investor protection, strict disclosure requirements, and integrated markets. His 
results suggest that changes in the economy, the institutional environment, and in how firms 
operate affect the relative importance of accounting information for use in firm valuation by 
outside stakeholders. 
 
Akbar et al. (2011) documents incremental value relevance of cash flow statement-derived 
measures (in addition to the balance sheet and income statement information) in the UK. 
Jones and Smith (2011) show that even supposedly transitory items, such as gains and losses 
reported as other comprehensive income and as special items, are value-relevant and have 
predictive power for forecasting both future net income and future cash flows. Brown and 
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Shivakumar (2003) document that pro-forma earnings39 reported by managers and analysts 
are more value-relevant than GAAP net income in the US. This finding implies that pro-forma 
earnings contain value-relevant information beyond that provided by operating earnings 
obtained by users (i.e. investors) from firms’ directly from financial statements. Ota (2000) 
explores a unique Japanese institutional setting where stock exchanges require firms to 
provide next year’s earnings forecasts and find them to be value-relevant. The presence of 
such an effect could be attributed to the relatively high accuracy of management forecasts. 
 
As far as value relevance of non-financial corporate reporting is concerned, Moneva and 
Cuellar (2009) evidence that financial environmental disclosures (investments, costs and 
contingencies) are value-relevant, but non-financial ones are not. Furthermore, their evidence 
confirms that environmental information provided on compulsory basis has recently become 
more value-relevant. Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) document a similar positive link for 
mandatory CSR disclosures. Yet, Plumlee et al. (2015) shows that even firm’s voluntary 
environmental disclosures are value-relevant. Specifically, higher quality of such disclosures 
is associated with higher firm value through two channels: lower cost of equity capital and 
higher expected future cash flows. 
 
However, the results of Cho et al. (2015b) challenge the claim that CSR disclosures are 
positively valued by shareholders. Finally, Qiu et al. (2016) find that value effects of CSR 
disclosures vary by the type of the disclosure: while environmental disclosures (more often 
studied in the literature) do not appear to be valued, firms that make higher social disclosures 
have higher market values, with the link being driven by higher expected growth rates in the 
cash flows of such companies, rather than by cost-of-capital effects. 
 
 
C.2.4. Event studies and other share price/return effects studies 
 
While this section examines a fundamental issue closely related to the one discussed in C.2.3 
above, the methodological approach is different, with the focus on stock returns rather than 
employing valuation models. The vast majority of the studies discussed here employ some 
variation of an event study methodology, where abnormal share price reactions to companies’ 
disclosures are analysed and the factors explaining the strength of these disclosures 
examined.40 By far the most commonly studied event is the earnings announcement and the 
subsequent post-announcement return pattern, so-called post-earnings announcement drift, 




39 Pro-forma earnings most often refer to earnings that exclude certain costs (e.g. non-recurring or non-operating 
items) that a company believes result in a distorted picture of its true profitability. Pro-forma earnings are not in 
compliance with standard GAAP methods and are usually higher than those that comply with GAAP. 
40 Abnormal return is the difference between the actual return of a security (or a portfolio of securities) and its 
expected return. In an event study context, such an expected (normal) return is defined as the return that would be 
expected if the event, e.g. earnings announcement, did not take place on a particular date. The review by MacKinlay 
(1997) succinctly outlines the basics of this methodological approach. 
41 Recent examples of studies belonging to this long-tradition stream of research include Alegria et al. (2009), Atiase 
et al. (2005), Baber et al. (2006), Bailey et al. (2006), Baker et al. (2019), Balakrishnan et al. (2010), Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008), Barber et al. (2013), Bartov et al. (2000), Beaver et al. (2018), Caylor et al. (2007); Christensen 
et al. (2004), Collins et al. (2009), DeFond et al. (2007), Dorminey et al. (2018), Efendi et al. (2014), Files et al. 
(2009), Francis et al. (2007); Francis et al. (2002a, 2002b), Fredrickson and Zolotoy (2016), Guillamon- Saorin et 
al. (2017), Herrmann et al. (2011), Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006), Johnson and So (2018), Johnson and Zhao 
(2012), Liang et al. (2018), Liu et al. (2003), Lobo et al. (2017), Michaely et al. (2016), Nguyen and Truong (2018), 
Olibe (2016), Perotti and Wagenhofer (2014), Rees and Thomas (2010), Rees and Twedt (2011), Shivakumar 
(2006), Shu (2013), and Wilson (2008), while earlier studies are reviewed by Kothari (2001). 
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The predominant picture emerging from this literature is that while the short-term market 
reaction to unexpected earnings (i.e. abnormal return) is positively related with an earnings 
surprise, the reaction is not just concentrated in the period of days immediately following the 
earnings announcements. The PEAD persists for weeks or even months after the 
announcement, possibly up to four quarters afterwards (see e.g. Balakrishnan et al., 2010, 
Jegadeesh & Livnat, 2006, Kothari, 2001 and the studies summarised there).42 The earnings 
surprise is usually measured as standardised earnings surprise (SUE) defined as a difference 
between realised and expected earnings standardised by dividing it by the deviation of 
unexpected earnings (see e.g. Jegadeesh & Livnat, 2006; Liu et al., 2003; Rees & Thomas, 
2010). Various studies differ in terms of how they calculate expected earnings with the 
benchmarks employed using for instance time series-based models of earnings, analyst 
(consensus) forecasts, etc. Other earning surprise measures include mean/median analyst 
EPS forecast error divided by share price or other price-based measures (ibidem). Hence, 
most of the studies discussed here examine the earnings post-announcement effects following 
meeting or missing some of the earnings thresholds, such as reporting a profit, reporting an 
increase in earnings, and meeting analysts’ forecasts, etc. (see e.g. Herrmann et al., 2011; 
Jegadeesh & Livnat, 2006; Johnson & So 2018; Liu et al., 2003; Rees & Thomas, 2010). 
Importantly, a number of studies, including Johnson and So (2018) indicate that the 
announcement effects are asymmetric, depending on the sign of the earnings surprise (i.e. 
whether reported earnings exceed or fall short of a benchmark), and propose a liquidity-based 
explanation for this phenomenon. 
 
Numerous studies examine earning announcement effects across companies, countries, and 
periods. A typical interpretation of the corresponding results could be summarised as follows: 
a stronger market reaction in the period directly surrounding the earnings announcements 
and/or weaker PEAD could be seen as evidence of earnings (and their announcements) being 
more informative (Baber et al., 2006; Francis et al., 2007; Francis et al., 2002a and 2002b; 
Liang et al., 2018). Along these lines, PEAD is stronger for announcements with higher 
information uncertainty and for firms whose stock returns demonstrate greater idiosyncratic 
volatility both in the US and international samples (Baber et al., 2006; Francis et al., 2007). 
Liang et al. (2018) shows that immediate market reactions to earnings announcements are 
stronger for firms whose managers are perceived as more credible and less prone to 
misreport. 
 
A number of studies document that earnings have become informative over time, 
strengthening the immediate market reaction surrounding the announcement date (see e.g. 
Francis et al., 2002a and 2002b; Collins et al., 2009; Efendi et al., 2014).43 One of the 
explanations put forward for this is the accompanying increase in the other supplementary 
disclosures provided by firms at the time of earning announcements (Baber et al., 2006; 
Francis et al., 2002b).44 Guillamon-Saorin et al. (2017) argues that despite firms’ attempts to 
sometimes use this additional information (such as non-GAAP earnings disclosures) as 
impression management tools, investors are able to see through such attempts. Similarly, 




42 This delay in market full response to loss/profit quarterly announcements makes it possible to construct a 
profitable trading strategy (investing in shares of extreme-profit firms and short-selling extreme-loss ones) found to 
deliver annualised return of 21% (Balakrishnan et al., 2010). Moreover, the profits from this loss/profit anomaly are 
not due to previously documented accounting-related anomalies (ibidem). 
43 Wilson (2008) challenges this finding, however. 
44 This assertion is partly challenged by Arif et al. (2018) who examine increasingly common practice of firms 
disclosing earnings announcements concurrently with the 10-K filing instead of first issuing a ‘stand-alone’ earnings 
announcement. They find that for such concurrent disclosures, the market reaction is muted even when controlling 
for the announcement timing, and PEAD is greater. 
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by pro-forma earnings disclosures despite the widespread concern expressed in the financial 
press and by regulators. 
 
Efendi et al. (2014) find that earnings informativeness (see Section A) has increased following 
the change of reporting format, i.e. the mandatory implementation of eXtensible Business 
Reporting Language (XBRL) for filing. Earning informativeness depends not only on the 
characteristics of reporting companies and the reported earning numbers. For instance, Lobo 
et al. (2017) examine earnings announcement effects for announcements accompanied by 
simultaneous analyst forecast revisions and find larger (smaller) earnings response 
coefficients (a proxy for the informativeness of earnings, see Section A) for announcements 
accompanied by reinforcing (contradicting) analyst forecast revisions. Other factors that 
increase earnings informativeness include country-level quality of earnings and investor 
protection (DeFond et al., 2007), the prevalence of institutional investors in the shareholder 
base (Bartov et al. 2000; Shu, 2013), and visibility of the reporting firm (Fredrickson & Zolotoy, 
2016). Michaely et al. (2016) find that stock returns around earnings announcements vary 
depending on the day of the week on which announcement takes place. The worst earnings 
news are announced on Friday evenings, i.e. times when the investors’ and analysts’ attention 
is likely to be at the lowest. This finding suggests that managers opportunistically time the 
releases of such bad news and then seem to exploit the resulting trading opportunities 
(Michaely et al., 2016). Baker et al. (2019) and Fredrickson and Zolotoy (2016) show that 
earnings announcements impact not only the returns of the reporting firms themselves, but 
also of their peers. 
 
Overall, the discussion above illustrates that earnings announcements are important events 
that have substantial stock return consequences manifesting themselves in both short and 
medium run. While we have indicated that returns underreact to earnings information in the 
short run, Alegria et al. (2009) and Nguyen and Truong (2018) document that earnings 
announcement dates nevertheless contain disproportionally high numbers of trading days with 
extreme daily returns.45 Yet, this phenomenon is put in a broader context by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) who quantify the relative importance of earnings announcements in 
providing new information to the share market. They find that approximately 5% to 9% of total 
information incorporated in share prices annually is associated with earnings announcements 
(with the average quarterly announcement being associated with approximately 1% to 2% of 
total annual information), therefore providing a modest but not overwhelming amount of 
incremental information to the market. These figures indicate that the primary economic role 
of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market. Instead, Ball 
and Shivakumar (2008) argue that the role of earnings lies elsewhere, e.g. in periodic contract 
settlement, in particular debt and managerial compensation contracts. Moreover, because 
accounting earnings primarily report actual outcomes, they play an economic role in the 
confirmation of prior information (ibidem). Finally, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argue that 
accurate reporting of actual earnings outcomes exerts an accountability discipline on 
managers’ and analysts’ forward-looking statements, such as growth prospects and earnings 
forecasts. Some of these issues are covered in more detail in subsequent sections of this 
report. 
 
Some studies examine the price effect of financial accounting information beyond that of 
headline earnings numbers. For instance, Thomas (1999) investigates whether abnormal 





45 Specifically, Alegria et al. (2009) defines extreme returns as those of magnitude of more than 2 standard 
deviations of daily returns for a given stock. Nguyen and Truong (2018) define an extreme daily return on a given 
stock as a highest daily return on that stock in a given month. 
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The results indicate that the market understates foreign earnings' persistence.46 As a result, it 
is possible to construct a zero-investment trading strategy that consistently earns positive 
returns for a period of up to one year, with most of the positive returns concentrated in the few 
days surrounding the subsequent year's quarterly earnings announcement dates. Huang and 
Zhang (2012) note that until recently, studies in accounting research have predominantly 
focused on using earnings information to explain stock returns. Their article confirms that 
information provided by the other primary financial statement—the balance sheet—is 
incrementally useful for determining returns, in particular for firms where earnings 
informativeness is low. Ng et al. (2013) documents that stock market under-reacts not only to 
earnings figures (in line with PEAD, see above), but also to managers’ earnings forecast, with 
the magnitude of under-reaction increasing in the perceived credibility of the forecasts. Atiase 
et al. (2005) show that the reaction to management’s earnings forecasts is less pronounced if 
these are released at the same time as earnings announcements. Heflin et al. (2016) examine 
the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on public management earnings forecasts and 
find it to be asymmetric. Specifically, FD increased managers’ use of management forecasts 
as a downward-guidance mechanism to help meet or beat earnings expectations, with this 
effect being more pronounced when existing analyst forecasts are optimistic and when firms 
had selective disclosure policies pre-FD. Finally, Tucker (2007) shows that openness of 
managers issuing profit warnings is not penalised by the markets: after controlling for selection 
bias, warning firms’ returns remain lower than those of non-warning firms in a short-term 
window ending five days after earnings announcement, but when this window is extended by 
three months, warning and non-warning firms exhibit similar returns. 
 
In addition to PEAD, another widely studied accounting-related return phenomenon is the so- 
called accrual anomaly, first documented by Sloan (1996). It refers to the empirical fact that 
the current level of accruals is negatively related to abnormal returns over the following year. 
This result suggests that the market fails to appreciate that the accrual component of earnings 
is less persistent than the cash flow component. Consequently, the market appears to 
overreact to earnings that contain a large accruals component. This result holds for both 
extreme positive and negative accruals. The over-reaction is subsequently reversed when 
earnings are reported in the following year and the market learns that the earnings of the 
previous period are not sustainable (Collins & Hribar, 2000). Collins and Hribar (2000) discuss 
the related literature and then jointly examine PEAD and the accrual anomaly. They find that 
the accrual mispricing appears to be distinct from PEAD: a hedge portfolio trading strategy 
that exploits both forms of market mispricing generates abnormal returns in excess of those 
based on either unexpected earnings or accruals information alone. 
 
Chen and Khurana (2015) document that elimination of 20-F reconciliation form for firms 
cross-listed in the US (which was used to reconcile their home country-based reporting to US 
GAAP), simplifying their reporting requirements, is accompanied by positive cumulative 
abnormal returns for firms reporting according to IFRS. However, this effect is absent for non- 
IFRS-reporting firms. Chen and Khurana’s (2015) findings seem to suggest that reporting 
requirements impose compliance costs (of preparation and auditing of a particular report), on 
firms, which shareholders can find excessive. 
 
Following recent methodological and computational advances, researchers have started to 
examine price/return effects of qualitative information contained in the narrative part of 
corporate reports employing textual analysis tools (see Loughran & McDonald, 2016, for a 
review of related literature).47 Loughran and McDonald (2014) find that 10-K document file 
 
 
46 See Section A for a discussion of earnings persistence. 
47 Given the nascent state of the field, the methodological debate on the merits of various methodological 
approaches is ongoing (Henry and Leone, 2016; Lewis and Young, 2019; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). Please 
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size, argued to be a simple yet effective measure of a financial statement readability, is 
positively related with the magnitude of earnings surprises, which suggests that firms trying to 
obscure mandated earnings-relevant information “bury” the results in longer documents. Guay 
et al. (2016) challenge this premise and argue that managers use voluntary disclosures to 
mitigate the negative effects of financial statement complexity. In particular, a positive relation 
between financial statement complexity (measured as an aggregate of various readability 
proxies, see Section A) and voluntary disclosure is stronger when liquidity decreases around 
the filing of the financial statements and/or when a firm has more outside monitors (such as 
financial analysts covering the firm or institutional shareholders invested in its equity), and is 
weaker when firms have poor performance and greater earnings management (ibidem). 
 
Karapandza (2016) shows that firms talking less about the future (i.e. using fewer future tense 
phrases) in their annual reports generate positive abnormal returns of about 5% annually. 
Such a lack of forward-looking statements result in companies being perceived as more risky 
with shareholders expecting to be compensated (through higher returns) for bearing the 
corresponding risk (ibidem). Feldman et al. (2010) examine whether the management 
discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of Forms 10-Q and 10-K has incremental information 
content beyond financial measures such as earnings surprises and accruals. They find that 
short-run market reactions around the SEC filing (i.e. over three days surrounding the date of 
the filing) are significantly associated with the tone change of the MD&A section (relative to 
the prior filing), even after controlling for accruals and earnings surprises. Management’s tone 
change is also positively related to medium-run returns over the period from 2 days after the 
SEC filing date until 1 day after the subsequent quarter’s preliminary earnings announcement 
(ibidem). Feldman et al. (2010) document that this drift (similar in nature to PEAD discussed 
earlier) cannot be explained by financial information conveyed through accruals and earnings 
surprises (ibidem). Baginski et al. (2018) document a negative relation between the tone of 
management’s earnings forecasts and future stock returns. Finally, Huang et al. (2014) 
investigate whether and when firms manage the tone of words in earnings press releases and 
find that abnormal positive tone a) predicts negative future earnings and cash flows, and b) is 
positively associated with upward perception management events, such as, just 
meeting/beating thresholds or future earnings restatements. Such an abnormally positive tone 
has a positive stock return effect at the earnings announcement and a delayed negative 
reaction in the one and two quarters afterward. Overall, the evidence is consistent with 
managers using strategic tone management to mislead investors about firm fundamentals, in 
particular in case of older firms or firms less able to manage earnings through accruals 
(ibidem). 
 
Existing literature also provides some evidence on the association between non-financial 
corporate reporting and stock returns (see Christensen et al., 2019, for a recent review). 
Beneish et al. (2008) show that firms making disclosures about internal control weaknesses 
(voluntarily under Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) experience negative announcement 
returns, but negative effects are smaller for larger firms reporting under Section 404 of the Act, 
suggesting that public disclosures are more informative for smaller firms that likely have higher 
pre-disclosure information uncertainty. Amer (2018) studies companies that have joined the 
United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) and are required to submit annual ESG report to 
UNGC. She finds that failure to report to the UNGC is penalised by the financial markets with 
an average cumulative abnormal return of −1.6% over a period of 5 trading days around the 
event, indicating that even voluntary reporting commitments undertaken by firms have 
substantial financial market consequences. Liesen et al. (2017) show that corporate 
disclosures of quantitative greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and, to a lesser extent, carbon 
performance are value-relevant. Specifically, investors could have achieved abnormal risk- 
 
 
see Section A for further discussion of methodological aspects of text-based measures of the quality of corporate 
reporting. 
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adjusted returns of up to 13.05% annually by exploiting inefficiently priced positive effects of 
(complete) GHG emissions disclosure and good corporate climate change performance in 
terms of GHG efficiency in their portfolio construction. Their results imply that investors should 
not neglect environmental disclosures and performance when making investment decisions 
(as financial markets were inefficient in pricing publicly available information on carbon 
disclosure in the sample period). Consequently, Liesen et al. (2017) call for mandatory and 
standardised information on carbon performance, which would consequently not only increase 
market efficiency, but also result in better allocation of capital within the real economy. Along 
these lines, Grewal et al. (2019) examine the equity market reaction to events associated with 
the passage of the EU directive mandating increased nonfinancial disclosures pertaining to 
firms’ ESG performance (applicable to firms listed on EU exchanges or with significant 
operations in the EU). They predict and find an average negative market reaction of –0.79%. 
This effect is less negative for firms having higher pre-directive ESG performance or higher 
pre-directive ESG disclosures. At the same time results are accentuated for firms having the 
most material ESG issues, as well as investors anticipating proprietary and political costs as 
a result of the mandated disclosures. Overall, their results are consistent with the equity market 
correctly perceiving net costs (benefits) for firms with weak (strong) nonfinancial performance 
and disclosure around key events surrounding the mandatory disclosure regulation of 
nonfinancial information (ibidem). 
 
 
C.2.5. Volatility effects 
 
Numerous studies investigate the link between the timing and content of corporate reporting 
and volatility of stock and option returns. For instance, Sridharan (2015) shows that financial 
statement information can is useful for predicting future realised stock volatility. Importantly, 
the information contained in financial statements allows for improvements in forecasting 
(relative to predictions based on stock- and option-market-based information), potentially 
improving performance of investors’ trading strategies (ibidem). 
 
More specifically, a number of studies investigate patterns of volatility around the earnings 
announcement dates. Barth and So (2014) find that investors anticipate some earnings 
announcements to convey news that increases market return volatility and pay a premium to 
hedge this non-diversifiable risk. Donders et al. (2000) document that stock return volatility 
implied by the option prices increases before announcement days and drops afterwards. 
Truong et al. (2012) finds these effects to be asymmetric, i.e. positive earnings surprises and 
positive profit announcements produce a larger uncertainty resolution than negative earnings 
surprises and loss announcements. Hann et al. (2019) illustrate that earnings announcement 
impact not only the stock and option volatility of announcing firms, but also of their industry 
peers. This suggests that earnings announcements help to resolve uncertainty about the value 
of not only the announcing firm but also its peers. Specifically, there is a significantly positive 
association between changes in the implied volatility of each industry’s first announcer and its 
peers around the first announcer’s earnings announcement (ibidem). Importantly, the 
aforementioned reductions in post-announcement volatility are positively related to the quality 
of accounting information (in particular, earnings quality), as documented for reporting firms 
by Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2016) and for peer effects by Hann et al. (2019). In a 
similar vein, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) hypothesise and find that deteriorating 
earnings quality is associated with higher idiosyncratic return volatility over the period of 1962– 
2001. In other words, poor earnings quality could expose investors to risks for which they 
would not be compensated (in terms of expected returns). 
 
A small number of studies have looked at the association between volatility and corporate 
reporting beyond financial accounting numbers. For instance, Kravet and Muslu (2013) 
examine companies’ textual risk disclosures in 10-K filings and find that, surprisingly, annual 
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increases in risk disclosures are associated with increased stock return volatility. This is in 
contrast to prior literature documenting resolved uncertainties in response to various types of 
company disclosures. However, this effect is less pronounced for firm-level disclosures that 
deviate from those of other companies in the same industry and year, supporting critics’ 
arguments that firm-level risk disclosures are more likely to be boilerplate. Rogers et al. (2009) 
find a similar positive association between earnings guidance provided by managers and 
volatility. However, Billings et al. (2015) document a link between abnormal run-ups in volatility 
and the managers’ decision to issue a forecast after controlling for the market’s ability to 
anticipate the guidance which suggests that the casual link works in the opposite direction. 
Upon disentangling pre-guidance volatility changes from post-guidance volatility changes, 
Billings et al. (2015) find no evidence that guidance increases volatility, refuting the finding of 
Rogers et al. (2009). 
 
Following the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, US firms have been mandated to provide 
management’s report on internal controls (as per Section 302) and such disclosures have 
been shown to reduce stock return volatility (Gupta at al., 2018). Benlemlih et al. (2018) paint 
a more nuanced picture and find a negative and significant association between firms’ 
environmental and social disclosures and a firm’s total and idiosyncratic risk, but not 
systematic risk (defined as per Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM). This result suggest that 
corporate transparency can help companies to build a positive reputation and trust with their 
stakeholders, which in turn can help mitigate the firms' idiosyncratic/operational risk. 
 
Finally, firms that voluntarily choose to increase their reporting frequency (and switch to 
quarterly reporting) somewhat surprisingly suffer from higher price volatility, offsetting some 
of the benefits of more frequent reporting (Rahman et al., 2017). Thus, while the evidence 
summarised in this section suggests a negative link between the scope and quality of 
corporate reporting and volatility of stock and option returns, some questions about the 
robustness of this finding remain. 
 
 
C.2.6. Concluding remarks 
 
We have shown that corporate reporting matters for and is used by investors. Its relevance 
manifests itself in a number of ways detailed below. 
 
• High-quality financial reporting reduces information asymmetries faced by market 
participants, which in turn reduces information advantages of informed investors 
(such as e.g. corporate insiders). Consequently, stock market liquidity improves. For 
instance, trading costs (reflected through bid-ask spreads) decrease, market depth 
increases, and trading volumes increase. These liquidity effects are stronger if 
disclosure regulatory regime is stronger (see Section C.2.1). So far, there is not 
enough empirical evidence illustrating similar effects for non-financial reporting (e.g. 
ESG reporting). 
 
• There appears to be quite some degree of consensus in both theoretical and 
empirical literature that more extensive and higher-quality corporate disclosures 
reduce perceived riskiness of the firms and therefore they are associated with lower 
cost of capital in general and lower cost of equity capital in particular (see Section 
C.2.2). Again, these effects have mostly been documented for financial reporting, 
although the literature examining the effects of non-financial reporting and integrated 
reporting has started to emerge recently. 
 
• There is ample evidence that financial accounting information has been value- 
relevant, although its relevance has decreased over time both in the US and 
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internationally (see Section C.2.3). Value relevance of financial reporting also varies 
across firms and countries. 
 
• A number of studies document that information provided by ESG reporting is also 
value-relevant and this finding holds for both mandatory and voluntary disclosures 
(see Section C.2.3). 
 
• The release of corporate reporting (both financial and non-financial) is an important 
factor explaining stock returns (see Section C.2.4). 
 
• Yet, only a small proportion of total information incorporated in share prices is 
associated with earnings announcements suggesting that the primary economic role 
of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market. 
 
• Empirical evidence suggests that market reaction to the releases of corporate 
reporting information is not instantaneous (as illustrated e.g. by the PEAD 
phenomenon) with share prices only slowly reflecting the information over time (see 
Section C.2.4). 
 
• The return effects of narrative corporate reporting vary with its linguistic 
characteristics (e.g. tone) and readability (see Section C.2.4). 
 
• Finally, Section C.2.5 documents that corporate reporting is useful in explaining and 
predicting volatility of stock and option returns, illustrating another aspect of 
usefulness of such information for investors. 
 
 
C.3. Corporate reporting and financial analysts 
 
This section examines earnings forecasts, share recommendations and coverage by financial 
analysts and the link between these and corporate reporting.48 In doing so, we mirror the 
approach of Section C.2. above by providing indirect evidence of usage of corporate reporting 
information by financial analysts. As before, we acknowledge that some of the relevant topics 
have been extensively reviewed by prior reviews such as Beyer et al. (2010), Bradshaw 
(2011), Ramnath et al. (2008), as well as, to a lesser extent, Brown et al. (2015), Cascino et 
al. (2013, 2014), and Christensen et al. (2019). Therefore, our discussion below complements 
and updates these prior reviews, extending the focus beyond the effects of narrowly defined 
financial reporting information and covering the emerging literature on analysts’ use of non- 
financial information, in particular CSR reporting. 
 
Before delving into details as to whether and how corporate reporting is associated with 
analysts’ forecasts, recommendation, and coverage, we discuss how corporate disclosures 
influence analysts’ timings of forecast revisions and the way they process and produce 
information. The usefulness of analyst research potentially derives from two sources: the 
discovery of private information and interpretation of public information, with the literature 
disagreeing as to which one dominates (Asquith et al., 2005; Francis et al., 2002a; Ivković & 
Jegadeesh, 2004). Chen et al. (2010) explore the relative importance of these two sources 
around the earnings announcement dates and find that information discovery (interpretation) 
dominates in the week before (after) firms announce their earnings. In addition, they find that 
 
 
48 We focus on the usage of corporate reporting by financial analysts and do not discuss here the literature on the 
effect that analysts forecast can have on corporate reporting choices (in particular, earnings management). The 
latter is outside of the focus of the FRC project. 
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the interpretation role increases in importance with the difficulty of financial accounting 
information, yet the information discovery role is more important overall. Livnat and Zhang 
(2012) challenge this conclusion: examining a broad set of corporate public disclosures, they 
suggest that investors value analysts’ ability to promptly interpret public disclosures, especially 
less structured or non-financial disclosures more highly than their ability for information 
discovery. Yet, Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006) show that analysts revise their forecasts of future 
earnings in response to revenue surprises, but they are slow to incorporate fully the 
information in revenue surprises, possibly exacerbating PEAD discussed earlier. De Franco 
et al. (2011) stress the relative importance of the analysts in interpreting the information 
reported by companies, in particular in notes to financial statements. Equity analysts are more 
likely to issue a report and to update their target price estimates at the earnings announcement 
dates when the magnitude of the accounting adjustments calculated from financial statement 
note information is larger (ibidem). 
 
Keskek et al. (2014) document reputation herding behaviour of analysts in both discovery and 
interpretation stages around the earnings announcements, with earlier forecasts having higher 
quality than later forecasts (suggesting that analysts who are more capable participate early 
in discovering and analysing of information). Finally, Altinkiliç and Hansen (2009) attribute the 
clustering of analysts’ recommendation releases around the earnings dates to analysts 
strategically piggy-backing on earnings information to improve the perceived performance of 
their recommendations. However, Yezegel (2015) argues that analysts issue 
recommendations when they face greater demand from investors, when the relative supply of 
information available on earnings announcements is higher and when they detect mispricing. 




C.3.1. Corporate reporting and analyst forecasts 
 
A sizeable body of literature examines the links between the features of corporate reporting 
and characteristics of analyst forecasts such as forecast dispersion/consensus and/or forecast 
accuracy.49 For instance, Tsao et al. (2016) document that firms that provide voluntary monthly 
earnings disclosures have more accurate and less dispersed analyst earnings forecasts and 
have lower overall uncertainty and less commonality of information in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Firms restating their financial reports in the past due to irregularities (as opposed to 
errors) suffer from a decreased credibility in their subsequent reporting, which in particular 
influences reduction in analyst accuracy and an increase in forecast dispersion in the post- 
restatement period, while other restatement firms exhibit only an increase in forecast error, 
suggesting that restatements affect analyst behaviour in forming judgements regarding 
subsequent earnings announcements (Ye & Yu, 2017). 
 
A number of studies have also investigated the effects of including a specific type of 
information in corporate reporting and of the quality of such information on the analyst forecast 
accuracy, precision, and likelihood of updates. The examples of such information items include 
reporting on firms’ accounting policies (Hope, 2003), estimates of values of employee share 
options (Bratten et al., 2016) or other complex derivatives (Chang et al., 2016), R&D expenses 
(Hill et al., 2018), or disaggregated earnings guidance (Lansford et al., 2013). Overall, the 
common conclusion of these studies tends to be that analyst forecast dispersion decreases 
 
 
49 Analysts' forecast dispersion (as opposed to consensus) refers to the disagreement among analysts regarding 
the expected earnings per share (EPS) of a given firm. It is usually measured as the standard deviation among 
analysts’ forecasts for a forecast horizon divided by the realized EPS. Forecast accuracy is usually defined as the 
absolute value of the percentage difference between realized EPS and forecasted EPS. 
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and analyst precision increases are associated with higher transparency as well as higher 
quality, broader scope, and lower complexity of information disclosed by firms. 
 
Similar conclusions are reached by studies employing linguistic analysis of corporate 
disclosures to examine the effects of its quantity and quality (e.g. readability, specificity) on 
analyst forecast dispersion and precision (e.g. Bozanic et al., 2018; Hope et al., 2016; Lehavy 
et al. (2011). Interestingly, contrasting the results of Kravet and Muslu (2013) and Hope et al. 
(2016) illustrate that depending on whether the focus is on the effects of quantity or quality of 
disclosures, the conclusion can differ. While Hope et al. (2016) show that improved quality (i.e. 
specificity as opposed to boilerplate) of risk disclosures is beneficial, allowing analysts assess 
firms’ fundamental risks better, Kravet and Muslu (2013) show that increases in the extent of 
risk disclosures are associated with more dispersed forecast revisions around the filings, 
suggesting that textual risk disclosures could increase analysts’ and investors’ risk 
perceptions. Similar conclusions are reached for the length of 10-K financial statement file by 
Loughran and McDonald (2014): longer reports are associated with higher analyst forecast 
dispersion. 
 
It is not just the contents and length of narrative reporting, but also the type of language used 
that matters for analyst forecasts. For instance, the use of pessimistic language tone in 
financial statements is positively associated with forecast accuracy and analyst coverage 
(Iatridis, 2016). Causal reasoning intensity on earnings-related financial outcomes of a large 
sample in MD&A sections of firms’ financial reports in the US is positive and significantly 
associated with a firm's causal reasoning intensity and analyst earnings forecast accuracy 
respectively, while the link is negative and significant for analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion 
(Zhang et al., 2019). 
 
C.3.2. Corporate reporting and analyst coverage 
 
Characteristics of corporate reporting (such as e.g. frequency, quality, readability, or tone) 
influence the likelihood that a particular firm is covered by analysts in the first place. Analyst 
coverage is higher for firms with less readable financial statements (Lehavy et al., 2011)50 and 
for firms voluntarily disclosing monthly or quarterly earnings (Rahman et al., 2007; Tsao et al., 
2016), once again evidencing investors’ demand for interpretation of corporate disclosures by 
analysts. Analyst coverage drops following firm restatements (Ye & Yu, 2017; see also Section 
A). Analyst coverage is higher for firms with more pessimistic language tone in their financial 
statements (Iatridis, 2016) and for firms with higher causal reasoning intensity on earnings- 
related financial outcomes in their MD&As (Zhang et al., 2019). 
 
The extent of analyst coverage also depends on macro-level factors characterising the 
reporting environment. For instance, following the adoption of IFRS, analyst coverage, in 
particular by foreign analysts, improves (De George et al., 2016; Lang & Stice-Lawrence, 
2015). Such macro-level factors also affect forecast dispersion and accuracy (Barniv et al., 
2005; Barth et al., 2017; De George et al., 2016; Jiao et al., 2012; Lang & Stice-Lawrence, 
2015). Specifically, following IFRS adoption, forecast dispersion has decreased and forecast 
accuracy has improved (Choi et al. 2013; De George et al., 2016; Jiao et al., 2012; Lang & 
Stice-Lawrence, 2015). Barniv et al. (2005) compare analysts’ performance in common- and 
civil-law countries, with the former (i.e. countries with a legal system of the English-law origin) 
usually having higher-quality financial reporting systems. They find that analysts with superior 
ability and resources in common-law countries will more consistently outperform their peers 
because appropriate market-based incentives exist, there. In civil-law countries, where the 




50 Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015) examine the impact of IFRS adoption and suggest the opposite, however. 
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mechanisms and lower-quality financial reporting51, analysts with superior ability will less 
consistently provide superior forecasts (ibidem). 
 
 
C.3.3. Usage of analyst forecasts by investors 
 
The literature also sheds some light on the usage of analyst reports by market participants. 
For instance, Kanagaretman et al. (2005) that analyst forecast properties and analyst 
coverage provide equity specialists with useful information, which then gets reflected in 
measures of market liquidity, i.e. depth of the market and bid-ask spreads. Francis et al. 
(2002a) argues that analyst reports do not substitute for earnings announcements or erode 
their informativeness but strengthen their price effects instead. The conclusion of analyst 
earnings forecasts decreasing information asymmetry at earnings announcement is 
corroborated by Amiram et al. (2016). Along the same lines, Zhang (2008) shows that the 
responsiveness of analyst forecasts to current earnings announcements reduces PEAD and 
is associated with shifting a larger portion of market earnings reactions to a narrow event 
window following the announcement. 
 
Kirk et al. (2014) argue that investors may use individual analyst forecasts as additional 
benchmarks in evaluating reported earnings because the consensus forecast under-utilises 
private information contained in individual analyst forecasts. They also find that measures 
reflecting such private information have incremental explanatory power over the consensus 
forecast for the market’s reaction to earnings news. Huang and Skantz (2016) show that 
issuance of non-GAAP earnings numbers by management (pro-forma earnings) and analysts 
(“street earnings”) increase the amount and precision of earnings information and thus help to 
narrow information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders following earnings 
announcements, improving price discovery. 
 
 
C.3.4. Corporate reporting environment and analyst forecasts 
 
Kim et al. (2017) show that after firms stop providing quarterly earnings guidance, their investor 
base becomes composed of a larger (smaller) proportion of long-term (short-term) institutions, 
who put more (less) weight on long-term (short-term) earnings in firm valuation, become more 
(less) sensitive to analysts’ long-term (short-term) earning forecast revisions. Such firms are 
less likely to dismiss chief executive officers for missing quarterly earnings targets by small 
amounts, relative to investors in firms that continue to issue quarterly earnings guidance. These 
findings evidence a particular benefit of stopping quarterly earnings guidance, i.e. the 
reduction of short-termism among investors. 
 
Barth et al. (2017), Bernardi and Stark (2018a), and Zhou et al. (2017) examine how another 
aspect of the corporate reporting environment, namely the mandated adoption of integrated 
reporting (<IR>) framework in South Africa, affects capital markets in general and financial 
analysts in particular and they provide somewhat contrasting results in this respect. While 
 
 
51 Common-law countries are generally perceived to have stronger investor protection laws higher-quality financial 
reporting. In such a setting, earnings information can play a more prominent role in corporate governance 
mechanisms and therefore have greater value relevance. The greater value relevance of earnings information 
increases investors’ demand for that information when making decisions. On the other hand, financial accounting 
systems are generally perceived to be of lower quality in their ability to reflect accurately the underlying economic 
activity of the firm in civil-law countries. Moreover, financial accounting practices in civil-law countries are oriented 
less toward serving the needs of outside investors and investor protection laws are weaker. These factors likely 
weaken the demand by investors for earnings information (see Barniv et al., 2005, and studies cited there). 
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Barth et al. (2017) argues that higher integrated reporting (<IR>) quality is not associated with 
greater analyst target price forecast accuracy, Zhou et al. (2017) find that that analyst forecast 
errors reduce as a company’s level of alignment with the <IR> framework increases. Moreover, 
Zhou et al. (2017) document that the beneficial effects of <IR> persist after controlling for 
factors relating to financial transparency and the issuance of stand-alone non- financial 
reports, suggesting that <IR> is providing incrementally useful information to the capital market 
over and above existing reporting mechanisms. Bernardi and Stark (2018a) corroborate these 
benefits of <IR> and show that ESG disclosure levels are not robustly associated with analyst 
forecast accuracy before the IR regime was introduced. However, they argue that these 
disclosures, in particular environmental disclosures, are associated with forecast accuracy 




C.3.5. ESG reporting and financial analysts 
 
The studies examining the links between ESG disclosures and analyst coverage and forecasts 
include Bernardi and Stark (2018b), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Dhaliwal et al. (2012), Lee et al. 
(2018), and Muslu et al. (2019). Bernardi and Stark (2018b) illustrate a positive link between 
analyst following and the quality of firms’ environmental and social disclosure. Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011) examine the initiation of voluntary CSR reporting and find that initiating firms with 
superior social responsibility performance attract dedicated institutional investors and analyst 
coverage (although this result holds mainly for firms with good CSR performance). Moreover, 
these analysts achieve lower absolute forecast errors and dispersion. Lee et al. (2018) 
examine the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related information 
and the value of financial analysts’ share recommendations. They find that the value52 of 
analysts’ recommendation revisions is lower for companies that voluntarily issue CSR-related 
reports compared to those that do not make such disclosures (suggesting some substitutability 
between corporate disclosures and analyst reports). Moreover, the overall effect of CSR on 
the informativeness of analysts is stronger in the recent years. 
 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012) examine the relationship between disclosure of nonfinancial information 
(proxied by issuance of stand-alone CSR reports) and analyst forecast accuracy using firm- 
level data from 31 countries. They find that the issuance of stand-alone CSR reports is 
associated with lower analyst forecast error, with this relationship being stronger in countries 
where CSR performance is more likely to affect firm financial performance (i.e. countries that 
are more stakeholder-oriented, as reflected by the composite measure53 constructed by 
Dhaliwal et al., 2012). The relationship is also stronger for firms and countries with more 
opaque financial disclosure, suggesting that issuance of stand-alone CSR reports plays a role 
complementary to financial disclosure (ibidem). The results in Dhaliwal et al. (2012) should 
however be interpreted with caution, given that they use a very rough proxy for CSR reporting 
(i.e. the presence of absence of a CSR report). Finally, Muslu et al. (2019) develop a disclosure 
score based on the tone, readability, length, and the numerical and horizon content of stand- 
alone CSR report narratives. They then examine the relationship between the CSR disclosure 
scores and analyst forecasts. The findings of Muslu et al. (2019) suggest that the contents of 




52 Lee et al. (2018) measure the value of analysts’ recommendation revisions indirectly by examining abnormal 
stock returns around the date when the revisions are issued. 
53 This composite measure considers different features of the institutional environment that are likely to affect how 
firms manage their CSR activities, such as e.g. employment laws, social security systems, human rights legislation, 
CSR reporting legislation, etc. 
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C.3.6. Concluding remarks 
 
As discussed above, corporate disclosures influence contents and timings of analyst forecast 
revisions and the way they process and produce information, which illustrates that corporate 
reporting could be useful for analysts and, implicitly, for investors whom they serve.54 The 
relevance of corporate reporting information for analysts manifests itself in a number of ways 
summarised below. 
 
• Analyst earnings forecasts are more accurate and less dispersed for firms with 
higher quality of financial and non-financial corporate reporting (see Sections C.3.1 
and C.3.5). 
 
• Analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion also vary with the institutional corporate 
reporting environment (see Section C.3.4). 
 
• Characteristics of corporate reporting (such as e.g. frequency, quality, readability, or 
tone) and of corporate reporting environment (e.g. mandatory adoption of a particular 
reporting standard) influence the likelihood that a particular firm is covered by an 
































54 In this context, the literature stresses analysts’ role in interpretation of public information (such as corporate 
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D. What are the information needs of stakeholders (other than 
shareholders) and how is this information used? 
This section focuses on the information needs of stakeholders (other than shareholders) and 
their usage of corporate reporting. Among those, creditors (who are the other type of capital 
providers besides shareholders) play a particularly important role. As outlined below, the 
existing literature on information usage by this specific stakeholder group focuses mostly on 
financial reporting. Given the breadth of the creditor-related relevant literature, we discuss 
studies pertaining to credit markets in Section D.1, separately from the studies examining the 
information needs and information usage by other stakeholders (e.g. consumers, employees, 
suppliers, managers, industry bodies, professional associations, accounting firms, 
consultants, NGOs, academics; see Section A for further discussion)55 discussed in Section 
D.2. In contrast with Section D.1, the literature reviewed in Section D.2 predominantly pertains 
to non-financial corporate reporting, complementing the recent review of the relevant literature 
by Christensen et al. (2019, Section 4). 
 
Section D answers big questions about (a) the information needs of creditors and of other 
stakeholders and (b) their usage of corporate information, pertinent to the FRC Future of 
Corporate Reporting project. It illustrates how the annual report (and its components such as 
financial statements or narrative information) are useful to different groups of stakeholders. 




D.1. Corporate reporting and creditors 
 
The empirical literature on the links between corporate reporting, the corporate reporting 
environment and credit markets mostly examines public debt markets (i.e. corporate bond 
markets) or (bank) loans (which are an example of a private debt market transaction). The 
evidence on other sources of credit, e.g. on trade credit, is quite scarce (Cascino et al., 2013). 
Moreover, the vast majority of the studies relevant for this section focus on financial reporting 
information and/or the financial reporting environment only (with a notable exception of the 
literature review by Christensen et al. (2019), and the literature summarised there). Early 
literature on the topics discussed here has been extensively reviewed by Armstrong et al. 
(2010), Ball et al. (2008), Cascino et al. (2013, 2014), Christensen et al. (2019), Penalva and 
Wagenhofer (2019), Shivakumar (2013), and Taylor (2013). Rather than updating the, our 
review updates and complements those reviews.56 
 
Ball et al. (2008) and Ball and Shivakumar (2008) put the relevance of this section into 
perspective by making a bold claim that demand for financial reporting information arises in 
credit rather than equity markets, making financial statements more useful to lenders than to 






55 Some aspects of the usage of corporate reporting by regulators and standard setters are covered by Section B 
above, while others are not within the scope of this FRC project. The usage of corporate reporting information by 
auditors is also excluded from the review for the same reason. 
56 Importantly, our literature search has not identified any studies directly examining the usage of corporate 
reporting by creditors besides those already covered by prior reviews (e.g. Cascino et al., 2013). Hence, Section 
D.1 relies solely on indirect evidence derived from data about debt contract terms, bond and CDS spreads, bond 
returns, credit ratings, etc. 
104  
timeliness, and conservatism, because debt contract terms (in particular, debt covenants57 
discussed below) utilise reported numbers.58 On the other hand, equity markets do not rate 
financial reporting consistently with these metrics, because (among other things) they adjust 
for the total information incorporated in prices (ibidem). Ball et al. (2008) corroborate their 
claims empirically for an international sample of firms. 
 
Cascino (2017) and Even-Tov (2017) examine the relation between share and bond markets 
and the role that accounting information plays in this context. Specifically, Cascino (2017) 
examines how accounting conservatism affects the sensitivity of corporate bond returns to 
changes in the value of equity (i.e. the hedge ratio). Cascino (2017) finds that for firms that 
report conservative earnings and use covenants in their bond contracts there is on average a 
stronger association between share and bond returns. Even-Tov (2017) shows that the bond 
price reaction to earnings announcements has predictive power for post-announcement share 
returns and that this predictive ability is driven by the bonds of firms with low credit rating 
scores (non-investment grade ones). 
 
The remainder of this section focuses on the effects of corporate reporting (and of the 
corporate reporting environment) on two specific features of debt financing: cost of debt, which 
is discussed in Section D.1.1, and debt covenants, discussed in Section D.1.2. Finally, Section 
D.1.3 discusses how information provided by corporate reporting could be useful for distress 
and bankruptcy prediction and for credit ratings. Hence, while Section D.1.1 focuses 
predominantly on valuation role of corporate reporting (see Section A), from the creditors’ 
perspective Sections D.1.2 and D.1.3 illustrate how corporate reporting could be helpful for 
creditors (and agents serving them, such as credit rating agencies) to monitor the use of the 
capital, i.e. the stewardship role of corporate reporting (see Section A). 
 
D.1.1. Cost of debt and access to credit market markets 
 
Not many studies directly examine the relevance of corporate reporting information and of the 
reporting environment on access to credit (i.e. issues such as credit rationing, provision of 
trade credit, etc.). However, there are numerous examples of studies illustrating this 
relationship indirectly by examining the link between corporate reporting and the cost of debt 
in general and loan pricing in particular. Earlier literature on the related issues has been 
reviewed e.g. by Armstrong et al. (2010), Cascino et al. (2013, 2014), and Taylor (2013). 
Therefore, our review complements and updates theirs. 
 
There exists significant research indicating that the quality and credibility of financial 
information is (a) reflected in the cost of debt capital in general (e.g. Bonsall & Miller, 2017; 
Francis et al., 2005; Li, 2015) and (b) is incorporated into the pricing of bank loans in particular 
(e.g. Anagnostopoulou, 2017; Bharath et al., 2008; Costello & Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011; 
Graham et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2011). The basic logic is that accounting quality is expected 
to affect loan pricing either by determining the ease of predicting the future financial position 
of borrowing firms and their ability to repay their loans, or by influencing the level of information 





57 Debt covenants are agreements between a company (a lender) and a creditor usually stating limits or thresholds 
for certain financial ratios that the company may not breach. 
58 Beatty et al. (2008), Franke and Müller (2019), Guay (2008), Penalva and Wagenhofer (2019), and Ruch & Taylor 
(2015) discuss the role of accounting conservatism in credit markets in more detail and review the corresponding 
literature. Moreover, Gong and Luo (2018) argue that private information that lenders obtain about borrowers’ (in 
particular, through the lenders’ relationships with the borrowers’ major customers) can facilitate more timely and 
precise evaluation of borrowers’ creditworthiness. Such an information reduces lenders’ reliance on accounting 
conservatism in the borrowers’ financial statements. 
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Graham et al., 2008). The reporting quality aspects shown to matter for bank loan pricing 
include: 
 
• accrual-based measures (proposed by Dechow and Dichev, 2002, and McNichols, 
2002; see also Section A) examined by Anagnostopoulou (2017) and Bharath et al. 
(2008); 
 
• prior mis-reporting and resulting restatement (Graham et al., 2008); 
 
• voluntary adherence to IFRS (Kim et al., 2011); 
 
• or reporting of material internal control weaknesses (Costello & Wittenberg- 
Moerman, 2011). 
 
Mansi et al. (2011) illustrate that the activity of financial analysts could be beneficial not just 
for equity investors (as discussed in Section C.3 above) but can also mitigate information 
asymmetries between a firm and its creditors. Specifically, a common factor based on earnings 
forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion, and forecast revision volatility significantly relates to 
both credit ratings and credit spreads. Anagnostopoulou (2017) also documents an important 
mediating effect of the institutional environment in an international setting: accounting quality 
matters for the determination of loan spreads only in combination with the level of legal 
enforcement, and this only holds for countries with stronger legal enforcement. Finally, using 
accrual-based measures, De Franco et al. (2017) documents that reporting quality (as 
reflected by discretionary accruals, see Section A) weakens the association between 
estimated managerial ability and bank loan pricing. 
 
Li (2015) shows that country-level measures of accounting standard conservatism are 
associated with lower firms’ cost of debt capital. Examining an international sample, Francis 
et al. (2005) find that firms in industries with greater external financing needs (as per model 
by Rajan & Zingales, 1998) have higher voluntary disclosure levels and the expanded 
disclosure policy for these firms leads to a lower cost of debt capital. Bonsall & Miller (2017) 
examine the impact of financial disclosure narrative on bond market outcomes. They find that 
less readable financial disclosures are associated with a higher cost of debt, as reflected in 
firms’ bond spreads. Donker et al. (2018) examine the consequences of a specific type of 
corporate disclosures, namely profit warnings, as a negative information-releasing event 
during the normal course of business and evaluate the evolving nature of relationship banking 
before and after such an event. They show that lenders generally increase the cost of loans 
and loan security after profit warnings. Asquith et al. (2005) shows that financial reporting 
information is often incorporated in loan pricing in a dynamic manner by making the interest 
charged on a bank loan a function of the borrower’s current credit rating or of their financial 
ratios (such as debt-to-EBITDA, leverage, or interest coverage). Then, the interest rate in the 
contract varies directly with changes in measures of financial performance (instead of using a 
fixed spread over a floating benchmark interest rate such as e.g. LIBOR). Such pricing 
mechanisms could eliminate the need for unnecessary re-contracting (e.g. re-financing by the 
borrower or change of the loan terms by the lender, such as, for example, requesting additional 
collateral by the borrower). These innovative pricing schemes also allow for asymmetric 
adjustments to the spreads depending on whether the borrower’s performance improves or 
deteriorates. Asquith et al. (2005) examine contingencies where specific types of adjustments 
are used, e.g. interest-decreasing performance pricing is more likely when multiple 
performance measures predict credit quality better. 
 
Bharath et al. (2008) and Florou and Kosi (2015) distinguish between public (e.g. corporate 
bonds) and private debt markets (e.g. banks loans). Florou and Kosi (2015) examine a global 
sample of public bonds and private loans and find that mandatory IFRS adopters are more 
likely, post-IFRS, to issue bonds than to borrow privately. They also show that mandatory 
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IFRS adopters have lower bond costs (i.e. bond yield spreads), but not lower loan spreads, 
and that the observed debt market benefits are concentrated in countries with larger 
differences between domestic GAAP and IFRS. Bharat et al. (2008) also find that accounting 
quality affects the choice between public and private debt markets. Specifically, poorer 
accounting quality borrowers preferring private debt, i.e. bank loans, consistent with the 
hypothesis of banks possessing superior information access and processing abilities that 
reduce adverse selection costs for borrowers. The study also shows that accounting quality 
has a significant but differential impact on debt contract design in the two markets (i.e. public 
v. private debt), consistent with differences in re-contracting flexibility across the two markets. 
Specifically, in the case of private debt (where there is greater re-contracting flexibility), both 
the price (i.e. interest) and non-price (i.e. maturity and collateral) terms are significantly more 
stringent for poorer accounting quality borrowers. However, for public debt, only the price 
terms are more stringent. Allaya et al. (2019) and Donker et al. (2019) corroborate the claim 
that previously discussed factors influencing debt pricing, i.e. extent of reporting and its 
credibility, improve firms’ access to debt with more favourable terms, in particular longer 
maturity. Finally, accounting information not only influences primary credit markets (as 
discussed above), but it also has implications for the efficiency of the secondary trading of 
debt securities (Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008). Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) finds that timely 
loss recognition reduces the bid-ask spreads suggesting that conservative reporting 
decreases information asymmetry regarding borrowers. 
 
Gong et al. (2018) examine the link between non-financial (CSR) disclosures and debt 
financing and find that Chinese firms with high CSR disclosure quality face lower costs of 
corporate bonds. This inverse relationship is stronger for firms with weak corporate 
governance and firms located in regions with weak institutional environments. Moreover, firms’ 
misconduct significantly mitigates the influence of CSR disclosure quality. Finally, firms with 
higher quality of CSR information are less likely to be subject to collateral terms, but they tend 
to include covenants that are more restrictive (ibidem). 
 
 
D.1.2. Debt covenants 
 
This section discusses the specific issue of the links between corporate reporting and debt 
covenants.59 In particular, we discuss the literature on the characteristics of corporate 
reporting information and of the reporting environment on the likelihood of using particular 
forms of covenants, their stringency, etc. We also review how reporting information is used to 
structure loan covenants. We acknowledge that Shivakumar (2013) and Taylor (2013) review 
earlier studies on this topic in quite some detail. Therefore, our review complements and 
updates theirs. In particular, the existing reviews provide an excellent typology of the common 
covenant types and reveal that prevalence of covenants (including, accounting-based ones) 
is considerably larger in private debt than in public debt. 
 
The literature documents the considerable decrease in prevalence of most types of 
accounting-based debt covenants, in particular balance sheet-based ones, over time (Ball et 
al., 2015; Demerjian, 2011; Taylor, 2013). This trend has been at least partly attributed to the 
implementation of IFRS and increased emphasis of accounting standard setters on fair-value 
accounting, which has reduced the usefulness of balance sheet items for debt contracting 




59 We focus on the usage of corporate reporting in the design and implementation of loan covenants and do not 
discuss literature on the effect that the presence and nature of covenants can have on corporate reporting choices 
(in particular, on earnings management). The latter issue is outside of the focus of the FRC project. 
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key reasons as to why fair-value accounting (as opposed to historical cost approach) might be 
less useful for debt contracting: 
 
1. Fair-value accounting removes the focus on an asset’s cash flows and requires firms to 
record asset price changes arising from changes in discount rates as an immediate gain 
or loss in the financial statements, even if such fluctuations in discount rates are transitory 
only (Shivakumar, 2013). The “inclusion of these transitory gains and losses in income 
statements could lower the relevance of income statement numbers for debt contracting, 
as these gains and losses provide little information about the firm’s ability to service the 
debt in the future. In fact, by frequently violating covenants included to act as trip-wires to 
signal a borrower’s financial distress, transitory gains and losses could simply lead to an 
increased need for renegotiation of contracts and thus to an increase in contracting costs” 
(Shivakumar, 2013, pp. 377-378).60 
 
2. Fair-value reporting also affects the usefulness of balance sheet numbers for debt 
contracting, because of the inclusion of fair-value changes to a firm’s own credit. When a 
firm’s default risk increases, the liabilities on the firm’s balance sheet shrink, causing the 
firm to potentially recognise a gain (Ball et al., 2015). “Covenants based on fair-value 
accounting numbers could lead to perverse outcomes, with deteriorations in a firm’s credit 
risk loosening covenant constraints (such as loosening leverage ratios), and thereby 
increasing a manager’s ability to take actions that are detrimental to lenders. Moreover, 
fair-valuing liabilities would lower the effectiveness of balance-sheet-based covenants in 
constraining managerial risk-taking, as losses from projects undertaken by risk-seeking 
managers will partly be offset by gains from reduced liability values” (Shivakumar, 2013, 
p. 378). 
 
3. Fair-value accounting also increases the reliance on estimates. Apart from assets traded 
in active markets, fair values for most other assets require managerial judgement, opening 
up the potential for misuse of fair-value estimates, particularly when these are not verifiable 
(Ball, 2006; Kothari et al., 2010; Shivakumar, 2013). 
 
The claim about fair-value accounting being uniformly detrimental for debt contracting is 
challenged by Demerjian et al. (2016) who argue that fair-value adjustments are included 
when they are most likely to improve performance measurement and debt covenants are being 
adjusted to take into account changes in reporting standards. Finally, Kim et al. (2011) show 
that banks impose more favourable non-price terms on IFRS adopters, particularly less 
restrictive covenants. 
 
An influential paper by Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) argue theoretically that financial 
covenants control the conflicts of interest between lenders and borrowers (i.e. agency costs 
of debt) via two different mechanisms outlined below 
 
1. Capital covenants (relying on information about sources and uses of capital, i.e. balance 
sheet information only) align debt holder and shareholder interests. 
 
2. Performance covenants (relying on current-period profitability and efficiency indicators 
formulated in terms of income statement and cash flow statement information alone, or in 





60 However, such inclusion of transitory gains and losses in the income statement might be justified as being 
relevant for evaluating managerial performance or for capturing the true economic income for the firm during the 
period (Shivakumar, 2013). 
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limit agency problems by transferring control to lenders when the value of their claim is at 
risk (i.e. when bankruptcy is likely). 
 
Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) then test the predictions of their model and find that the use 
of performance covenants relative to capital covenants is positively associated with: 
 
• the financial constraints of the borrower; 
 
• the extent to which accounting information portrays credit risk; 
 
• the likelihood of contract renegotiation; 
 
• and the presence of contractual restrictions on managerial actions. 
 
These findings illustrate how different financial reporting information is useful for debt 
contracting depending on the circumstances. 
 
Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) examine the effect of financial reporting quality on 
the trade-off between monitoring mechanisms used by lenders. They find that when a firm 
experiences a material internal control weakness (as reflected in a Sarbanes-Oxley Act- 
mandated internal control report), its lenders decrease their use of financial covenants and 
financial-ratio-based performance pricing provisions and substitute them with alternatives, 
such as price and security protections and credit-rating-based performance pricing provisions. 
Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) also document that changes in debt contract design 
following internal control weaknesses are substantially different from those following 
restatements, where lenders impose tighter monitoring on managers’ actions, but do not 
decrease their use of financial statement numbers. This finding contrasts with those of Graham 
et al. (2008) who examine the link between corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting 
and find that compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement 
have significantly more covenant restrictions. Again, it illustrates how features of financial 
reporting information affect the details of debt contracts offered to firms. 
 
Looking into specific financial statement-derived items, Cook et al. (2014) show that a 
borrower’s coverage ratio has a negative statistical and economic impact on the inclusion of 
all categories and sub-categories of restrictive bond covenants. Demerjian (2017) shows that 
debt covenant intensity (i.e. the number of financial covenants used in a loan package) is 
associated with greater uncertainty, which is reflected among others by the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts dispersion and the within-industry standard deviation of quarterly profit growth. 
Hence, the covenants imposed by lenders do not only depend on the information reported by 
the borrowers, but also by their industry peers. 
 
Finally, Carrizosa and Ryan (2017) identify covenants in commercial loan contracts that 
require public borrowers to periodically disclose two types of accounting-related private 
information to lenders: projected financial statements for future periods and monthly historical 
financial statements. They examine this interesting phenomenon and find that that: 
 
• loan contracts include these covenants in settings where they enhance lenders’ loan 
contract monitoring; 
 
• these covenants are positively associated with the frequency of loan contract 
amendments; 
 
• and lenders trade on the borrower private information they receive in secondary loan 
markets. 
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D.1.3. Credit ratings and distress prediction 
 
The literature on the use of corporate (financial) reporting information to predict corporate 
distress and bankruptcy dates back to at least the 1960s (see e.g. Altman, 1968; Beaver, 
1966). Some of the earlier studies have been extensively reviewed by Beaver et al. (2005), 
Beaver et al. (2011, 2012), and Mossman et al. (1998), illustrating the debate on the 
effectiveness of information provided by corporate financial reporting in predicting firm 
bankruptcies. Therefore, the literature review in this section should be seen as updating these 
extant literature reviews and expanding their scope by covering the impact of corporate 
reporting on credit ratings and credit default swap (CDS) spreads. 
 
In this context, Beaver et al. (2012) identify proxies for discretion over financial reporting, the 
importance of intangible assets, the comprehensiveness of the accounting model and 
recognition of losses. They find that each of these proxies for financial reporting attributes is 
associated with financial ratios that are less informative in predicting bankruptcy. Furthermore, 
time-series tests reveal a decline in the predictive ability of financial ratios for bankruptcy and 
document that this decline is associated with the aforementioned measures of financial 
reporting attributes (ibidem). Akins (2018) finds that improved reporting quality (following the 
adoption of SFAS 131 improving segment disclosure) is associated with less uncertainty about 
credit risk as captured by disagreement among the credit rating agencies and that reporting 
quality is more important in reducing uncertainty when debt market participants have less 
access to private information. Kim et al. (2013) construct an index of financial statement 
comparability for firms and find that this measure is negatively related to lower credit spreads 
for both bonds and five-year CDSs. Chan et al. (2013), Florou et al. (2017), and Wu and Zhang 
(2014) examine the effects of either voluntary or mandatory adoption of internationally 
recognised accounting standards (i.e. IFRC or US GAAP) on firm credit ratings. Florou et al. 
(2017), and Wu and Zhang (2014) document the increase in credit relevance of financial 
statements, the increase of which is particularly pronounced for higher risk speculative-grade 
issuers and in countries with a particularly strong rule of law. Chan et al. (2013) and Florou et 
al. (2017) also provide evidence consistent with increased transparency and credibility of 
financial reporting translating into increases in creditworthiness, reflected in credit ratings, in 
the post-adoption period. However, Charitou et al. (2015) show that not all firms are winners 
and post-adoption disclosures after mandatory IFRS implementation in 19 European countries 
in 2005 reduced implied default risk for some of the companies only. Finally, Barker and Hayes 
(2004) extensively discuss the case study of Enron and illustrate how shortcomings in US 
GAAP requirements allowed the company to use misleading accounting practices (in relation 
to off-balance-sheet financing, revenue recognition, and financial statement disclosures) and 
in doing so conceal the economic fundamentals of the business. 
 
Shivakumar et al. (2011) document that credit market’s respond not only to the release of 
earnings or other financial statement data, but also to earnings guidance provided by 
management. They examine changes in CDS spreads to management earnings forecasts and 
document how credit markets react significantly to management forecast news and that the 
reactions to forecast news are stronger than to actual earnings news. The forecast news is 
mainly relevant for firms with poor credit ratings or announcing bad news. Moreover, the 
relevance of management forecasts to credit markets is particularly strong during periods of 
high uncertainty (such as e.g. recent financial crisis). 
 
Bonsall and Miller (2017), Cecchini et al. (2010), and Mayew et al. (2015) examine linguistic 
properties of narrative financial disclosures and link them to changes in credit ratings and 
likelihood of bankruptcy. Bonsall and Miller (2017) find that firms required to improve the 
readability of their filings experience more favourable ratings and lower bond rating 
disagreements. Cecchini et al. (2010) and Mayew et al. (2015) show that attributes of narrative 
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information provided in MD&A could predict corporate bankruptcy. Strikingly, the performance 
of such linguistic-based models compares favourably with quantitative prediction methods 
(ibidem). In particular, the information in MD&A disclosures is more useful in predicting 
bankruptcy relative to financial ratios three years prior to bankruptcy, which suggests that 
MD&A disclosures are more timely than financial ratios and hence, a leading indicator of going 
concern problems (Mayew et al., 2015). 
 
 
D.1.4. Concluding remarks 
 
We have shown that corporate reporting matters for and is used by creditors and agents 
serving them (such as credit rating agencies). Its relevance manifests itself in a number of 
ways detailed below. 
 
• Financial corporate reporting information serves a valuation role. It provides creditors 
with relevant information, which they take into account in their decisions to extend 
credit to companies and to price it appropriately. Higher quality and credibility of 
financial information lowers the cost of debt capital. In particular, it is incorporated 
into the pricing of bank loans and is reflected by spreads on corporate bonds (see 
Section D.1.1). 
 
• The quality of financial reporting also determines access to particular credit markets: 
firms with poorer accounting quality are more likely to use private debt (e.g. bank 
loans) as opposed to public debt such as corporate bonds (see Section D.1.1). 
 
• The literature also documents the effects of financial reporting regulatory 
environment (e.g. country-level measures of accounting conservatism, adoption of 
IFRS, etc.) on access to credit markets and on credit pricing (see Section D.1.1). 
 
• The quality of financial reporting also affects non-price terms of credit (such as 
maturity and collateral), which are more stringent for poorer accounting quality 
borrowers (see Sections D.1.1 and D.1.2). 
 
• The financial reporting information could be useful in stewardship role (see Section 
A). For instance, accounting-based debt covenants are a mechanism to monitor 
creditors’ performance, financial reporting information is a key input to commonly 
used bankruptcy-prediction models, etc. (see Sections D.1.2 and D.1.3). 
 
• The prevalence of debt covenants (including, accounting-based ones) is 
considerably larger in private debt than in public debt. However, the literature 
documents considerable decrease in prevalence of most types of accounting-based 
debt covenants, in particular balance sheet-based ones over time. This trend has 
been at least partly attributed to the implementation of IFRS and increased emphasis 
of accounting standard setters on fair-value accounting, which has reduced the 
usefulness of balance sheet items for debt contracting (see Section D.1.2). 
 
• Financial reporting information serves a valuation role for various credit-related 
financial markets: it influences corporate debt pricing on the secondary market, 
pricing of credit default swaps, etc. (see Sections D.1.1 and D.1.3). 
 
• Finally, there is only very limited evidence of relevance and usage of non-financial 
reporting (e.g. CSR reporting) in the context of credit markets. 
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D.2. Corporate reporting and other stakeholders 
 
There exists a very limited literature directly examining the use of financial reporting 
information by stakeholders who are not capital providers. A rare example of such a study is 
Drake et al. (2017) who conduct a demographic analysis of financial statement downloads 
from SEC EDGAR database and find that four demographic characteristics (income, 
household characteristics, education, and local conditions) are key factors explaining the 
usage of the EDGAR database of financial statements. On a relative basis, education has 
significantly more explanatory power for financial statement usage than does income or 
household characteristics. Financial statement usage is higher in areas with major cities, more 
accounting and finance jobs, higher capital gains and dividend income, greater access to 
broadband internet, a top-100 business school, or higher rates of college-educated residents. 
Usage is lower in ZIP codes with more fixed income, self-employment income, retirees, 
unemployed workers, homeowners, or households with children (ibidem). An important 
limitation of Drake’s et al. (2017) study is that, due to lack of data availability, it cannot examine 
whether the users of financial statements are actually investing in the companies whose 




D.2.1. Supply-chain effects 
 
Cheng and Eshleman (2014), Gosman et al. (2004), and Hui et al. (2012) examine the 
association between supply-chain links between firms and financial reporting. Gosman et al. 
(2004) show that major customers (recognised as such in corporate disclosures by their 
suppliers) have higher operating profitability and profitability persistence, with the sources of 
the higher profitability consistent with purported advantages of supply chain arrangements (i.e. 
customer relationships being a proxy for unrecorded organisational-capital intangibles). Hui et 
al. (2012) argue that powerful firm’s suppliers and customers prefer it to account more 
conservatively due to information asymmetry and these stakeholders’ asymmetric payoffs with 
respect to the firm’s performance. They indeed find that when a firm’s suppliers or customers 
have greater bargaining power, the firm recognizes losses more quickly. Finally, supplier-firm 
shareholders are found to respond to the earnings announcements of their major customers 
(Cheng and Eshleman, 2014). In particular, shareholders in suppliers to other companies tend 
to overreact to earnings news on those companies’ customers because that news contains 
imprecise information about the suppliers’ future cash flows.. Cheng and Eshleman (2014) 
also find that the overreaction declines with the strength of the economic ties between the 
supplier and the customer. 
 
 
D.2.2. Labour force and whistleblowers 
 
A number of studies investigate the link between firms’ labour forces and their financial 
reporting. Ji and Tan (2016) show that firms strategically vary their disclosure policies in 
response to labour unemployment concern, in particular providing more “bad news” earnings 
forecasts when unemployment concern is low. A similar effect of unemployment concern on 
disclosure holds when the tone of 10-K and 10-Q filings is used as an alternative proxy for 
corporate disclosure (ibidem). Call et al. (2017) examine the association between employee 
quality and financial reporting outcomes and find that firms with a high-quality workforce, 
particularly at a firm’s headquarters, exhibit higher accruals quality, fewer internal control 
violations, and fewer restatements. These firms also issue superior management forecasts, in 
terms of frequency, timeliness, accuracy, precision, and bias (ibidem). 
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Call et al. (2018) suggest that whistleblowers, including firm employees, are a valuable source 
of information for regulators who investigate and prosecute financial misrepresentation. 
However, Call et al. (2016) find that firms grant more rank-and-file share options when involved 
in financial reporting violations, consistent with management teams’ incentives to discourage 
employee whistleblowing. Lowe et al. (2015) state that while the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 
requires company executives to certify financial statements and internal controls as a means 
of reducing fraud, many companies have operationalized this by instituting a sub-certification 
process and requiring lower-level managers to sign certification statements. Given that these 
lower-level organizational members are often the individuals who are aware of fraud (and are 
in the best position to provide information on the fraudulent act), the unintended consequence 




D.2.3. Non-financial corporate reporting and stakeholders 
 
Chalmers et al. (2019) thoroughly review the literature on firm internal controls and their 
disclosures finding that such disclosures affect shareholders and analysts, as well as various 
stakeholders of a firm. In particular Su et al. (2014) find that internal control weakness 
disclosures adversely affect customers' perceptions of firms' ability and incentives to honour 
implicit commitments to customers and therefore customers are less willing to buy from such 
firms (which is then shown to lead to a decline in firms' sales growth after such a disclosure). 
 
Studies by Briem and Wald (2018), Searcy and Buslovich (2014), and Stubbs and Higgins 
(2018) provide direct evidence of stakeholders’ perspectives on integrated reporting <IR>. In 
particular, Briem and Wald (2018) illustrate that companies follow coercive pressures from 
investors and other stakeholders (such as NGOs and customers) when obtaining external 
assurance of their integrated reports and that they tend to raise their non-financial indicators 
and increase their credibility and reliability. Stubbs and Higgins (2018) evidence limited 
appetite for mandating of <IR> among corporate insiders, such as executives. Yet, many 
stakeholders (e.g. regulators, standard setters, industry bodies, professional associations, or 
accounting firms) believe that <IR> will become the reporting norm over time if left to market 
forces as more and more companies adopt the <IR> practice. Over time <IR> is expected to 
be perceived as a legitimate practice, where the actions of integrated reporters are seen as 
desirable, proper, or appropriate (ibidem). 
 
Abdo et al. (2018), Bradford et al. (2017), Diouf and Boiral (2017), Haque et al. (2016), 
O’Dwyer et al. (2005), Searcy and Buslovich (2014), and Wong & Millington (2014) provide 
direct evidence on the perspectives on CSR/sustainability reporting taken by various 
categories of investors and other stakeholders (e.g. consumers, employees, managers, 
regulators, standard setters, industry bodies, professional associations, auditors, accounting 
firms, consultants, NGOs, academics).61 A common theme of a number of these studies is the 
discrepancy between the information that the stakeholders expect on the one hand and the 
contents of the disclosure standards and actual disclosures made by the companies on the 
other hand (Abdo et al., 2018; Bradford et al., 2017, Haque et al., 2016, Diouf & Boiral, 2017, 






61 Section A.2 above also discusses the conflicting pressures from various stakeholder groups. However, in some 
cases these discrepancies may result in firms tending to adopt ad-hoc reporting strategies for different 
stakeholders, pretending to be addressing their respective concerns (Cho et al., 2015). 
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• companies’ tendency to take a tick-box approach providing only minimum disclosure 
requirements and concerns about the credibility of the information provided (Abdo et 
al., 2018); 
 
• mismatch between dimensions of reporting, e.g. those promoted by the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) and customers’ information needs (Bradford et al., 2017); 
 
• tendency for sustainability reports to reflect the impression management strategies 
used by companies to highlight the positive aspects of their sustainability 
performance and to obfuscate negative outcomes (Diouf & Boiral, 2017); 
 
• an apparent preoccupation with financial performance and advancing shareholders 
interest coupled with a failure by managers to accept accountability (Haque et al., 
2016); 
 
• general resistance to disclosures on the part of companies (O’Dwyer et al., 2005). 
 
These findings have clear implications for the regulation of corporate disclosures and 
enforcement of reporting standards (see also discussion in Sections A and B above). For 
instance, it might be desirable for the regulators to engage stakeholder groups in the process 
of design and implementation of reporting standards to ensure that their information needs are 
adequately satisfied. The findings also raise a bigger question about prioritising potentially 
conflicting information needs of various groups of stakeholders (in particular, vis-à-vis 
shareholders) by the bodies responsible for regulating corporate reporting and disclosures. 
 
Haque et al. (2016), O’Dwyer et al. (2005), and Searcy and Buslovich (2014) also highlight 
the issues of lack of proactive stakeholder engagement as an impediment to the efficiency of 
the disclosure process. For instance, Searcy and Buslovich (2014) document that the majority 
of the corporations considered stakeholder input in preparing their sustainability/integrated 
reports. In the vast majority (more than two-thirds) of the cases corporations relied exclusively 
on internal personnel to write the report, with the remaining corporations using a combination 
of internal and external authors.62 
 
Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014), Guenther et al. (2016), Liesen et al. (2015), and Thijssens et 
al. (2015) examine the effects of pressure of various stakeholder groups (e.g. government, 
customers, clients, employees, media, NGOs, general public) on CSR disclosures, in 
particular environmental ones, which allows for drawing some indirect inferences about the 
information needs of these groups of stakeholders. There is some disagreement as to how 
effective this pressure is. For instance, while Liesen et al. (2015) suggest that external 
stakeholder pressure is a determinant of the existence, but not of the completeness of 
emissions disclosure, Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014) find that stakeholder pressure improves 
the quality of transparency of sustainability reports prepared within the GRI framework. While 
Guenther et al. (2016) show that all stakeholders are associated with carbon disclosures, 
Thijssens et al. (2015) argue that differences in environmental disclosures between 
companies are mainly associated with differences between their environmental stakeholders’ 
legitimacy, implying varying degree of effectiveness of stakeholder pressure. Finally, Axjonow 
et al. (2018) find that, in contrast to the common belief, stand-alone CSR reports do not 
influence corporate reputation among non-professional stakeholders like (potential) 
consumers, employees, and the general public changes. However, they are able to 
 
 
62 Engagement of stakeholders in the corporate reporting process discussed here is of a different nature than that 
discussed in the context of their production of shadow-accounts (also known as counter-accounts), which has been 
discussed in Section A. Here we refer to stakeholders being engaged in the preparation of the company’s own 
reporting information. 
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D.2.4. Concluding remarks 
 
We have illustrated above that corporate reporting information (in particular, non-financial 
reporting) has a very broad audience covering many categories of stakeholders who are not 
capital providers (e.g. consumers, employees, suppliers, managers, industry bodies, 
professional associations, accounting firms, consultants, NGOs, academics). In this context, 
corporate reporting information is primarily relevant in terms of its accountability role (see 
Section A). 
 
• Corporate reporting not only matters for the company that releases information, but 
it also has effects on firms along the supply chain (see Section D.2.1). It also affects 
behaviour of retail customers, indicating that they are within the audience of 
corporate reporting as well (see Section D.2.3). 
 
• There is some evidence that managers consider the labour force to be within the 
audience of the corporate reporting (including financial reporting) and use corporate 
reporting strategically to strengthen firms’ bargaining positions (see Section D.2.2). 
 
• The corporate reporting environment has consequences for whistleblowing and 
could therefore facilitate or hinder the accountability role of corporate reporting (see 
Section D.2.2). 
 
• Non-financial reporting has huge potential to address the information needs of 
various stakeholders. Yet, this potential remains largely unfulfilled so far due to 
discrepancies between the information that stakeholders expect and the contents of 
the disclosure standards and actual disclosures made by companies (see Section 
D.2.3). 
 
• This mismatch is magnified by a lack of stakeholder engagement in the process of 
design and implementation of reporting standards and in the reporting activities of 
the companies (see Section D.2.3). 
 
• To date, academic literature has largely failed to solve conceptually the problem of 
prioritising the potentially conflicting information needs of various groups of 
stakeholders, in particular vis-à-vis shareholders (see also Section A). This 
unresolved question is of vital importance for the bodies responsible for regulating 
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E. How does corporate reporting affect managers’ (or firms’) 
behaviour? 
In this section we consider what the academic literature says about ‘real effects’ and how 
corporate reporting impacts managers’ and firms’ behaviour. 
 
Sections C and D have addressed evidence of how capital providers (shareholders and 
creditors) use financial information, making inferences, for example on the basis of liquidity, 
cost of capital, firm value, terms of debt contracts, and so forth. The analysis of real effects 
allows similar indirect inferences about how other stakeholders use corporate reporting 
information (importantly, both financial and non-financial). This provides a clear rationale as 
to why real effects are so important. It is not just corporate reporting driving the change of 
behaviour; it also gives insights about usage of reporting by various parties. 
 
The literature reveals that effects on capital providers and other stakeholders are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, which leads us to question whose behaviour is it that we are 
interested in? In terms of how other stakeholders utilise corporate reporting, the literature gives 
examples of compliance strategies and the use of reporting as an impression-management or 
PR tool. However, there are also examples of reporting influencing joined-up thinking and such 
decision-making becoming culturally embedded in organisations. There is some evidence that 
organizations may use disclosures to improve practice, but it is still early days for research on 
real effects, which faces many challenges, for example, proving causality versus correlation. 
 
In this section, we start with how the academic literature defines real effects (Section E.1). 
Section E.2 then considers how and why behaviour may change due to the influence of 
reporting on issues such as regulation, compliance strategies and impression management, 
identity signalling, agenda-setting, and stakeholder engagement. In Section E.3 we look at 
what behaviour may change due to reporting, considering internal investment behaviour, 
executive compensation and turnover, takeovers, activism, integrated thinking, operations, the 
‘tone-at-the-top’, and stewardship. 
 
 
E.1. Definition of real effects 
 
Real effects are defined as "situations in which the disclosing manager or reporting entity 
changes its behaviour in the real economy (e.g. investment, use of resources, consumption)" 
(Leuz & Wysocki, 2016, p. 545). This is in contrast to capital market effects, which describe 
the behaviour changes of those receiving the information (these are discussed in detail in 
Sections C and D above). However, the two are closely connected because it is often 
information about the potential or actual response of the reader that the author of the 
information is responding to (Kanodia & Sapra, 2016). Although some argue that managers 
have very little real discretion to change behaviours unless directly beneficial to shareholders 
(Harrison & van der Laan Smith, 2015), the real effects hypothesis contradicts the assumption 
that the accounting process is a neutral one. An example often discussed is the 2008-2009 
financial crisis and whether accounting disclosures exacerbated the downward spiral in the 
economy or were merely “the messengers of an unpleasant reality” (Kanodia & Sapra, 2016, 
p. 624). 
 
In academic literature, there is a substantial body of research looking at the effects of reporting 
standards internationally, specifically on the adoption of IFRS. However, reviews by De 
George et al. (2016) and Leuz and Wysocki (2016) conclude that few studies are able to 
attribute effects purely to the adoption of standards, because of other contributing factors, 
such as simultaneous institutional reforms and changes to reporting infrastructure (e.g. stricter 
enforcement). These interactions and complementarities make it impossible to attribute such 
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effects solely to the IFRS adoption, and are suggested areas for future research. However, 
these cited authors do provide a list of major categories of economic benefits of improved 
disclosure (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016, p. 545) (see Sections B, C and D above). The review by 
Leuz and Wysocki (2016) calls for more research into real effects, as there is considerably 
less on corporate behaviour than on capital markets. This is particularly important as more 
governments appear to be using disclosure requirements “as a public policy instrument to 
encourage or discourage certain behaviours and business practices” (p. 602) – more of which 
is covered below. 
 
In addition to financial reporting, in recent years there has been an increasing body of literature 
considering the real effects of non-financial reporting, particularly since the growth of more 
narrative reporting and the development of Integrated Reporting (<IR>). Integrated reporting 
is considered a disruptive innovation in corporate reporting (Simnett & Huggins, 2015), 
merging financial and non-financial reporting. Accountants have sought such a solution for 
decades, but many academics reveal concern and skepticism about the IIRC project (Atkins 
et al., 2015; Brown & Dillard, 2014; de Villiers et al., 2014), concerned that ultimately <IR> will 
still promote the dominance of financial reporting over non-financial reporting. A dual objective 
of <IR> is the provision of better information for both internal and external decision-makers 
(Barth et al., 2017). Whilst the numbers-based financial reporting is aimed at financial 
stakeholders (the primary addressees of reporting), and the complexity of that information has 
in the past precluded its use by other stakeholders (Gray, 2006), more narrative reporting 
socializes accountability to a wider group of (often non-financial) stakeholders (Brown & 
Dillard, 2014; Lai et al., 2018). However, literature suggests that investors and other financial 
stakeholders continue to be the main recipients (and therefore focus) of integrated reporting 
(Lai et al., 2018; Rinaldi et al., 2018). Much of the current non-financial reporting literature 
focuses on issues of ESG or CSR reporting, but Castilla-Polo and Gallardo-Vázquez (2016) 
conducted a recent review of accounting literature on the reporting of intangibles, or 
Intellectual Capital, which is challenging to include in traditional financial reporting, albeit in 
contrast to the management literature which take more operational or strategic approaches. 
As intangible assets may include a wide range of aspects, they are often aggregated in to 
groups such as human capital (focusing on personnel – e.g. levels of diversity), structural 
capital and relational capital (external relationships and networks), and if reported as such give 
clear focus for managers of their importance. Recent changes in the guidance on reporting in 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2018) appear to focus more on intangibles, such as 
inclusive cultures, and therefore this small body of literature may be relevant here and to future 
developments. Future research may track whether managers have subsequently focused 
more on such intangibles (in reporting and, if possible, in action), which may be linked to which 
stakeholders consider such narrative information important. 
 
Across the literature that considers the real effects of corporate reporting, the main academic 
theories utilized for papers focusing on financial reporting were the traditional agency63 and 






63 Agency theory explains the relationship between and behaviour of business principals (commonly 
owners/shareholders) and agents (company executives), who are believed to be motivated by different outcomes. 
64 Stakeholder theory states that modern businesses must serve not only shareholders and business owners, but 
all the multiple constituencies who are believed to be stakeholders of a business, for example; employees, 
creditors, suppliers, local communities, etc. 
65 Institutional theory describes how organisations are dependent on structures, rules, norms, and routines, 
explaining how these come to be stable and are subject to change processes, emphasizing ‘rational myths’, 
isomorphism and legitimacy. 
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isomorphism. More recently, articles invoked stewardship theory66 and signaling theory67 when 
considering the internal effects of reporting, and this can be seen in practice to align with the 
UK’s changing approach to governance demonstrated in the 2018 Corporate Governance 
Code, moving away from a purely agency focus to that of stewardship. 
 
 
E.2. How and why does reporting affect behaviour? 
 
Changes in reporting requirements, whether financial or non-financial reporting, may bring 
about changes in corporate behaviour for many combinations of reasons. Several of the 
reasons for financial reporting changing behaviours have been covered in previous sections 
(for example, extensive discussion of Leuz & Wysocki, 2016), and it is important to note that 
both financial- and non-financial reporting requirements may bring about real effects (actual 
behaviour change), changes in disclosure strategies (which may or may not bring about 
corporate behavioural change), and capital effects (behavioural change on the part of the 
receivers of reported information). 
 
 
E.2.1. Do mandatory or voluntary approaches affect behaviour more? 
 
The regulation of financial and non-financial reporting has been covered extensively in Section 
B above and it may seem obvious that the simplest way to alter behaviour is to regulate it. But 
the questions over what is being regulated nevertheless remain; is it the reporting of behaviour 
or the actual behaviour? A body of literature focussed on the integration of information on 
environmental, social and governance issues, discusses the pros and cons of mandated 
versus voluntary reporting. Overall, the literature suggests that companies prefer a voluntary 
approach to non-financial reporting, whereas other stakeholders may prefer mandated 
(Stubbs & Higgins, 2018). In the context of <IR> adoption, one argument made by investors 
is that increased legitimacy and market forces will lead to more <IR> and therefore mandating 
is unnecessary (Stubbs & Higgins, 2018). Leong and Hazleton (2019), focusing on 
sustainability disclosure, argue that mandating is not likely to lead to social change because 
often the information disclosed is not useful for activists’ purposes. However, mandated non- 
financial reporting is described as preferable because it is has the potential to be more 
homogeneous, comparable and useful. This, however, would depend on it being well- 
designed and specified. A possible solution is for minimum standards to be recommended, 
but for organisations to be able to exceed these should they choose (see also Leuz & Wysocki, 
2016), but with the inherent trade-off that leaving discretion to managers, may allow them to 
use it opportunistically (see Sections A and B for further details). The recent EU Non-Financial 
Reporting Directive is such an example, and future research will thus reveal further insights 








66 Stewardship theory suggests that left to their own devices, managers will act as responsible stewards of the 
assets they control, behaving for the benefit of the organisation, rather than purely self-interest. 
67 Signalling theory within agency theory refers to when one party (the agent) conveys information about itself to 
another party (the principal). However, within management literature it explains what information gains salience 
and how people alter their behaviour in circumstances of imperfect information. 
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E.2.2. Changes in behaviour of disclosure and compliance strategies: Managing 
impressions 
 
Whereas reporting changes may be brought in with the intention of having real effects on 
corporate behaviour, in fact they may just impact behaviours relating to disclosure and 
compliance strategies. See also Section A.2.2 for a discussion of impression management. 
One potential negative real effect of mandating is that if the costs of reporting are considered 
too onerous, or the companies are scared of the reputational damage of reporting, then firms 
may engage in avoidance strategies, such as actions to keep the firm under certain size limits, 
with investment cuts or re-categorising employees (Gao et al., 2009). For example, gender 
pay gap (GPG) reporting, recently mandated in the UK, was designed to encourage firms to 
reduce their GPG. Because it applies to all companies with over 250 employees (Goergen & 
Tonks, 2019), anecdotal evidence shows companies reducing or changing the contract types 
of employees. Further research is required on the unintended outcomes of reporting policies. 
Particularly with social, moral or ethical issues (e.g. CSR, diversity, tax-avoidance) research 
suggests firms are more likely to change behaviours (such as disclosing previous wrong- 
doing) in response to pressures from other peer firms, rather than as a response to formal 
regulatory pressures (Pffarer et al., 2008). 
 
However, the harmonization of standards can lead to real effects such as increasing/changing 
certain activities, motivated by benchmarking – i.e. trying to avoid reputational damage, 
adopting at least minimal standards in comparison to competitors, and this has been covered 
extensively for financial reporting in previous sections (see in particular Section A.2.2). This 
suggests that the real effects would be strongest in those firms performing worst in whatever 
the benchmark issue is (Castilla-Polo & Gallardo-Vázquez, 2016; Christensen et al., 2019; 
Kim & Lyon, 2015; Milne et al., 2006). With particular regards to sustainability reporting, many 
papers express a deep scepticism of companies’ non-financial reporting using metaphorical 
representations of ‘a sustainability journey’, which purports commitment, giving ‘warts and all’ 
perspectives, attempting to win trust from and improve legitimacy with their stakeholders (Al- 
Shaer & Zaman, 2019; Camilleri, 2018). In fact it is focused on creating a ‘sustainable business 
rather than contributing to a sustainable society” (Milne et al., 2006, p. 819). Selective reporting 
can give an air of transparency, whilst masking the truth (Dawkins & Ngunjiri, 2008), although 
in their study looking at thousands of public firms across 45 countries, Marquis et al., (2016) 
found that those organisations known to have poorer environmental performance were often 
more visible to stakeholders and therefore less likely to be selective in disclosure. Institutional 
pressures and scrutiny may lead to more substantive, as opposed to symbolic transparency. 
 
Early assumptions were that the balance of power between business and society would be 
altered by the additional information provided in social and environmental reporting, 
empowering stakeholders (Gray et al., 1996). However, more recently academics have 
suggested that corporate sustainability reporting may be counter-productive for social change 
(Boiral, 2013; Milne & Gray, 2013). A key aspect appears to be that of formal versus informal 
power, with a lack of the former described as “the biggest conceptual limitation to believing 
that sustainability accounting can promote organizational change” (Leong & Hazleton, 2019, 
p. 815). The question of the purpose of sustainability reporting is then raised – is it accounting 
to report per se, or is it accounting as a pre-cursor to change? In addition, there is growing 
criticism in the academic literature of sustainability reporting as an impression management 
tool (see also Section A.2.2), describing the “deceptive nature of discourse contained in stand- 
alone sustainability reports”, whilst the company engages in covert politicking activity to the 
contrary (Cho et al., 2018, p. 865). Boiral (2013) analysed how 23 sustainability reports from 
firms in the energy and mining industry projected idealised versions of themselves, using 
Global Reporting Initiative indicators to camouflage sustainability problems. Demonstrating 
the counter-accounting approach, Boiral (2013) estimated that 90% of significant negative 
125  
events across those organisations were not reported, contravening the GRI principles of 
balance, completeness and transparency. 
 
However, in their paper, entitled “It’s not always bad news”, focusing on integrated reporting, 
McNally and Maroun (2018) challenge the idea that <IR> is only about box-ticking and 
impression management, suggesting instead that it has the potential to expand our 
understanding of accounting systems, facilitating broader management controls and bringing 
a wider perspective to value creation. 
 
 
E.2.3. Signalling identity 
 
As well as managing external impressions of itself, what and how a company reports may play 
a role in signalling internal identity, which may impact corporate behaviour. Armstrong et al.’s 
(2010) review of the role of reporting financial information highlighted the important informal 
contracting roles of signalling and reputation. Signalling theory within agency theory refers to 
when one party (the agent) conveys information about itself to another party (the principal). 
However, within management or organizational studies literature (and based on social and 
psychological mechanisms) signalling theory explains which information gains salience and 
how people alter their behaviour in circumstances of imperfect information (see Connelly et 
al., 2011 for a review). Whilst <IR> challenges the dominant view of performance management 
as solely based on financial metrics (de Villiers et al., 2014), existing research on non-financial 
reporting says little about the actual process of its adoption. Gibassier et al. (2018) conduct a 
seven-year, longitudinal ethnographic study of a large multinational corporation and how they 
adopted <IR>, overcoming the lack of prescription regarding what the reports should contain. 
Their research findings acknowledge the aspirational nature of <IR> and how multiple 
participants developed collective conceptualizations of innovative ways to report, linking back 
to the foundational vision and mission of the company. Whereas previous studies have 
developed arguments about why companies may adopt IR, little research has shown how they 
do so. Gibassier et al. (2018, p. 1351) considering that process, argue that innovations such 
as <IR> can be generative, partly because they are ill-defined and unknown (and therefore 
companies need to consider how and why they are adopting it). Busco & Quattrone (2017) 
suggest that the additional time and effort invested in constructing the integrated report 
rejuvenates the original purpose, mission, vision, and thus makes the identity of the 
organization salient. 
 
When reporting includes intangible assets, such as intellectual capital and goodwill, a 
company can make otherwise implicit assets explicit to its employees and other stakeholders 
(Castilla-Polo & Gallardo-Vázquez, 2016). This and other narrative aspects of reporting 
provide a greater understanding internally and externally of both identity development i.e. ‘who 
we are’ (Lev & Zambon, 2003), and how the company achieves its performance (Lai et al., 
2015, p. 1398), in addition to improving an external image and corporate reputation. 
Intellectual capital and other intangibles, if measured and reported can be seen as a 
managerial resource in decision-making to be directed at organizational change (see Lev & 
Zambon, 2003). Internally, companies engaging in CSR reporting may do so in an effort to 
reflect core values (signalling theory) and beliefs about better governance (Dawkins & Ngunjiri, 
2008). This ‘strategic storytelling’ (Higgins et al., 2014) may also be used to enhance 
legitimacy and dialogue with investors and analysts. Reporting that is able to signal identity 
internally can enhance organizational identification. In management and organizational 
studies, there is a vast literature on the positive benefits of organizational identification. For 
example, Vadera and Pratt (2013) state that such research highlights positive attributes of 
identification such as enhanced individual self-esteem, and greater job satisfaction This in turn 
can increase employee loyalty, motivate employees to act in the firm’s best interests, reduce 
employee turnover and increase performance. 
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E.2.4. Agenda setting 
 
Reporting may change corporate behaviour through its agenda-setting role (Camilleri, 2018; 
Leong & Hazelton, 2019; Qian & Schaltegger, 2017; Stephan, 2002). This is particularly the 
case when public commitment to disclosure is made upfront “to provide information regardless 
of its content” (Armstrong et al., 2010, p. 187). 
 
In the context of <IR>, companies manage both the external environment and the six capitals68 
in its value management and value creation (Castilla-Polo & Gallardo-Vázquez, 2016). 
Through the narrative element of <IR>, the purpose and outcomes of social investments can 
be more clearly articulated and associated with longer-term notions of progress, risk and 
strategy. This articulation provides the focus for action for managers’ behaviours. Adams et 
al. (2016) analyse case studies of four major global companies, each using <IR> to distinguish 
themselves as a responsible company, telling more human-centred, value-creation stories, 
connected to firm financial performance. Increasing numbers of asset owners and asset 
managers, focused on more integrated reporting, are also seeking to meet the simultaneous 
objectives of both long-term returns and contributing to a more sustainable and inclusive world. 
This more engaged behaviour of owners and managers will likely influence the focus of a firm’s 
behaviour (Adams et al., 2019). 
 
In the UK, publicity and media reports concerning reporting requirements for boardroom 
diversity have placed the gender agenda firmly in the spotlight. Since the Davies Review of 
2011 and subsequent changes to the UK’s Code of Corporate Governance (2014 and 2018), 
the diversity agenda has spread to include the senior management pipeline and multiple 
characteristics and definitions of diversity (FRC, 2018). Media coverage (in the national and 
business press as well as social media), particularly of the largest listed companies (the FTSE 
100 firms) has focused leaders’ agendas on the need to improve gender diversity, for 
reputational and relational purposes (Sealy et al., 2017). 
 
 
E.2.5. Shareholder & stakeholder engagement 
 
Better quality reporting may reveal activities to shareholders that are not aligned with their 
priorities (whether financial or otherwise). Therefore, in response to shareholder reaction (real 
or anticipated), companies may adjust or reduce some activities in order to align with 
shareholder interests (Christensen et al., 2019; Schultz et al., 2018). This may also work the 
other way to influence reporting. For example, Kim and Lyon (2015) investigate how 
companies may seek to either ‘greenwash’ (inflate their ESG credentials) or ‘brownwash’ 
(minimise them). They found this relationship to be dependent on the balance of power 
between consumer and investor stakeholders. Recently, Michelon et al. (2020), show an 
increase in the number of CSR disclosures for a sample of firms targeted by shareholder 
resolutions demanding improved transparency. However, they are unable to document a 
similar positive change in the underlying CSR practices. Additionally, Adams et al. (2016) 
found that while firms endeavour to present themselves as responsible, for example, by 






68 The six capitals are financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, social and relationship, and natural. 
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stewardship in the annual report. This may be out of concern of an impression of a reduction 
in flexibility or competitiveness from adoption of standards. 
 
New forms of disclosures have been aimed at widening the sphere of accountability 
shareholder primacy to include other stakeholders, “such as future generations, communities, 
customers, suppliers and employees” (Andon et el., 2015, p. 995). Behaviours may change in 
response to either financial or non-financial reporting but the latter may have broader effects 
as it has a wider user group – e.g. consumers, activists, special-interest groups – who may be 
interested in issues such as ethics, values and contributions to wider society (Christensen et 
al., 2019). This broader user group also makes it harder to predict the real effects. Accessible 
and good quality financial reporting and non-financial reporting reduces the transaction costs 
of this wider stakeholder group obtaining information, which may enhance their ability to push 
for change within organisations (Leong & Hazleton, 2019; Stephan, 2002). For example, 
Dyreng et al. (2015) describe how a non-profit UK activist group used a subsidiary disclosure 
requirement to exert pressure on companies using tax havens for their subsidiaries. 
Companies were publicly shamed for tax avoidance, which then led to them paying higher 
effective tax rates in subsequent years. Similar ‘shaming’ occurred during the Davies Review 
period (2011-2015) focused on gender diversity in UK boardrooms, highlighting the 21 FTSE 
100 listed companies with all-male boards. Activist organisations such as The 30% Club 
(whose membership is senior business managers) use reported board membership data to 
increase the pressure for change. By 2014 there were no all-male boards among the 100 
largest UK-listed firms. Narrative reporting on the benefits of increased diversity from those 
organisations with diverse boards, has contributed to increased activity by institutional 
investors on boardroom diversity in the UK; for example investors such as Legal & General 
Investment Management and the Church Investors Group have implemented a voting policy 
of 30% female representation on boards (Tornero, 2019). However, it should be noted this is 
minority action, and power is limited by institutions such as capital markets, majority investors 
and competitors that push against such action (Leong & Hazleton, 2019). The increased 
transparency in the UK designed to increased shareholder activism and better stewardship 
may not yet have achieved that aim (Chiu, 2014). 
 
 
E.3. What does corporate reporting change? 
 
E.3.1. Investment efficiency 
 
Leuz and Wysocki (2016, p. 551) suggest that "real effects studies face a number of 
challenges, including difficulties in separating capital markets and real effects and the 
measurement of investment efficiency". A large body of research predicts and finds that 
financial reporting reduces information asymmetry and agency costs (see Armstrong et al., 
2010 for a review), leading to more efficient investment (Badertscher et al., 2013; Bens & 
Monhan, 2004; Biddle et al., 2009; Bushman et al., 2006; Cheng et al., 2011; Goodman et al., 
2014; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). Much of the literature is predominantly focused on capital 
effects and this is addressed above extensively in sections C and D. The majority of literature 
looking at the impacts of reporting suggests that high quality financial reporting improves 
capital investment by reducing both under- and over-investment (Biddle et al., 2009). 
However, this may refer to investment behaviours within the firm issuing the reports, not just 
those receiving the information. For example, better financial reporting may decrease 
managers’ motivation “to engage in value destroying activities such as empire building in firms 
with ample capital” (Biddle et al., 2009, p. 4). Focusing on accounting fraud, Beatty et al. (2013) 
find that the quality of accounting information not only affects the firm’s own investments, but 
additionally plays a role in affecting others firms’ investments. Leuz and Wysocki (2016) also 
suggest that disclosures of public listed firms, as studied in this review, 
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improve the industry information environment, and thus private firms benefit as well as public 
ones. 
 
In addition to reporting assisting external providers of capital in making efficient allocations, it 
has real effects on internal decision-making on actions that create value for the company. 
Christensen et al. (2019) give examples from the US, EU, China and Africa, where non- 
financial reporting may affect the attractiveness of CSR investments, which may impact the 
balance of CSR versus non-CSR investment. Accounting treatments may change spending 
and investing behaviours, due to spillover effects, as managers learn from other companies’ 
disclosures, decreasing uncertainty regarding competitors’ strategies or valuation, and adjust 
their own investment decisions (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2000; Christensen et al., 2017, 2019; De 
George et al., 2016; Dernev & Mangen, 2009; Schultz et al., 2018; Shroff, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, investment decisions need not only be focused on capital. Jung et al. (2014) 
found that firms with higher quality reporting practices are associated with greater labour 
investment (i.e. employment decisions) efficiency that are more aligned with fundamental 
economic principles. Their study shows both less over investment (overhiring/underfiring) and 
less underinvestment (underhiring/overfiring). 
 
 
E.3.2. Executive compensation 
 
Remuneration reports have been mandated in the UK since 2002, with disclosure on 
performance targets, measures and benchmarks for senior managers (Zakaria, 2012). In fact, 
the level of disclosure on executive compensation contracts is higher in the UK than in other 
European countries (Conyon et al., 2011b). Accounting regulations are relevant to executive 
compensation decisions (Conyon & Peck, 2012), and there is a substantive literature 
considering the link between accounting performance measures and management 
compensation contracts (see review by Fields et al., 2001, on performance measurement 
choice in remuneration contracts; a review by Bushman and Smith, 2001, on the role of 
earnings in compensation settings, and see also Shivakumar, 2013). 
 
In considering what performance measures are most appropriate to include in executive 
remuneration plans, Zakaria (2012, p. 191) suggests that they should be linked to shareholder 
value creation, be aligned with company strategy, and reflect operating performance, and be 
linked to balanced growth and returns. “To that end, financial performance measures are most 
commonly used as they are seen to be objective, quantifiable, and have a direct link to 
shareholder value (Miller, 2004).” CEOs achieving performance targets set in the US typically 
result in share option plans, but in the UK share grants (Long Term Investment Plans- LTIPs) 
are more common. The differences are due mostly to tax rules, legal regulations and 
accounting standards in the two countries. In the UK since the early 2000’s share options have 
declined in favour of LTIPs (Conyon et al., 2011a) due to changes in corporate governance 
guidelines and accounting standards. These measures, either accounting or share-based, are 
determined by the remuneration committee (Conyon et al., 2000). 
 
In a descriptive analysis of performance measures used in executive compensation, Zakaria’s 
(2012) study of 440 UK large companies and 1,269 compensation plans found, unsurprisingly, 
that managers approve of highly attainable targets. Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) find that 
bonus targets do not reflect past performance, making it easier for managers to achieve. 
Earnings per share growth – benchmarked against Retail Price Index - and total shareholder 
return – benchmarked against peer companies – were the most popular performance 
measures. Zakaria suggests that these choices appear to be driven by “mimetic isomorphism” 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) - firms mimicking the practice of other firms, in the absence of any 
clear guidelines. 
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Voulgaris et al. (2014) build on this and contribute to the academic debate on the role of IFRS 
and the fair value approach (FVA) in contracting (Shivakumar, 2013). Their study examines 
actual performance conditions used in executive compensation contracts, with a sample of 
over 3,000 UK firm-year observations over an eight-year period. Adoption of IFRS should 
make earnings more timely, volatile and accurately informative for investors and shareholders. 
However, Voulgaris et al. (2014) point to a “trade-off” decrease in use for other purposes, 
including feeding into the stewardship role of evaluating and rewarding managerial 
performance (Kothari et al., 2010; Zakaria, 2012; see also Section D.1). Post-IFRS accounting 
measures provide less useful information about managerial performance for performance- 
based compensation, as they are unable to screen out the market-related noise (Bushman & 
Smith, 2001; Kothari et al., 2010). 
 
How investors use accounting information for valuation is different to how shareholders use it 
to evaluate a manager’s performance and contribution (i.e. reporting has distinct valuation and 
stewardship roles; see Banker et al., 2009; Bushman et al., 2006; Lambert, 2001; and Section 
A). Fair value accounting has an adverse effect on the stewardship role of accounting figures 
(Kothari et al., 2010; Wu & Zhang, 2009), as managers are not incentivised to utilise private 
information in their decision-making processes. This is despite Voulgaris et al.’s (2014) finding 
of an improvement in accounting quality since the adoption of IFRS in the UK. 
 
Another trade off suggested by Carter et al. (2009) is that between encouraging effort and 
discouraging earnings management, through changing compensation practices. In a post- 
SOX environment in the USA, the CEO and CFO have responsibility for the integrity of the 
financial reports (Hui & Matsunga, 2015). Carter et al. (2009, p. 504) studied just under 20,000 
CEOs and CFOs during the period 1996-2005 and found that post-SOX, the proportion of their 
total reward through salary decreased – i.e. more was through bonuses, consistent with more 
focus on effort (since the reduced flexibility of the reporting environment post-SOX resulted in 
less earnings manipulation) – although interestingly there was no evidence that firms changed 
their contracts. The less flexible reporting environment, post-SOX, resulted in a decrease in 
earnings management, "thus enhancing the ability of earnings to provide an indication of 
managerial effort". 
 
In addition to earnings based measures, Nwaeze et al. (2006) considered cash flow 
operations, an important indicator of success in some companies. Reporting on cash flow 
operations provides stewardship information distinct from other earnings information and 
reflects different aspects of CEO performance. Such managerial performance measures may 
be used to “supplement earnings-based measures, especially when earnings quality is low or 
when [cash flow operations] availability is a crucial determinant of enterprise activities, or both” 
(Nwaeze et al., 2006, p. 233). 
 
As mentioned above, the integrity of communications from CEOs and CFOs to investors via 
financial reports may also be incorporated in the executive’s compensation arrangements, as 
boards may consider the quality of disclosures to be an important driver of firm value. There 
is a substantial body of literature exploring whether disclosure and corporate governance are 
substitutes or complements. Hui and Matsunga (2015, p. 1016) find that “firms with stronger 
governance structures are more likely to tie bonuses to disclosure quality in order to encourage 
effective communications.” Whilst communications about the retrospective performance of the 
company are key, Bertomeu (2012) points out that the most forward- looking information about 
the firm’s prospects may be contained in the share ownership of executives, rather than salary 
or bonuses. “Understanding how much information about future prospects is conveyed through 
managerial stock ownership is of interest as part of the broader literature that examines the 
interactions between contract design and firm performance, on the one hand, and the cost and 
benefits of disclosure, on the other hand” (Bertomeu, 2012, p. 472). 
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Linking executive compensation to some form of ESG measure is still not yet commonplace, 
but sustainability reporting is evolving and investors are increasingly identifying the value of 
sustainability performance (Tonnello & Singer, 2015). Eccles et al. (2014) compared firms who 
have been conducting sustainability reporting for a long time (i.e. since the 1990s) with those 
that had not, to reveal a number of differences, such as established processes for stakeholder 
engagement, more long-term orientation, and higher measurement and disclosure of non- 
financial information. Boards made responsible for sustainability are also more likely to create 
sustainability committees, devoted to these issues (Salvioniet al., 2016). These high 
sustainability companies also significantly outperformed their counterparts over the long-term, 
both in terms of stock market as well as accounting performance. Some literature suggests 
that management needs to be incentivised and compensated for the increased risks of long- 
term social strategies (Eccles et al., 2014; Frye et al., 2006). Companies with longer term 
orientation are also more likely to link sustainability performance to executive compensation 
in order to sharpen their focus on sustainability issues. 
 
In a recent US study, Burchman and Sullivan (2017) found just 2% of S&P500 firms tied 
environmental metrics to executive compensation, and 2.6% had a diversity metric. Safety 
metrics were more common, with 5%, mostly those in more dangerous environments, such as 
mining. Other factors influencing sustainability KPIs in the CEOs compensation package 
include having board-level sustainability committees and sustainability reporting assurance, 
particularly if the assurance is conducted by one of the ‘Big 4’, and when the firm is in a 
sustainability-sensitive industry, such as mining or energy (Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2019). 
Sustainability reporting assurance may lack credibility, however, due to the absence of a 
universally accepted benchmark for assessing sustainability sufficiency and competency 
(Michelon et al. 2019; Smith et al., 2011; see also Section A.2.4). 
 
A major financial cost that directors are responsible for is that of executive pay. In the UK, ‘say 
on pay’ is a very influential legislation in terms of both reporting, corporate governance and 
shareholder activism. The board of directors is solely responsible for the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report (DRR) in the annual report, specifically not subject to the CEO or CFO 
signing it off. The DRR has to be approved at the annual general meeting and what is 
perceived by shareholders as excessive CEO pay can garner a high level of voting dissent. 
This then places the board under scrutiny and criticism and can be reputationally damaging. 
Therefore directors are sensitive to the threat of dissent (Ertimur et al., 2010; Ferri & Maber, 
2013). One possible response in advance to proactively mitigate some damage is referred to 
as ‘obfuscation’ – i.e. trying to hide the realities in complex reporting (see also Section A.2.2). 
Although the content of remuneration reports is regulated, there is no requirement for ‘plain 
English’ and the information can be presented however the company chooses. In the US, 
Laksmana et al. (2012) find that the more excessive the CEO’s compensation package, the 
less readable the disclosures were. CEO compensation packages are undoubtedly complex 
and the information is difficult to process. There is a huge literature in the behavioural and 
decision-making fields, looking at how people respond to complex information. One 
suggestion is that when the cognitive cost of processing information is very high, the reader 
disengages and/or the information (and the decision-making it predicates) may be discarded. 
This would have the effect of reducing shareholders’ dissenting voices on say on pay. 
However, interestingly, this does not seem to be the case with the more sophisticated 
investors. These, for example institutional investors, can recognise the ‘obfuscation’ for what 
it is and take it as a warning sign, reacting negatively to the pay disclosure (Tan et al., 2014). 
“In this case, more difficult-to-read remuneration reports would backfire” (Hooghiemstra et al., 
2017, p. 697). In their study of UK-listed firms 2003-2009, Hooghiemstra et al. (2017) find that 
even when institutional investors were the minority of shareholders, their negative response 
to such obfuscation caused voter dissent. They conclude that the readability of reports and 
disclosures affects shareholders’ reactions (Miller, 2010; Tan et al., 2014). 
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By implication, regulators should recognise that boards can undermine regulators’ efforts to 
ensure shareholders have sufficient information on the appropriateness of CEO compensation 
(Conyon & Sadler, 2010). Given the directors’ current total discretion, regulators could 
minimise obfuscation by prescribing how the information should be presented in the DRR 
(Hooghiemstra et al., 2017, p. 698). 
 
 
E.3.3. Executive turnover 
 
The “principal role of the income statement is to measure firm performance for contracting, 
particularly with management”, with the balance sheet more relevant to the stewardship role 
(Jarva et al., 2019, p. 249). Therefore, CEO turnover decisions may be affected by reporting, 
particularly following deviation from analysts’ forecasts (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003). This is more 
often the case if the firm is followed by a large number of analysts and/or there is less 
agreement between them. Deviation from expected performance is the important issue, as the 
firm’s board use expectations as part of their criteria for assessing CEO performance. Also 
referring to CEO performance, Carter et al., (2009, p. 504) state that earnings may provide 
“an indication of managerial effort”. Burchman and Sullivan (2017, p. 3) also suggest that 
earnings reveal “essential insights into managerial effectiveness and thus a company’s long- 
term prospects”, so financial reporting is not only used by shareholders but also provides board 
directors with reliable and relevant information that allows effective advice to, monitoring and/or 
removal of management (Armstrong et al., 2010). 
 
Extensive prior literature considers the determinants of CEO turnover, with a consistent, if not 
always strong inverse relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover (Brickley, 
2003). Jarva et al. (2019) considered whether GAAP or ‘street earnings’ (analyst-adjusted 
GAAP, typically not including one-off expenses) are more relevant to this relationship. A 
proportion of the academic literature suggests that as street exclusions (of the non-recurring 
items that reduce profit) are not value-relevant, boards should not consider them when making 
decisions about CEO dismissal. Others suggest that street exclusions are relevant for internal 
corporate governance and decision making and therefore may well be useful in providing 
information on CEO performance. In their study of 2,635 turnover events between 1993-2016, 
Jarva et al. (2019) consider which was more important. Their findings reveal the “likelihood 
and speed of forced turnover – but not voluntary turnover – are positively related to street 
exclusions and, more generally, to GAAP earnings” (Jarva et al., 2019, p. 250). This suggests 
that GAAP earnings, used in decisions to retain a CEO, differ from street earnings, the 
performance measure used externally for valuation purposes. Boards may choose to use the 
more conservative and reliable GAAP earnings to evaluate, retain, or discipline CEO 
performance, as this may help legitimise their retention or dismissal decisions. 
 
Boards may rely on accounting-based measures when considering CEO retention or dismissal 
and also on data only available internally (Hayes & Schaefer, 2000). CEOs communicate 
information that shaped street earnings, in order to avoid timely write-offs (Li & Sloan, 2017). 
They face a difficult choice: On the one hand they could suggest analysts use street earnings 
(avoiding losses), which may keep the company’s share price high, but brings with it an 
increasing chance of scrutiny and therefore their possible dismissal. On the other hand, they 
could apply GAAP in a timely and appropriate manner – protecting their job but signalling loss 
to the stock market. In addition, communications between managers and analysts, privately 
or publicly, through the release of non-GAAP measures may be opportunistic: The managers 
may try to outperform expectations, engaging in “expectations management” (Guillamon- 
Saorin et al., 2017; Isidro & Marques, 2013). 
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E.3.4. Takeover activity 
 
At a broader level, the adoption of corporate standards (e.g. IFRS) across industries or 
countries has been found to affect individual firm’s decisions regarding mergers and 
acquisitions behaviour (de George et al., 2016). Financial statements are a key source of 
information for making takeover-related decisions (Raman et al., 2013). “Managerial 
monitoring also occurs through the market for external takeovers. Reporting quality impacts 
the effectiveness of this corporate governance mechanism (de George et al., 2016, p. 953).” 
Louis and Urcan (2014) find that the use of comparable accounting standards and better 
screening leads to more cross-border acquisitions, and suggest that it would simplify 
managers’ post-acquisition integration. They also found an increased likelihood of cross-IFRS 
reporting entities merging, and that the use of comparable reporting standards also leads to 
more firms deciding to join cross-country listings (Chen et al., 2015). Concurring with Francis 
et al. (2015), Louis and Urcan (2014) conclude that it is improved comparability, resulting from 




E.3.5. Integrated decision-making: a chicken and egg question 
 
Literature on how reporting affects decision-making is challenged by questions of directionality 
(which comes first) and more empirical evidence is needed regarding the prevalence or 
magnitude of such effects (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). Anecdotally, what gets measured gets 
managed, causing valuable constructive change in strategic thinking, which enables 
companies to convert data into action (Qian & Schaltegger, 2017; Burritt & Schaltegger, 2010), 
integrate thinking and decision-making, thus creating more value for the firm (Barth et al., 
2017; De George et al., 2016). For example, in a case study, Lai et al. (2018, p. 1399) suggest 
that <IR> is “an integrated thinking facilitator”, developing integrated thinking through 
enhancing dialogue across departments. The need or decision to produce sustainability 
reports may influence the board in terms of integrated thinking, connectivity and governance 
(Adams et al., 2019) and such disclosures may influence decision-making as companies are 
motivated to perform better. This is contrasted by Al-Htaybat and von Alberti-Alhtaybat (2018), 
whose case study suggests that the occurrence of integrated thinking within organisational 
strategy leads to the possibility of integrated reporting. 
 
Which came first, the integrated thinking or the integrated reporting? This may be a function 
of compulsion or desire – i.e. if the company feels it is pushed into such reporting either 
through regulation or legitimacy concerns then integrated thinking may well be an unintended 
positive outcome of this – “an outside-in driven effect” for change (Qian & Schaltegger, 2017, 
p. 365). However, as Sustainable Development Goals gain more prominence (for example, 
environmental issues such as carbon output, or social issues such as leadership diversity), 
they may be incorporated more overtly into strategy and the firm’s business models, leading 
to greater authenticity as firms behave more consistently with the values they espouse 
(Harrison & van der Laan Smith, 2015). If the focus of the reporting is in line with the broader 
organisational culture and/or the firm’s institutional logics, managers may be more likely to 
change their behaviours accordingly (Bundy et al., 2013; Hall et al., 2015). This may include 
management approach, strategy, governance, the use of targets and reporting on 
performance against those targets, influencing the value chain and value creation behaviours 
that contribute to business success (Adams et al., 2019; Adams 2017a; 2017b). However, it 
is important to highlight that research has not yet clarified whether this is the case. Instead, as 
discussed in previous sections, there is a large amount of evidence that reporting is often used 
as an impression management tool. 
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This has led to calls for <IR> research to address senior management thinking and decision- 
making in practice (de Villiers et al., 2017), Vesty et al. (2018) conducted an in-depth case- 
study with one Chairman recalling the relationship between integrated thinking and integrated 
reporting. The Chairman was clear that the mission and values of the company drive strategy 
and that integrated strategic thinking drives reporting, rather than the other way around. 
Additionally, she claimed that the integrated annual report adds value in attraction and 
selection as it gives potential employees and senior managers a fuller, more accurate picture 
of the organisation’s identity. The company found fully following the six capitals of <IR> 
restrictive and so adapted the rules, using it more broadly as a guide. The Chairman did 
believe in involving investors and stakeholders in the reporting journey and, contradicting other 
research (McNally et al., 2017), believed this was taken seriously. The main challenge the 
company faced with <IR> was moving beyond reporting value creation to reporting broader 
societal impact (i.e. both for-profit and for-purpose). 
 
 
E.3.6. Board of directors 
 
There are a number of studies considering how aspects of corporate governance, including 
board composition, influence the type and quality of reporting (e.g. Byron & Post, 2016; 
Klettner et al., 2014; Mallin et al., 2013), and more recently a growing literature of how 
commitment to quality reporting can influence both the board structure and ownership 
structure. In reality, the link between quality reporting and the number/quality of outside/non- 
executive directors’ (NEDs) influence is likely to flow both ways (Armstrong et al., 2010). For 
example, Klein (2002) discusses the impact of more NEDs on the board, suggesting that their 
greater independence leads to better monitoring of the accounting/reporting processes, 
actively constraining earnings management. Alternatively, perhaps managers recognising the 
need for transparency in the financial reporting, invite more NEDs to join the board. 
 
The literature examining shareholder activism and whether they hold directors accountable for 
internal controls, through shareholder voting, is not large. If, as a response to what is being 
reported, directors face a high number of withheld votes, this reputational penalty may 
motivate better director oversight (Ertimur et al., 2012). A study by Ye et al., (2013) considers 
the post-SOX-404 environment in the US and finds shareholders react negatively to the 
presence of material weaknesses reported in the 404 report and vote against managers. 
Unsurprisingly, shareholders demonstrate greater dissatisfaction with a higher number of 
weaknesses, but this can be mitigated if the company provides early warning of weakness 
during the financial year. Specifically, audit committee directors are not penalised for internal 
weaknesses but are penalised for accounting restatements. 
 
In their comprehensive literature review Armstrong et al. (2010) highlight the role of accounting 
systems in corporate governance and debt contracting, particularly regarding “reducing the 
information-related agency costs that arise among managers [and] directors” (p. 227). An 
important theme in their review is the role of informal contracts – i.e. the unwritten expectations 
about behaviour and reward for directors – that manifest themselves in the facilitation of 
relationships and economic transactions. Their review points to a large body of descriptive 
literature in the decade 2000-2010 and calls for future research to investigate the direction of 
causality in the relationships amongst governance mechanisms and an organisation’s 
accounting and reporting systems. 
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E.3.7. Reporting and operations 
 
Disclosure of internal control systems may serve as a governance mechanism (Schultz et al., 
2018), particularly in relation to operational elements. For example, several papers focus on 
‘dangerous’ industries, such as resources and energy production. Christensen et al. (2017), 
looking at disclosure regulation on safety in the mining industry, conclude that information on 
social responsibility in financial reports can have additional real effects, even if this information 
is already available elsewhere. Increased awareness of safety issues was found to be linked 
to increases in compliance with mine-safety, leading to fewer violations and a decrease in 
injuries. 
 
Based on the adage that ‘what gets measured gets done’, it should not be surprising 
that a number of papers do demonstrate such real effects - for example that carbon reporting 
can lead to better carbon performance (Burritt & Schaltegger, 2010; Qian & Schaltegger, 
2017). Qian and Schaltegger (2017) demonstrate this positive association between Global 500 
companies’ carbon disclosure levels and their carbon performance (through emission 
intensities) data between 2008-2012. Taking a legitimacy and management perspective, Qian 
and Schaltegger (2017) state that even where disclosure had previously been used as a 
legitimizing tool, “carbon disclosure motivates companies and creates an outside-in driven 
effect for subsequent change and improvement in carbon performance” (Ibid, 2017, p. 365). 
 
However, there are a number of issues with this and similar studies. Firstly, they are 
based on the carbon emissions reported by organizations themselves, whereas research 
shows that emissions may be misstated (Ballou et al., 2018; Michelon et al., 2019). Secondly, 
although the paper attempts to address the causality issue with a change regression and fixed 
effects, it is unclear that this is sufficient to completely address the endogeneity issue. Thirdly, 
the study uses carbon emission intensity, so while it can be said that there is an increase in 
emission efficiency, the results do not say anything about the overall level of emissions per 
se. The findings are nevertheless interesting and useful to investors, but if a companies’ overall 
emissions do indeed increase, that company cannot claim to be helping the planet. This is a 
clear example of the tension that is generated when disclosure is intended for investors but 
subsequently used by other stakeholders in different contexts. 
 
Similarly, Kim and Lyon (2011) report that voluntary greenhouse gas emission reporting is not 
well understood. In their study of firms’ strategic voluntary disclosures to US government, 
organisations in the same geographic region as one another were found to have reported very 
similarly, revealing normative pressures to adopt particular business practices. Firms also 
engaged in highly selective reporting and, despite reductions being reported by individual 
firms, the total level of emissions actually increased. In contrast, non-participating firms in the 
same region reduced their emissions over time. Those voluntarily disclosing tended to be 
larger firms facing stronger regulatory pressure. 
 
Christensen et al. (2019) suggest a controversial real effect intention by policy makers or 
regulators may be to ensure the exit of firms perceived to be contributing to societal problems 
(such as dangerous or heavily polluting companies). They argue that a limitation of studies 
looking for behavioural change is that they are often focused on a single industry or a narrow 
sample. 
 
However, the reporting on behavioural change connected to increasing gender diversity in UK 
boardrooms, did lead to a substantive change in the total number of women on boards across 
all listed premier companies (Sealy et al., 2017). Changes announced in 2012 by the Financial 
Reporting Council, requiring premium listed companies to report on their boardroom diversity 
policy and any objectives, were followed by a significant increase in the gender diversity of 
boards. However, within the aggregated increase (from 12.5% in 2012 to 25.8% in 2015), 
there were substantial differences between individual firms. For example, within firms ranged 
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from having 50% to 9.1% female directors. However, whilst the need to report may have 
increased the overall numbers of women, it does not tell us anything about changes in board 
behaviour or inclusive cultures. See also Section A for further details about the disconnect 
between corporate words and actions. 
 
 
E.3.8. Reporting and the tone at the top 
 
We consider how reporting regulations can influence the ‘tone-at-the-top’, by which we mean 
the general ethical climate throughout an organisation, set by senior management and the 
board of directors. Researchers disagree on how regulators can influence tone 
(Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003; Rosanas & Velilla, 2005), but as Lail et al. (2015) explain, this 
is theoretically underpinned by beliefs about what motivates managers. The assumption of 
agency theory is that managers act in their own best interest. The appropriate regulatory 
approach, therefore, is to mandate desirable behaviour through increased monitoring, 
decreased discretion and fear of punishment. This can induce a compliance-based approach. 
In contrast, an empowerment-based approach rooted in stewardship theory, sees managers 
as trustworthy guardians and grants greater discretion and less burdensome monitoring. An 
example of agency, compliance-based regulation is Dodd-Frank, in the US, with restrictions 
on financial markets, increased monitoring and more aggressive whistle-blowing programmes. 
Whereas, the UK’s recent 2018 update of the Code of Corporate Governance has taken a 
decisive step towards more stewardship-focused guidance, and future research opportunities 
await in tracking changes in reporting and behaviour. How reporting will affect managerial 
behaviour depends on its levels of monitoring versus discretion. Empowerment-based 
guidance gives potential for stakeholders to gain a more transparent view of how the company 
operates, but also gives managers more discretion to report opportunistically (see earlier 
Sections A.2 on impression management and E.2.2). Therefore, it “places a greater societal 
burden on management and magnifies the importance of setting a proper organisational tone” 
(Lail et al., 2015, p. 35). Future research should track the changes closely. 
 
 
E.3.9. A final word on stewardship 
 
The contemporary notion of stewardship concerns the use of reported accounting information 
to control what management does, with accountability to internal and external stakeholders, 
appraising past performance and controlling future managerial actions. It is often associated 
with accountability, control, and risk. However, as O’Connell (2016, p. 223) asks, is the Chief 
Financial Officer viewed as a steward of the company’s assets or the head of a profit centre? 
Boards rely on share prices and earnings to monitor managerial performance (Engel et al., 
2003). So, higher quality reporting (i.e. improved transparency and reduced asymmetry) 
should therefore enhance corporate governance mechanisms, as managers are required to 
gather additional information, which should positively affect their decision-making (De George 
et al., 2016). For example, changes in the reporting environment can affect decisions about 
dividend payouts (Hail et al., 2014): Either the firm does not feel the need to have to signal 
success through excessive payouts (due to improved monitoring), or because of the decrease 
in overinvestment, there is more excess cash available for dividend payouts. 
 
One objective of financial reporting is mitigating agency-principal conflicts. However, a notable 
change in IFRS is that stewardship ceases to be an aim in and of itself and is subsumed within 
decision-usefulness. This highlights an unresolved question within the academic literature of 
whether there is a role for stewardship in financial accounting, separate from decision- 
usefulness (see Section A on the purpose of corporate reporting)? Apart from studies 
considering managerial compensation (see Section E.3.2 above), literature on the 
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stewardship role in accounting research is sparse (O’Connell, 2016). As identified by De 
George et al.’s (2016) review on IFRS adoption, one limitation of IFRS and stewardship 
literature is that the research does not highlight the mechanisms through which IFRS adoption 
affects stewardship or the specific accounting attributes that drive change. Nor is it clear 
whether and how governance structures have been affected by IFRS. 
 
O’Connell (2016, p. 224) concludes that “with the exception of work on the compensation- 
earnings association, the academic community appears to offer limited empirical guidance to 
standard-setters and others about the potential importance of stewardship in contemporary 




E.4. Concluding thoughts 
 
This section of the review has sought to answer the question “How does corporate reporting 
affect behaviour?”. As Sections C and D have addressed evidence of how capital providers 
(shareholders and creditors) use financial information, making inferences, for example on the 
basis of liquidity, cost of capital, firm value, terms of debt contracts, and so forth. The analysis 
of real effects allows similar indirect inferences about how other stakeholders use corporate 
reporting information (importantly, both financial and non-financial). This provides a clear 
rationale as to why real effects are so important. In addition to corporate reporting driving 
behavioural change, it also gives insights about the usage of reporting by various parties. 
 
• However, one of the first points to make is that effects on capital providers and others 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is often information about the potential or 
actual response of the receiver (e.g. capital providers) that the sender of the 
information is responding to. This also leaves us with the question in whose behavior 
are we interested (shareholders, managers, directors, or external stakeholders)? 
 
• When searching for evidence of real effects, we find many studies considering the 
changes of an organisation’s behavior relating to disclosure or compliance 
strategies, as well as the use of reporting as an impression management or public 
relations tool. This may particularly be the case for the more recent non-financial 
elements of reporting. With a much smaller body of evidence relating to integrated 
and non-financial reporting, there is discussion as to whether non-financial reporting, 
and its ‘misuse’ as a public relations tool, can be counter-productive to social change. 
However, this begs the question as to the purpose of the reporting – is it and should 
it be social change? (see also Section A) 
 
• A very interesting section of this literature considers the chicken and egg situation of 
whether integrated thinking and decision-making leads to integrated reporting or vice 
versa. Quantitative research may reveal associations, but not necessarily causation. 
This is where qualitative research and case studies may be useful, although less 
generalizable. The chicken and egg challenge may apply to reporting practices other 
than <IR>, but the literature on <IR> provides a useful illustration. We conclude that 
which came first is likely to differ on a case-by-case basis and may be a function of 
compulsion or desire. If the company is pushed into integrated reporting, either 
through regulation or legitimacy concerns, then more integrated thinking required for 
integrating reporting may well be an unintended positive outcome. However, whether 
the organisation chooses to act on this – i.e. change its behaviours – or is just 
focused on reporting as an impression management exercise varies, and the 
literature shows examples of each. Alternatively, if an organisation’s leadership is 
already strategically focused on integrating broader measures of performance (e.g. 
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environmental or social), then this approach will more likely enable successful 
integrated reporting. Examples were found in the literature of how such thinking and 
reporting have become culturally embedded over time in some organisations. 
 
• Does improved reporting help steer corporate practices and improve them? The 
literature finds some evidence in this respect. However, there are also studies that 
suggest better disclosures do not necessarily lead to better outcomes. Further, as it 
is challenging to provide sound evidence of causality, results should be taken with 
caution and more research is needed. 
 
• A potential unintended consequence of ESG-related regulatory initiatives is that, in 
the context of investor-primacy, companies may also report how ESG issues are 
impacting financial performance. While this in itself is not a problem, it does raise the 
question as to whether reporting on ESG issues should address primarily the 
interests of other stakeholders. Should reports be constructed in such a way that 
they inform readers more broadly about the social and environmental impacts of 
corporate activities, including how they contribute to the achievement, or impairment 
of the Sustainable Development Goals? 
 
• How organisations respond to this will be affected by numerous contextual factors, 
including: 
 
− the organisational context and culture that supports (or not) changed behaviour, 
− industry norms and institutional pressures that support (or resist) the change, 
− the regulatory context (including compliance and empowerment), and 
− the national and societal context regarding acceptability and expectation of 
behaviour change, especially on social and environmental issues. 
 
• Research on real effects is still in its infancy and faces many challenges. But, as 
more governments are using disclosure requirements as a public policy instrument 
to encourage or discourage certain behaviours and business practices, the need for 
more research into real effects is imperative. The Non-financial Reporting Directive, 
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This review reveals a vast literature on the role, characteristics and effects of corporate 
reporting, which includes studies of both financial and non-financial information. On one hand, 
the mainstream accounting research tradition has focused on the role of financial information 
in capital markets for valuation and stewardship purposes. On the other hand, a secondary 
stream of research on non-financial reporting has developed within the (social) accountability 
framework. Recent years have also seen increased attention being paid to non-financial 
reporting by mainstream scholars, whose research interests mainly focus on how non-financial 
reporting affects capital markets and investment decisions. The increased attention by 
accounting academics on non-financial reporting is due to recent changes in the regulatory 
environment which have introduced the mandatory disclosure of non-financial reporting (for 
example, the EU Directive 95/2014). Following a valuation perspective, non-financial 
information is useful to assess the types of risks and opportunities that companies must 
manage. The review also points to an extensive focus on “numbers” (e.g. financial statements) 
although, as the role of non-financial reporting and disclosure becomes more prominent, 
together with the introduction of computational linguistics techniques in accounting research, 
recent literature is increasingly interested in the role of narrative disclosure. 
 
This concluding section starts by articulating the structure of the report against the key 
questions posed by the FRC and presents a list of the key findings emerging from the 
literature. It then presents the limitations of the review, the challenges for future research, and 
the key policy recommendations for the Future of Corporate Reporting project. 
 
 
An overview of the report and its mapping to the key questions posed by the 
FRC 
 
1. What are the characteristics of good corporate reporting? 
 
Section A explains that the characteristics of good reporting are dependent on the 
purpose of reporting. The valuation and stewardship perspectives see reporting as 
addressing the needs of investors (see footnote 1 – e.g. financial stakeholders), both for 
investment decisions and monitoring purposes. The accountability view assumes 
reporting fulfills a duty to provide an account for those actions the organization is 
responsible for to all stakeholders, implying that good reporting is related to stakeholder 
engagement processes. 
 
The academic literature adopting a valuation or stewardship perspective has mainly 
focused on characteristics defining the quality of financial statement information, as 
illustrated in Section A.1. For narrative information (see Section A.2), the literature has 
focused on disclosure attributes describing both the quantity and the richness of the 
message conveyed. Within the accountability view, the quality of corporate reporting is 
related to an aspirational/emancipatory role of reporting itself, in changing corporate 
practices and behaviors, and is often embedded in stakeholder engagement processes 
 
 
2. What types of information are included as part of corporate reporting? 
 
For the purpose of this review we define corporate reporting as financial and non- 
financial information included in annual reports, quarterly reports, restatements, 
earnings announcements and other ad-hoc stand-alone reports (such as sustainability, 
corporate social responsibility, integrated reports). 
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We use the term financial reporting to indicate disclosure of financial information such 
as that contained in the financial statements, including the notes, but also the narrative 
discussion of corporate performance (i.e. narratives or other quantitative indicators that 
complement financial data, for example narrative information in the strategic report or 
management discussion or analysis). Non-financial reporting includes corporate social 
responsibility, social, environmental or sustainability reports (which are interchangeable 
terms), as well as other types of narrative information included in specific sections of the 
annual reports (such as for example, risk disclosure, or disclosures about environmental, 
social and governance issues) or in other corporate documents (integrated reports, 
intellectual capital statements, etc.). 
 
Following the development of research on corporate reporting, Section A is divided into 
research that has focused on financial information contained in the financial statements 
vs. research that has focused on narrative reporting (both financial and non-financial). 
 
 
3. What is the role of non-financial/ESG/sustainability reporting? 
 
Following a valuation/stewardship perspective with emphasis on investors’ needs, non- 
financial/ESG/sustainability reporting serves the purpose of helping with interpreting, 
contextualizing and assessing the financial performance of firms (See various 
approaches to measuring the quality of narrative information in Section A.2). From an 
accountability perspective, the role of non-financial/ESG/sustainability reporting is to 
fulfill corporate accountability duties to a variety of stakeholders. These accountability 
duties include impacts of corporate activities that are not strictly financial, i.e. social and 
environmental. Further, the accountability view also ascribes the potential for an 
educational, aspirational, emancipatory role to this type of reporting, as long as it is 
embedded in stakeholder engagement processes (see section A.2.5). 
 
 
4. How is non-financial/ sustainability reporting defined in academic literature? How is it 
used? 
 
CSR and sustainability reporting can be defined as that which seeks to respond to public 
pressure over the societal and environmental impacts of corporate activities and/or to 
respond to specific legitimacy threats, such as environmental accidents (see Section 
A.2.2). Despite criticism over reporting practices, the accountability view argues that this 
type of reporting has the potential to provide stakeholders with an account of the social 
and environmental impact of corporate activities (see Section A.2.5). As noted in the 
opening of Section A, non-financial reporting has become relevant also for investors 
(see also Section B.2 for an overview of the evolution of reporting). Sections C and D 




5. How does the annual report fit into the wider corporate reporting framework? 
 
The annual report is still a very relevant and key documents for a corporate reporting 
framework, as it conveys information about corporate performance both through 
financial statements (see Section A.1) and through narrative information (see Section 
A.2), the importance of which has grown over time (see Section A.1.4. and Section A.2.3 
for studies on the relevance of narrative disclosure for correctly interpreting financial 
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statement information). The evolution of reporting, including the role of the annual report 
is also discussed in Section B.2. 
 
 
6. What is the role of regulation in corporate reporting? 
 
The regulation of financial reporting and disclosure practices can be justified by the 
existence of externalities, market-wide cost savings from regulation, insufficient private 
sanctions and dead-weight costs from fraud, and agency conflict that could be mitigated 
by disclosure. Importantly, disclosure is not only subject to regulation but itself can be 
considered a regulatory mechanism. In other words, disclosure regulation is used to 
steer corporate practices towards desired outcomes. Section B discusses how 
regulation affects corporate reporting practices; the real effects of disclosure regulation 
are discussed in Section E. 
 
 
7. What is the role of corporate reporting in building corporate accountability? 
 
As explained throughout Section A, Section B also reiterates the above point by looking 
at the evolution of reporting, as well as at the implementation of specific regulations (for 
example in the UK, see Section B.1.2.) 
 
 
8. How have different periodic reports evolved (preliminary announcements, interim 
reports, annual reports, sustainability reports)? 
 
The evolution of different types of reports is discussed in Section B.2 which highlights: 
(1) financial statements are still deemed to be an essential component of the financial 
reporting system, and the corporate governance model of a firm; (2) the idea that 
investors are the key audience for corporate reporting has been questioned and 
debated; (3) widening the scope of corporate reporting to also include the provision of 
non-financial information does not necessarily require that the purpose of corporate 
reporting (or the focus on investors’ needs) will change, or has changed. 
 
 
9. What are the information needs of investors and how is this information used? 
 
The information needs of investors stem from the three main functions of reporting 
identified in Section A, i.e. valuation, stewardship, and, to a lesser extent, accountability. 
Corporate reporting information (in particular, financial reporting) is the cornerstone of 
equity valuation and consequent trading decisions for (potential) equity investors (see 
Section C). Creditors use such information while assessing borrowers’ credit risk, which 
in turn affects companies’ access to credit and the terms of credit arrangements, e.g. 
loan pricing or debt covenants (see Section D.1). Corporate financial reporting also 
guides shareholders in their stewardship activities, e.g. it is used in setting executive 
compensation, determining executive turnover, and guiding shareholder activism (see 
Section E.3). Finally, financial analysts and credit rating providers are important users 
of corporate reporting information, processing it to meet the information needs of 
investors (see Sections C.3 and D.1.3). 
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10. Is there a link between corporate reporting and movements in share prices? 
 
There is ample evidence of associations between corporate reporting information and 
capital market movements (not only equity markets, but also derivative and credit 
markets; see Sections C.2 and D.1). In particular, release of corporate reporting 
information affects investors’ trading behavior (see Sections C.1.1 and C.2.1), share 
returns/prices (see Section C.2.5) and their volatility (see Section C.2.6). Such effects 
have been documented for financial reporting (both financial statements and narrative 
reporting) and non-financial reporting information (see Section C.2). 
 
 
11. What are the information needs of users that are not capital providers and how is this 
information used? 
 
Information needs of other stakeholders (e.g. consumers, employees, suppliers, 
managers, industry bodies, professional associations, accounting firms, consultants, or 
NGOs) mainly stem from an accountability role of corporate reporting, enabling these 
stakeholders to scrutinise the actions for which firms are held responsible in the eyes of 
these stakeholders (see Section A). Stakeholders use both financial and non-financial 
reporting information (see Sections A, D, and E). Examples include the usage of 
corporate reporting information for in whistleblowing, identifying targets of NGO 
campaigns, consumers’ decisions to continue purchasing from the reporting firm, or in 
formulating of negotiating positions of labour force and/or of suppliers vis-à-vis such a 
firm (see Sections D.2, E.2 and E.3). 
 
 
12. What is the purpose of the annual report? 
 
This question is usually not directly addressed by the literature and is conceptually 
subsumed in the broader issue of the purposes and functions of corporate reporting in 
general discussed above (see also Section A). Throughout the report (in particular 
Sections C-E), we discuss (mostly indirect) evidence on how various information 




13. Who is the audience of the annual report? 
 
In most cases, the literature answers this question indirectly only by examining how 
investors and other stakeholders use corporate financial reporting information in general 
and annual reports in particular (see above). The limited direct evidence available 
suggests that both preparers of corporate reporting information and its users consider 
investors as the primary audience of such information. See also Figure 1 in Section A. 
 
 
14. How is narrative information in the annual report used? 
 
Narrative reporting complements and contextualises financial statement information for 
investors (when using the information in valuation or stewardship contexts), but is 
sometimes used as an impression management tool misleading the audience of 
corporate reporting (see Sections A, C.1, and C.2). Other stakeholders use narrative 
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and non-financial reporting predominantly in the context of accountability (see Sections 
A.2, D.2, and E.3). 
 
 
15. What is the role of the financial statements? 
 
The role of financial statements is mainly explained by the valuation and stewardship 
perspectives discussed in Section A, with a focus on investors’ information needs. As 
such, the effects of financial statement information on capital markets is discussed in 
Section C. The debate as to whether financial reports could serve the needs of a wider 
range of stakeholders, and society more generally, is discussed in Section B.2. 
 
 
16. How does corporate reporting affect behaviour? 
 
Sections C and D address how corporate reporting affects the behaviours of capital 
providers (shareholders and creditors), using information to make inferences, for 
example on the basis of liquidity, cost of capital, firm value and terms of debt contracts 
(see above). What the literature says about ‘real effects’ and how corporate reporting 
impacts managers’ and firms’ behaviour, is addressed in Section E, allowing similar 
indirect inferences about how other stakeholders use corporate reporting information 
(importantly, both financial and non-financial), see also Section D. 
 
Section E.2 considers how and why firm and managerial behaviour may change due to 
the influence of reporting on issues such as regulation and compliance strategies. It also 
considers the use of reporting as an impression management or PR tool (see also 
Section A.2.2), for identity signalling, agenda-setting, and stakeholder engagement. 
Section E.3 looks at what behaviours may change due to reporting, considering internal 
investment behaviour, executive compensation and turnover, takeovers, activism, 
integrated decision-making, operations, the ‘tone-at-the-top’, and stewardship. 
 
 
17. What is the purpose of corporate reporting? How is this defined in academic literature? 
 
In this concluding section, we reiterate how the purpose of corporate reporting is not 






Overall, our analysis suggests that corporate reporting (both financial and non-financial) 
matters for stakeholders, in particular investors, and its relevance manifests itself in a number 
of ways: 
 
• The purpose of reporting is not uniquely identified. There are three overarching 
views on the role of reporting: the valuation role mainly considers reporting as 
addressing the information needs of, and use by, shareholders and potential 
investors for investment decisions (and therefore traditionally research in this area 
has focused on financial information); the stewardship role captures the role of 
financial information to monitor the behaviour of management by capital providers 
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(shareholders and creditors); the (social) accountability role considers the role of 
information for a wider set of stakeholders, whose main interests are not necessarily 
financial (and may potentially even conflict with ‘pure’ financial interests), but who 
are nevertheless affected by corporate activities. This latter stream has emerged via 
analysis of non-financial information and it entails the idea that reporting has the 
potential to change corporate behaviour (see Section E). 
 
− As the purposes of reporting involve multiple users with varying needs, the way 
in which the quality of reporting is defined depends very much on what one 
considers to be the primary purpose of reporting. The literature provides several 
approaches to the conceptualisation of quality across its different research 
paradigms. Positivistic research (which assumes the world can be understood in 
terms of causal relationships between observable and measurable variables, 
and that such relationships can be studied objectively using scientific methods) 
is focused on finding accurate, valid and reliable proxies for measuring reporting 
quality (assumed to be an objective reality). Interpretivist research (which 
assumes the world can be understood by gaining a deep understanding of a 
phenomenon and its complexity within a unique context, with such phenomena 
therefore often being studied using qualitative, descriptive methods) suggests 
that corporate reporting is socially constructed with different meanings assigned 
by different stakeholders. 
− The literature recognises that defining the purpose of reporting is inherently a 
political process. There is no consensus on whether corporate reporting should 
serve a valuation, stewardship or accountability purpose, nor which of these 
purposes should prevail over the others. As such, it is impossible to define 
uniquely what is meant by the quality of corporate reporting. 
− Academic research widely acknowledges that different stakeholders may have 
different information needs, so it is difficult for one size to fit all. For example, 
investors needs are still largely focused on financial information, although non- 
financial information becomes material to the extent that it carries financial 
implications (e.g. risks and opportunities). On the other side, other stakeholders 
may need a wider array of disclosures, not necessarily quantified or expressed 
in financial terms. 
− Even within a particular group of users, e.g. shareholders, the information needs 
can vary depending on the purpose for which corporate reporting is used, e.g. 
valuation versus stewardship. 
− Users face cognitive limitations, which implies that some users do not use all the 
information provided, as they are not able to adequately process it. This implies 
that users often rely on information intermediaries (e.g. analysts) to process 
information reported by companies, which highlights the key role that analysts 
play in the functioning of capital markets 
 
• The quality of reporting is a multidimensional concept. 
 
− Several papers employ definitions of quality that derive from the qualitative 
attributes of reporting as stated in accounting conceptual frameworks or reporting 
guidelines, using multidimensional frames of analysis (i.e. quality is defined in 
terms of reliability, materiality, comparability, neutrality, completeness etc.) 
− The quality of reporting cannot be studied in isolation from the firm’s wider 
reporting incentives, which include firm-specific factors, such as the governance 
system (e.g. the rules, practices and processes by which a company is directed 
and controlled) or growth opportunities, but also other market incentives and 
wider institutional arrangements. 
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− The quantity of information is not necessarily a proxy for quality as it does not 
allow one to fully capture the intrinsic characteristics of the information reported. 
Further, more disclosure may simply be associated with less meaningful 
information (‘boilerplate’ or statement of the obvious), as well with more 
opportunities to manage impressions, by obfuscating unfavourable news or 
emphasizing favourable news. 
− Recent developments in computational linguistics and their adoption in 
accounting research have facilitated the analysis of the textual characteristics of 
disclosure to assess the quality of corporate reporting. 
− The discretion left to management in reporting decisions (by accounting 
standards or reporting guidelines) is a double-edge sword – both for financial 
statements and narrative reporting. This discretion can be used to communicate 
“private” information and enhance the value of the signal conveyed by reporting, 
or to provide a comprehensive account of activities and impact of those corporate 
activities for which the firm is responsible, or it can be used to “bias” the 
representation of the company’s underlying performance and practices. 
− Some out-of-the-box, yet more radical approaches to what is considered quality 
of reporting suggest that much could be learnt from dialogic accounting and 
participatory governance systems. Dialogic accounting is a practice that 
recognises multiple points of view and refuses to privilege capital markets and 
investors as ‘priority’ stakeholders. Such accounting practices also reject the idea 
of a universal narrative, preferring instead to think of a company as being 
exposed to a range of perspectives and interests from various stakeholders. 
Following this view, the overall portrayal of a firm’s performance and practices 
should be assessed using not only self-reported information, but also accounts 
provided by stakeholders. In this perspective, the process of producing (or co- 
producing) corporate reporting with stakeholders would enhance the quality of 
reporting itself. 
 
• The literature often documents a mismatch between the needs of users and what 
is being reported (this should not necessarily mean more disclosure, but rather 
reporting that better fits the users’ needs). This is particularly the case for non- 
financial information such as CSR or sustainability information, where the literature 
has documented extensive use of impression management and gaps in performance 
portrayal. 
 
• A key concern in the literature about social/environmental information relates back 
to the purpose of reporting. Recent frameworks that encourage CSR/ESG reporting 
are very much focused on the information needs of investors, rather than wider 
stakeholders. In other words, while the scope of reporting is widening, the purpose 
of reporting is not changing, and for most regulators/standard setters the primary 
users of corporate reports are still shareholders and investors, i.e. they adopt a 
valuation/stewardship perspective rather than a (social) accountability view.69 This is 
the case for example for standards like the <IR> framework and the SASB (focused 








69 Yet, while some evidence starts to emerge about investors’ and analysts’ growing appetite for using CSR/ESG 
reporting information for valuation/stewardship, existing reporting standards in this area are often not considered 
sufficiently useful for these purposes. 
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• The institutional environment matters in terms of how regulations affect corporate 
reporting practices (and their implications on capital markets). 
 
− Regulations of financial reporting and disclosure practices are introduced for 
different reasons, which include the existence of externalities, market-wide cost 
savings from regulation, insufficient private sanctions and dead-weight costs 
from fraud and agency conflict that could be mitigated by disclosure. Importantly, 
when disclosure regulation is introduced to steer corporate practices, the 
evidence suggests that the disclosure response is often boilerplate. 
− It is very challenging to disentangle the effect of the disclosure mandate on 
reporting behaviour from other potential concurrent changes (for example the 
level of enforcement). 
− As noted above, reporting discretion is a double-edge sword, and this applies 
even in the context of new reporting regulations and mandates, as firms will 
respond to new regulations and mandates in line with their reporting incentives, 
and with other institutional drivers that affect the quality of reporting. 
− The impact of the same form of reporting or reporting items on capital markets 
may vary depending on the rule of law or levels of investor protection, 
predominant ownership and financing patterns specific to the firms, other capital 
market developments, and level of enforcement. 
 
• Corporate reporting matters for and is used by stakeholders, in particular 
investors (shareholders and creditors), and its relevance manifests itself in a number 
of ways. 
 
− For shareholders, the literature finds the indirect effects of corporate reporting 
manifesting themselves via market liquidity (e.g. bid-ask spread, market depth), 
trading behaviour, value relevance, cost of capital, stock returns and their 
volatility. The corporate governance literature also identifies how the information 
reported is used by (potential) shareholders for stewardship purposes, e.g. in 
setting executive compensation, assessing performance of managers and 
forcing executive turnover, identifying takeover targets, etc. 
− There is ample evidence of the use of corporate reporting information by financial 
analysts (who serve investors). 
− For creditors, corporate reporting information has been shown to matter for the 
terms of debt contracts agreed (e.g. covenants, pricing, and maturity), the ability 
to assess lenders’ creditworthiness and to predict bankruptcy. 
− For other stakeholders, the literature is relatively scant and the evidence is not 
generalisable. Some examples include the use of corporate reporting information 
in whistleblowing, identifying targets of NGO campaigns, consumers’ decisions 
to continue purchasing from the reporting firm, or in the formulation of negotiating 
positions of the labour force and/or of suppliers vis-à-vis such a firm.70 
 
• Mandatory disclosures seem to have stronger capital market effects than voluntary 
ones. However, there are several empirical challenges in documenting causal 
relationship, severely limiting the number of studies that reliably document economic 
effects of new disclosure regulations. 
 
• Research shows that reporting practices may have spillovers to other firms (e.g. 
peers, companies along the supply chains, etc.), both in terms of capital market 
 
 
70 Moreover, the usage of reporting information by other stakeholders could translate into “real effects” discussed 
below. 
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effects for peers (when a firm reveals some private information this may also have 
effects on other peers in the industry or along the supply chain). Further, research 
also shows that their reporting practices subsequently get institutionalised (or 
imitated). 
 
• Research on the “real effects” of disclosure (i.e. changes in corporate behaviour 
that are triggered by reporting) is still in its infancy and it faces many empirical 
challenges, so causal estimates are hard to obtain. 
 
− The research in the area has documented that behaviours are linked to reporting, 
i.e. corporate reporting has real effects on firms’ policies (e.g. investment) and 
on stakeholders (e.g. customers, which then translates into sales growth). 
However, it is yet unclear whether these real effects are aligned with the aim of 
reporting (e.g. whether ESG reporting influences ESG performance). 
− Furthermore, two problems with this research are (1) contextual factors that may 
affect the actual behaviour, which include, organisational context and culture or 
tone that supports (or not) the behaviour, the industry norms and institutional 
pressures that support (or resist) the change, the regulatory context (including 
compliance and empowerment) and the national and societal context regarding 
the acceptability and expectation of behaviour change, especially on social and 
environmental issues; and (2) the effects depend on whose behaviour one is 
interested in (shareholders, managers, directors, external stakeholders). 
− As the scope of disclosure and transparency regulation starts to expand beyond 
financial reporting, understanding the effects of firm practices and behaviours 
becomes of great importance and this is one area where more research is 
needed. 
− As societal attention to sustainable development increases and the awareness 
of future environmental and social challenges improves, a potential unintended 
consequence of regulatory initiatives in the field that maintain an investor-focus 
is to lead companies to report on how new risks and opportunities affect 
corporate financial performance, rather than how corporate activities affect 
sustainable development (i.e. reporting on externalities and impacts). 
− Disclosure through other means (such as social media, conference calls etc.) 
can also have real effects, but it is out of the scope of this review. 
− Documented evidence of impression management implies that non-financial 
disclosure may become almost akin to corporate communications and a PR 
function, which implies there is little need to change if companies can 
successfully manage impressions. 
− As more governments are using disclosure requirements as a public policy 
instrument to encourage or discourage certain behaviours and business 
practices, the need for more research into real effects is imperative. 
 
• The Non-financial Reporting Directive, whose effects are too recent to be yet fully 






We acknowledge some of limitations of our review. Given the vast scope of this exercise and 
the feasibility constraints (imposed by the resources and time-frame available to the team), 
we have faced a trade-off between the breadth of analysis against its depth. Moreover, while 
we believe the report offers a comprehensive and representative overview of the literature on 
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the topics covered, and the methodology followed, it cannot be classified as a fully systematic 
literature review on these topics. In particular, for the sake of brevity and feasibility of the 
exercise, in some cases we refer to recent literature reviews on selected topics covered here 
as well, updating, complementing, and enhancing these extant reviews rather than replicating 
them. Finally, we acknowledge limitations stemming from the less than perfect effectiveness 
of relatively simple automated keyword searches. We have attempted to address these by 
supplementing the sample of papers identified through this route with the inclusion of 
additional sources, guided by our expertise and academic judgement (as discussed above). 
 
Some of the limitations also stem from the nature of the literature reviewed rather than from 
the methodological approach taken while reviewing it. In particular, the literature suffers from 
a relative paucity of studies on some of the newly emerging topics (in particular, regarding 
non-financial information and the corporate reporting information needs/use of non-investor 
stakeholders). Second, the geographic focus of the extant literature is predominantly a US 
setting, with a considerably smaller proportion of studies examining UK, European, Australian 






We identify the following key challenges for the future of corporate reporting in relation to the 
gaps that have not yet been fully addressed by the literature: 
 
• Assessing the quality of reporting is a difficult endeavour for the reasons explained 
above. All evidence therefore should be interpreted accordingly and considerations 
about what should be reported, why and how, is, inherently, part of a political 
process. 
 
• Causality in large scale empirical studies is challenging to prove; estimates gained 
from this literature should therefore be interpreted cautiously. Hence, a meaningful 
real impact assessment of new disclosure regulations and mandates cannot be 
provided. 
 
• As non-financial reporting becomes more predominant, and as the role of narrative 
reporting (even within financial reporting) assumes more weight, two considerations 
are key: (1) there will be difficulties in designing comparability standards for non- 
financial reporting and ensuring reliability and credibility of this type of information; 
(2) reporting standards, guidelines and regulation will continue to face the challenges 
that allowing discretion in narrative reporting choices (minimum requirements) 
entails. In this regard, effective reporting standards and regulations need to be 
conceived together with other institutional arrangements such as, for example, 
enforcement. 
 
− Until very recently, the focus of the literature has been mostly on investors and 
mostly on large-scale indirect evidence (e.g. earnings announcements, analyst 
forecasts, etc.) rather than direct examination of stakeholder needs and their 
usage of corporate reporting information. It might be the case that as far as the 
big questions are concerned, we are in the situation of “we don’t know what we 
don’t know”. Hence, future research on the topic should embrace mixed-methods 
and/or experimental approaches to better ascertain directly what stakeholders’ 
needs are, and how corporate reporting is used. Further, case-based research 
may be able to provide insights on how the desired change is implemented inside 
organisations and what challenges and tensions may impede such change. 
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• The literature does highlight aspirational goals and potential for reporting, particularly 
around accountability and social change. For example, some studies reveal a 
change in real operations affecting mine safety, carbon disclosure, or leadership 
diversity. However, there are methodological challenges for large-scale studies. 
Regulators and academics need to work together, and more studies are needed on 
how reporting affects corporate behaviour, and to assess the economic impact of 
new regulatory mandates. 
 
• Periodic and structured corporate reporting is only one of the many channels through 
which companies disclose information. With the advent of social media, as well as 
other interactive features of the internet that allow for real-time information to reach 
a broad audience, it is debatable (and unpredictable) whether structured reporting 
will remain the most important channel. 
 
 
Policy discussion and recommendations 
 
A key question for policy makers is whether the traditional investor-focus of most reporting 
regulation and guidance is considered to still be the most appropriate for the future of corporate 
reporting. The literature does not uniquely identify the purpose of reporting. There are three 
overarching views for the role of reporting: the valuation role mainly considers reporting as 
addressing information needs of, and use by, investors; the stewardship role captures the role 
of financial information to monitor management behaviour; the (social) accountability role 
considers the role of information for a wider set of stakeholders, whose main interests are not 
necessarily financial (and potentially even conflicting) and who are affected by corporate 
activities. While frameworks such as <IR> have created momentum in the financial community 
to acknowledge the importance of non-financial issues for corporate activities, and therefore 
contributed to expanding the scope of corporate reporting, several scholars criticise the 
excessive focus on the needs of investors, vis-à-vis other stakeholders and society. This focus 
often implies that considerations of what should be reported are related to risks and 
opportunities that may have financial implications for companies in the short-term, at the 
expense of transparency over externalities and impacts that may have long-term 
consequences, on companies’ financial performance but also on society overall. While it is not 
for us to say whether policymakers and regulators should believe that capital markets are 
perfectly efficient, and ultimately will drive the optimal allocation of capital for the greater 
societal benefit, we can highlight that there is no academic consensus on this issue. 
 
In order to ensure a proper impact assessment of reporting regulations, standards and 
guidelines, policies should be conceived and implemented with the aim of testing of their 
impact, for example by working collaboratively with academics to design randomized pilot 
studies or collect specific data around regulatory changes, even if only for a subset of firms 
affected. 
 
Another recommendation is to reflect on the opportunity to consider more participatory models 
of reporting, where users could be more deeply engaged in the production process of the 
reporting itself, rather than being considered as only the addressees of corporate information. 
This clearly would present several challenges because of the different nature of various 
stakeholder interests, but dialogic accounting could potentially allow for a more pluralistic 
expression of public interest. 
 
In relation to this, new forms of reporting that integrate financial and non-financial concerns 
such as the <IR> framework are important, although maintaining the focus on investor needs 
may inhibit more disruptive and innovative ways of conceptualising corporate reporting in the 
face of the challenges that society is facing today. The evidence on whether corporate 
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reporting actually changes firms’ decision making or behaviour is debatable and there is not 
enough evidence to say whether investors’ needs have been satisfied. This is an area that 
policy makers and regulation could further investigate, in collaboration with academia (which 
will continue to produce more evidence in the coming years). 
 
Another recommendation in light of the evidence presented in this literature review is that 
standard setters and regulators may need to start considering not only what firms should report 
(content), but also how they should report it (format) and via which channels. This may mean 
going beyond structured and period reporting. 
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Appendix – Methodology 
Following the discussions between the team preparing the report and the FRC, it was agreed 
that this literature review should focus on academic literature on corporate reporting as defined 
above. It was also agreed that the literature universe underpinning this exercise would be 
defined as studies included in Scopus (a largely comprehensive database of international 
academic literature), written in English, published (or accepted for publication) from 1992 
onwards (with particular focus on more recent work), and identified by searching titles and 
abstracts for keywords from the pre-agreed list. This search was carried out between May and 
September 2019, and therefore papers published after this were not part of the review. 
 
The list of keywords pertaining to financial and non-financial reporting was agreed as follows: 
 
− financial report/disclosure; 
− corporate report/disclosure; 
− annual report; 
− financial statement; 
− corporate governance statement; 
− remuneration report; 
− earnings announcement/preliminary announcement; 
− risk report/disclosure; 
− voluntary report/disclosure; 
− mandatory report/disclosure; 
− narrative information/disclosure/reporting; 
− strategic report; 
− MD&A/management discussion and analysis; 
− non-financial report/disclosure; 
− corporate social responsibility/CSR report/disclosure/assurance; 
− sustainability report/disclosure/assurance; 
− social/environmental/governance report/disclosure/assurance; 
− integrated report; 
− stakeholder engagement/dialogue. 
 
 
The usual stemming and lemmatisation procedures employed in linguistic studies were then 
followed (to eliminate the impact of a grammatical form of a word, to remove inflectional 
endings only and to return the base or dictionary form of a word, which is known as the lemma, 
allowing for the joint analysis of the common lemma, e.g. report, reports, and reporting). This 
first-stage exercise was concluded in May 2019 and it identified over 18 thousand papers. The 
second stage involved elimination of the papers with no full-text availability, missing 
information, missing abstracts, etc., which reduced the sample size to 16,428 papers. 
 
Given the desire to focus on high-quality work and feasibility of the project, it was agreed that 
the scope be restricted to papers from journals belonging to the top two quality tiers, i.e. of 
quality classified as “world-leading in originality, significance and rigour” (4*) or “internationally 
excellent in originality, significance and rigour” (3*), as per the Academic Journal Guide (2018) 
published by the Chartered Association of Business Schools. This step allowed for a 
considerable reduction of the number of papers to be analysed, with the resulting sample 
containing 3,373 papers. In the fourth step, we examined these papers and applied the list of 
exclusions (as agreed with the FRC and discussed below), reducing the sample further to 
2,814 papers. Among those, 6.2% of papers were published between 1992 and 2000, 34.4% 
between 2001 and 2010, and the remaining 59.4% from 2011 onwards. 
158  
This sample of 2,814 papers was then used to identify papers relevant for each section and 
subsection of the report using additional targeted keyword searches and academic judgement 
by the members of the team. While identifying the final set of papers to be included and 
covered in the report, we focused in particular on the most recent papers and papers not 
included in prior surveys of literature on the related topics. 
 
Finally, we made a relatively small number of additions to the list of papers covered in this 
report (less than 10% of the total) by using papers not picked up by the automated searches 
discussed above, to reach the final sample of 538 papers covered in this report. The most 
common sources of these additions are as follows. 
 
• “Snowballing”, i.e. additions to the list based on reading of the papers identified by 
automated searches; 
 
• Seminal papers in the field, often pre-dating our sampling window; 
 
• Some high-quality working papers of high relevance included based on our 
academic judgement; 
 
• Published papers of relevance not picked up by automated keyword searches but 




Following discussions between the team preparing the report and the FRC, a number of 
exclusions, both in terms of topics and sources, were agreed in order to assure viability of the 
project within the agreed timeframe and its alignment with the FRC’s goals for the project. 
These include the following: 
 
• exclusion of the literature on economic and regulatory determinants of reporting 
choices (for instance, accounting standards for the former and capital market 
determinants of earnings management for the latter), unless relevant for other aims 
of the FRC project; 
 
• exclusion of the literature discussing information needs and usage of corporate 
reporting by regulators, in particular in enforcement actions by regulators or by the 
State (e.g. SEC enforcement); 
 
• exclusion of the discussion of the literature on the use of corporate reporting by 
auditors; 
 
• exclusion of the details of the implementation of some accounting standards (e.g. 
IFRS); 
 
• focussing only on publicly listed companies (thus excluding private firms, charities, 
public sector bodies, etc.); 
 
• focussing only on studies relevant for well-developed markets (thus, in particular, 
excluding a number of studies on emerging economies deemed irrelevant for the 
goals of the project); 
 
• focussing on periodic and structured corporate reporting only, as defined above (thus 
excluding discussion of other corporate disclosure channels such as conference 
calls, companies’ websites and social media; 
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• focussing only on published and forthcoming English-language academic papers 
only, thus excluding most of the academic working papers (see above, however) and 






Chartered Association of Business Schools (2018). Academic Journal Guide. Online publication. 
https://charteredabs.org/academic-journal-guide-2018/ 
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Glossary & Acronyms 
10-K: The 10-K is a report filed annually by US public companies about their financial 
performance, submitted to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
 
10-Q: The 10-Q is a report filed quarterly by US public companies about their financial 
performance, submitted to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, submitted to the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission, disclosing the financial performance of a US public 
listed company. 
 
20-F: The 20-F is a form, submitted to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, 
containing the annual report and financials of a foreign company with shares listed on a stock 
exchange in the US. 
 
CAPM: The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is used to describe the relationship between 
systematic risk and the expected return of a security. 
 
CDS: The credit default swap (CDS) is a financial contract that pays out in the event of a 
default of a bond issuing company the risk of a default by a bond issuing company (debtor). 
 
CEO: A chief executive officer (CEO) is the senior executive responsible for a company’s 
overall operations and performance. 
 
CFO: A chief financial officer (CFO) is the senior executive responsible for managing a 
company’s financial performance. 
 
CSR: Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a term used to describe a company’s 
consideration of, and response to, the expectations and concerns of wider society. 
 
Dodd-Frank: Dodd-Frank, otherwise known as The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, is a US federal law that places strict regulations on the financial 
industry in an attempt to protect consumers and prevent an economic recession similar to that 
of the financial crisis of 2008. 
 
EDGAR (SEC EDGAR): The electronic data gathering, analysis and retrieval (EDGAR) 
system is a public database displaying information submitted by foreign and US based 
companies listed on US markets, to the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
EPS: Earnings per share (EPS), also known as net income per share, is a metric that reflects 
the income earned by each share of stock outstanding. 
 
ESG: Environmental, social and governance (ESG) refers to a wider set of non-financial 
criteria used to evaluate a company. 
 
FASB: The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is an independent institution whose 
primary goal is to establish and improve generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for 
use by US public companies. 
 
FD: Regulation fair disclosure (Reg FD, or FD) is a rule, passed by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, that prevents a US publicly traded company from selectively 
disclosing important information. 
 
FOG Index: The FOG Index is a statistical formula that provides a numerical output 
representing the readability of a given item of text. 
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FRC: The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is the independent regulator responsible for the 
regulation of auditors, accountants and actuaries in the UK and Ireland. It sets standards and 
provides guidance in the areas of accounting standards, auditing standards, corporate 
governance and stewardship. 
 
GAAP: Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are a collection of commonly 
followed accounting rules and standards for financial reporting. 
 
GHG: Greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting refers to the reporting and measurement of 
greenhouse gas emissions produced by a company’s activities. 
 
GRI: The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an independent institution that aims to develop 
and disseminate global sustainability reporting guidelines to help organisations report 
information on the economic, social and environmental dimensions of their activities 
 
IAS: International accounting standards (IAS), established by the International Accounting 
Standards Committee in 1973, are a collection of global accounting standards designed to 
facilitate the cross-country comparison of company reports. 
 
IASB: The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is an independent institution that 
aims to develop and approve international financial reporting standards (IFRS). 
 
ICAEW: The Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAS) is a global 
professional body of chartered accountants, it acts as a regulator, educator and thought 
leader. 
 
ICAS: The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) is a global professional body 
of chartered accountants, it acts as a regulator, educator and thought leader. 
 
IFRS: International financial reporting standards (IFRS) are a collection of global accounting 
standards that are issued by the International Accounting Standards Board. 
 
IR: Integrated reporting (IR, or <IR>) is a reporting framework issued by the International 
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) that aims to communicate a company’s short, medium 
and long-term value creation through the concise disclosure of a company’s strategy, 
governance, performance and prospects. 
 
KPI: A key performance indicator (KPI) is a measurement used to monitor the progress of an 
entity in reaching its targets. 
 
LIBOR: The London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) was a widely used benchmark for short- 
term interest rates, it reflects the average interest rate at which global banks can borrow from 
each other (to be phased out and replaced by the Sterling Over Night Index Average (SONIA)). 
 
MD&A: Management discussion and analysis (MD&A) is a section of a US company’s report 
in which management provide a narrative explanation of financial statements and other 
statistical data that relates to a company’s performance. 
 
MF: Management earnings forecasts (MF, or MEF) are voluntary disclosures, completed by 
members of management, detailing the expected earnings of a company (equivalent to a profit 
forecast). 
 
NED: A non-executive director (NED) is a member of a company’s board who is not part of 
the executive team. 
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NFD: The Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD) is an EU law that requires large public 
interest entities to disclose non-financial and diversity information. 
 
NFR: Non-financial reporting (NFR) refers to a company’s disclosure of social, environmental 
and corporate governance information. 
 
NGO: A non-governmental organisation (NGO) is a non-profit, citizens’ group that functions 
independently of the government on a local, national or international level. 
 
PEAD: Post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is a tendency for a company’s cumulative 
abnormal returns (i.e., abnormal profits generated by stock) to drift for several weeks, or even 
several months, following a positive earnings announcement. 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a US federal law –created in response to 
high-profile company scandals, such as Enron - that outlined new and enhanced standards 
for US public listed company boards, as well as management and public accounting firms. 
 
SASB: The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) is an independent institution 
whose aim is to develop and disseminate industry specific sustainability accounting standards 
that help organisations communicate information on environmental, social, human capital and 
corporate governance topics. 
 
SEC: The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is an independent federal 
government agency responsible for protecting investors, maintaining markets, and facilitating 
capital formation. 
 
Section 302 (of Sarbanes-Oxley Act): Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley act states that the 
CEO and CFO of a company are directly responsible for the accuracy, documentation and 
submission of company filings, such as financial reports, to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
 
SER: Social and environmental reporting (SER) refers to any financial or non-financial 
disclosure made by a company on the social and environmental impact of their activities. 
 
SFAS 131: Statement of financial accounting standards (SFAS) 131, published by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, establishes standards for the way that public listed 
companies report information about operating segments when using US GAAP in financial 
reports. 
 
SUE: Standardised earnings surprise (SUE) is the difference between the reported earnings 
and expected earnings of an entity, divided by the deviation of unexpected earnings of an 
entity. 
 
XBRL: Extensible business reporting framework (XBRL) is a software standard which enables 
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